Gideon_Welles

$4.50

CIVIL WAR
RECONSTRUCTION

selected essays by
GIDEON WELLES

Compiled with an introduction

by Albert Mordell
Preface by H. L. Trefousse

Over the period from 1870 to 1878,
Gideon Welles, Lincoln s Secretary of the
Navy, wrote a number of articles which
appeared in The Galaxy and the Atlan
tic Monthly. Welles was disturbed by
various charges made against Lincoln,
his administration, and their policies and
procedure during the Civil War and Re
construction, and began this series of
essays with the intention of setting
the record straight. As time went on,
however, Welles expanded the scope of
his essays; as they became more general,
the public was afforded its first glimpse
into the actual inside operation of Abra
ham Lincoln s administration.

The essays concentrate upon some of
the most dramatic events of the war. How
did Lincoln arrive at the fateful decision
to relieve Fort Sumter? Who was re
sponsible for the planning and execution
of the expedition against New Orleans?
Why did the President decide to issue the
famous Emancipation Proclamation? How
was his decision to free the slaves re
ceived by the Cabinet? How did Lincoln
overcome the radical opposition to his
renomination and how did the break be
tween Johnson and his opponents origi
nate?

(continued on back flap)

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Selected essays

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Owl .War irf "t^constr uction

Selected Essays by

Gideon Welles

Civil War

and

Reconstruction

Compiled by

ALBERT MORDELL

TWAYNE PUBLISHERS

New York

Copyright 1959, by Albert Mordell, Editor

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 59-8383

DESIGNED BY I, FBEDEBICK DODXJCK

MANOTACTUBED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY

UNITED PRINTING SERVICES, INC.

NEW HAVEN, CONN.

v ; PREFACE

It is fortunate that the members of Abraham Lincoln s
administration were among the most literate cabinet ministers
in our history. Deeply conscious of the importance of the un
precedented events in which they were playing such an im
portant role, they sought to justify their actions to posterity
in the publications they left behind. These diaries, books, and
articles tended to reflect faithfully those violent clashes of
personality and policy which form so important a background
for the study of the Civil War.

One of the most prolific of the writers in Lincoln s cabinet
was the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles. Best known for
his three-volume diary which was published in the beginning
of the twentieth century, he set forth many of his impressions
long before, when he wrote a series of essays for The Galaxy
and Atlantic Monthly magazines in the 1870 s. At first, he
merely sought to correct a number of errors which he had
detected in the writings of others, chiefly Thurlow Weed s
Autobiography and Horace Greeley s American Conflict. As
time went on, however, he expanded his scope. Over a period
of eight years, his essays tended to become more general and
the public was afforded one of its first inside glimpses of the
trials and tribulations of Abraham Lincoln s administration.
Since his diary was available to Welles when he wrote the
articles, his assertions were not based on memory alone, and
their accuracy has generally stood the test of time. Invaluable
as a supplement to the diary, which they round out in many
particulars, the essays have become an important source for the
history of the Civil War. Here, for the first time, they have
been collected for the interested reader.

Gideon Welles was a Jacksonian Democrat from Connecticut
who turned Republican when he became disgusted with his
party s pro-slavery bias after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska
Act in 1854. Taken into Lincoln s cabinet to give recognition
to the many former Democrats who had voted for the Presi
dent, Welles was opposed equally to extreme Southern theories

6 Civil War and Reconstruction

of secession and what he called radical Northern tendencies
toward centralization. Earlier than most o his colleagues, he
recognized the greatness of his chief, many of whose ideas he
shared, and he observed carefully the masterful way in which
Abraham Lincoln, the prairie lawyer, emerged triumphant over
a host of enemies both inside and outside of the party.

What makes these essays so interesting is their concentration
on some of the most dramatic events of the war. How did
Lincoln arrive at the fateful decision to relieve Fort Sumter?
What measures did the Navy Department take to hold Fort
Kckens? Who was responsible for the planning and execution
of the expedition against New Orleans? Why did the President
decide to issue the Emancipation Proclamation? How was his
decision to free the slaves in rebellious areas received by the
Cabinet? How did Lincoln overcome the radical opposition to
his renomination and how did the break between Johnson and
Ms opponents originate? The answers to these questions con
stitute the theme of Secretary Welles* essays.

One of the main purposes to the articles was Welles desire
to repel accusations made against him during the Civil War.
That he and not the Secretary of State, William H. Seward,
appreciated the administration s decision to relieve Forts Sum-
tor and Pickens, that the navy and not the army made possible
the success of many amphibious operations were facts which he
was anxious to place before the public. A hardworking and
capable executive, he resented intimations that he had been
a mere figurehead too ponderous to get anything done. In
reality, his enterprise and skill transformed the Navy Depart
ment and the fleet into important instruments of victory. There
fore, it is easy to understand that he sought to counteract the
excessive publicity given to the War Department and to the
army* and in these pages, he accomplished his purpose. He had
tfee facts; he marshalled them well, and ,the reader cannot help
atairing the ptack of the Connecticut journalist who became
Itead of the wartime 1 navy.

Since Welles t>ublkhed these essays in eighteen separate
fcctidea spread over a .period of eight years, from 1870 to 1878,
hfe account might seem disjointed. In reality, however, it forms

Preface 7

a coherent whole. Two themes run through the entire series:
The greatness of Abraham Lincoln and the dangers of centraliza
tion. That the President knew just when to issue his Emancipa
tion Proclamation, that he approached the problem of the
relief of Fort Sumter in a masterful fashion, and that he sought
to reconstruct the Union without further centralization im
pressed Welles tremendously. In these pages, the Secretary of
the Navy made it quite clear that Lincoln, and not Seward,
was the real leader of the embattled nation. Welles, the Jack-
sonian Democrat, had found a new hero. If he overemphasized
his colleagues shortcomings at times, if he failed to appreciate
the arguments of the other side, we can forgive him. He was
merely trying to protect his hero. And he could not have picked
a greater man.

Taken as a whole, these essays so conveniently compiled by
Mr. Mordell, and presented in two volumes, constitute the Civil
War memoirs of the one cabinet member who was among Presi
dent Lincoln s closest supporters. It is fortunate that they were
done so well.

HANS Louis TREFOUSSE

CONTENTS

Chapter Page

INTRODUCTION 11

1. MR. WELLES IN ANSWER TO MR. WEED
The Facts of the Abandonment of the Gosport
Navy-Yard

The Galaxy, X (July, 1870) 15

2. FORT SUMTER

Facts in Relation to the Expedition Ordered by the
Administration of President Lincoln for the Relief
of the Garrison in Fort Sumter
The Galaxy, X (November, 1870) 36

3. FORT PICKENS

Facts in Relation to the Reinforcement of Fort

Pickens, in the Spring of 1861

The Galaxy, XI (January, 1871) 83

4. ADMIRAL FARRAGUT AND NEW ORLEANS
With an Account of the Origin and Command of the
First Three Naval Expeditions of the War, Part One
The Galaxy, XII (November, 1871) 114

5. ADMIRAL FARRAGUT AND NEW ORLEANS

With an Account of the Origin and Command of the
First Three Naval Expeditions of the War, Part Two
The Galaxy, XII (December, 1871) 145

6. LINCOLN AND JOHNSON

Their Plan of Reconstruction and the Resumption

of National Authority, Part One

The Galaxy, XIII (April, 1872) 180

7. LINCOLN AND JOHNSON

Their Plan of Reconstruction and the Resumption

of National Authority, Part Two

The Galaxy, XIII (May, 1872) 205

8. THE HISTORY OF EMANCIPATION

The Galaxy, XIV (December, 1872) 228

9. THE CAPTURE AND RELEASE OF MASON
AND SLIDELL

The Galaxy, XV (May, 1873) 256

INTRODUCTION

In 191 1, a diary kept by Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy
In both Lincoln s and Johnson s administrations, was published
in three volumes. It had a literary flair, set forth portraits of
notables like a novel, and maintained points of view that have
been part and parcel of those held by subsequent historians. (The
keeping of diaries by cabinet members was not a new practice.)
Its fame is second only to that of the diaries of John Quincy
Adams, Secretary of State under Monroe. There had also been
literary men in cabinets before Welles: novelists like John P. Ken
nedy and James K. Paulding, and historians like George Bancroft.
Welles, however, was not exactly a literary man; he was a
journalist and an owner and editor of newspapers.

It is amusing to recall some mild controversies of the 1830 s
that Welles, a Jackson supporter and editor of the Hartford
Times, had with the youthful Whittier, then editor of another
Hartford paper, the New England Review, and an anti-Jackson
man. Once, when Welles copied an editorial of Whittier s on
dreams without indicating the source, Whittier called attention
to the lapse in not giving him credit, adding: "Dreams are not
always in the market, but we should think the said editor suffi
ciently a dreamer, and his faculties sufficient somniferous to
manufacture his own night visions." However, they later saw
eye to eye on several matters, namely, the abolition of imprison
ment for debt and a hatred of slavery. When the Republican
Party was founded in the early fifties, both joined it.

After Welles retired from Johnson s cabinet, he wrote a num
ber of articles for the Galaxy and the Atlantic Monthly from
1870 to 1878, in which year he died at the age of seventy-six.
Richard West, Jr., who has written the only life of Welles, an
excellent work, states that the chief motive in writing these arti
cles was to correct mistaken views held by contemporary his
torians. Howard K. Beale, in his article on Welles in the Dic
tionary of American Biography, calls the Galaxy articles "impor
tant historical documents." In 1874, Welles published in book

11

12 Civil War and Reconstruction

form an article dealing with Lincoln and Seward that had ap
peared in three issues of the Galaxy. The book amplified the
original articles, and the subtitle tells its story: "Remarks upon
the Memorial address of Chas. Francis Adams, on the late W. H.
Seward, With Incidents and Comments Illustrative of the Meas
ures and Policy of the Administration of Abraham Lincoln and
Views as to the Relative Positions of the Late President and
Secretary of State/ Welles forever scotched the legend that Sew
ard was the brains of the administration.

These articles give us an insight into the workings of the
cabinet, into naval operations, and, above all, lead to a correct
appraisal of Lincoln s procedure. Posterity has endorsed most
of Welles s views. On President Johnson s conciliatory attitude
toward the late "rebels" and the right of the President to dismiss
a member of his cabinet, controversial subjects for many years,
Welles has been proven correct: he supported Johnson s position
and stood out against the radical Republicans who then wielded
power.

It is not within my province to set forth the great accom
plishments of Welles as Secretary of the Navy. He saw the value
of John Ericsson s plans for the Monitor; he showed good judg
ment in selecting David Farragut, over higher ranking officers,
for the expedition against New Orleans. In his article on the
subject, he states that he chose Farragut because he was loyal to
the Union. Welles was not in a position to recount the struggles
and difficulties that Farragut underwent with his personal
friends, fellow officers in the Navy, who resigned. One of the
last of such encounters was with Arthur Sinclair, grandfather
of Upton Sinclair. Sinclair subsequently had charge of the build
ing of the iron-clad Mississippi, intended to meet Farragut at
the battle of New Orleans, but burned while still unfinished.
(The present writer has given a full account of the crisis in
Farragut s life in his article, "Farragut at the Crossroads," United
State Naval Proceedings, February, 1931, pp. 151-61.)

As the centenary of the Civil War approaches, these articles
increase in importance. Although Welles was Secretary of the
Navy, he does not devote all the articles to naval matters. He
had had nearly twenty-five years of political experience, first

Introduction 1$

holding office as a member of the House of Representatives In
Connecticut in 1827. He held various other offices, having been
State Comptroller and Chief of the Bureau of Provisions and
Clothing in the Navy Department, candidate for governor in
1856, and delegate to the Republican conventions of 1856 and
1860, Hence, he was equipped to pass judgment upon the policies
of Lincoln s and Johnson s administrations, and to expatiate on
the presidential campaigns of 1860 and 1864.

Above all, he saw Lincoln s greatness when he had been most
criticized. Posterity has accepted his verdict on Lincoln. It has,
more or less unanimously, admitted the validity of his criticisms
of phases in the careers of Seward, Stanton, Chase, Sumner and
Grant as a politician, and he is just in his comments on some
naval officers and generals.

Besides writing a Preface, Hans Louis Trefousse has supplied
the brief introductory informative notes to the articles in this
book.

ALBERT MORDELL
Philadelphia

Mr. Welles in Answer to Mr. Weed

THE FACTS OF THE ABANDONMENT OF THE
GOSPORT NAVY YARD

The Gosport Navy Yard in Norfolk, Virginia, was one
of the most important Federal naval installations south
of the Potomac. When the Confederates captured it
in 1861, they also seized the partially submerged hulk
of the U.S.S. Merrimack, a disaster which was keenly
felt in the North. Thurlow Weed, the New York politi
cian and close confidant of Secretary of State William
H. Seward, later intimated in his autobiography that
Gideon Welles had not shown sufficient energy in 1861,
when warned about the dangers threatening Federal
ships at Norfolk. To refute these allegations, Welles
prepared his first article for Galaxy.

i

N THE GALAXY for June there was published a chapter
from the autobiography of Mr. Thurlow Weed, which contains,
with a vast amount of egotism some facts perverted, and no little
fiction. The author has a very fertile recollection, a prodigiously
prolific memory, and in his conceits and details he remembers,
and relates with a minuteness that is wonderful, events that never
took place, or which occurred under circumstances widely dif
ferent from his narration of them.

This chapter of the autobiography commences with an ac
count of two visits which were made to Washington in March
and April, 1861-an interesting period of our history, Mr. Weed
describes not only his observations, but the vigilant supervision

The Galaxy, X (July, 1870).

15

16 Civil War and Reconstruction

which he exercised over the Government, and the admonitions,
promptings, and instructions which he kindly administered to
the President and various Departments. It is pleasant to read
the incidents he relates. It is still more pleasant to witness the
self-satisfied complacency and the modest and unaffected self-
conceit which crop out in almost every sentence. That the auto-
biographer was as officious and intrusive as he states, perhaps
without any intention of being impertinent, is altogether prob
able. Unfortunately for the accuracy of his memory and the
truthfulness of his statements, many of his reminiscences are
inconsistent with facts. The two opening paragraphs will bear
republication. Mr. Weed says:

The first and only inauguration I ever attended was
that of Mr. Lincoln in 1861. It was known that designs
upon his life while on his way from Springfield to Wash
ington were providentially averted. It was also known that
the question of seizing upon the government and its ar
chives had been contemplated. The few troops in Washing
ton were therefore stationed around the Capitol. During
the ceremony of inauguration I walked about the grounds,
encountering Major-General Wool, with a detachment of
United States troops ready for action, and two pieces of
cannon posted so as to rake an important avenue. I soon
after found Lieutenant-General Scott, with the same num
ber of cannon (on one of which the veteran was resting
his elbow), posted in an equally advantageous position.
This, in a country so long exempted from serious internal
collisions, occasioned painful reflections. General Scott as
sured me that these precautions were not unnecessary, and
that they had not been taken a moment too early. All,
however, passed without either an attack or an alarm. But
it was not long before unequivocal symptoms of rebellion
were manifested. When in Washington a few days after
ward, I was awakened early one morning by Horace H.
Riddell, formerly a resident of and representative from
Alleghany county, N. Y., but then living at Harper s Ferry,
who informed me that unless immediately reinforced the
arsenal and armory at that place would be attacked and
taken by enemies of the Government, who were banding

Mr. Welles in Answer to Mr. Weed 17

together for that purpose; adding that there was not an
hour to lose. I went immediately to the Secretary of War
with this information. He thought -the danger could not
be so imminent, but said that the subject should have im
mediate attention. I went from the Secretary of War to
General Scott, who promptly said that my information was
confirmatory of that which he had received the evening
previous. "But," he added, "what can I do? My effective
force, all told, for the defence of the capital, is twenty-one
hundred. Washington is as much in danger as Harper s
Ferry. I shall repel any attack upon this city, but I cannot
hazard the capital of the Union, as I should do by dividing
my force, even to save Harper s Ferry." My friend Riddell s
information was but too reliable. The next day brought
us intelligence of the loss of Harper s Ferry.

Soon ofter this, our first taste of rebellion, I received in
formation from an equally reliable source that Gosport,
with its vast supply of munitions of war, was in danger.
Of this I informed the Secretary of the Navy at the break
fast table of Willard s Hotel. Believing from his manner
that he attached but little importance to my information,
I reiterated it with emphasis, assuring him that it would be
occasion for deep regret if Gosport were not immediately
strengthened. Meeting the Secretary at dinner the same day,
I renewed the conversation, and was informed that the
matter would be attended to. This did not quiet my solici
tude, and leaving the Secretary to the placid enjoyment of
his dinner, I repaired to the White House. Mr. Lincoln,
however, had driven out to visit some fortifications. I made
another attempt in the evening to see him, but he was again
out. Early the next morning, however, I found him, and
informed him what I had heard of the danger that threat
ened Gosport, and how, as I feared, I had failed to impress
the Secretary of the Navy with the accuracy of my informa
tion or the necessity of immediate action. "Well," said Mr.
Lincoln, "we can t afford to lose all those cannon; I ll go
and see Father Welles myself," as he did immediately. The
result was that Admiral Paulding, who was then despatched
to Norfolk, arrived just in time to enjoy an illumination
occasioned by the burning of Government property, and
witness the capture of Gosport.

18 Civil War and Reconstruction

I do not affect to misunderstand the scope and purpose of
the allusions to myself, nor the impressions which the auto-
biographer seeks to convey. They are in character and keeping
with years of misrepresentation in relation to the abandonment
of the navy-yard at Norfolk, and other events by which the
administration of the Navy Department was for years maligned
and wronged. This detraction and these slanders, covertly made,
I wasted no time to correct, when employed in duties which
demanded all my atention. Nor should I now notice them but
for certain associations of the autobiographer, nor have given
them a thought if they had been repeated by any anonymous
defamer. Time and truth will dissipate the errors which have
been industriously and insidiously sown some of which pervade
the pages of what purport to be histories of the civil war and
the two last administrations.

Dates are important in developing history, and are some
times essential to verify statements and facts. The arsenal and
armory at Harper s Ferry were destroyed and the place was
abandoned on the evening of the 8th of April, 1861. The navy-
yard at Norfolk, as it is familiarly called, but correctly speaking,
Gosport, was abandoned on the night of the 20th.

Commodore Paulding testified before the Congressional Com
mittee, who inquired into and reported upon the subject of
"the destruction of the property of the United States at the
navy-yard in Norfolk, and the armory at Harper s Ferry," as
follows:

I was sent to Norfolk on the 16th of April, 1861. Under
verbal orders of the Secretary of the Navy, left the Navy
Department that evening and arrived at Norfolk the fol
lowing afternoon, conveying despatches to Commodore Mc-
Cauley, and with directions from .the Secretary of the Navy
to confer with him and Commodore Pendergast with refer
ence to the safety of the public property at the Norfolk
Navy-yard. I performed that duty, and left Norfolk in the
Baltimore boat on the afternoon of the 17th of April.

He further testifies that he returned and reported to me,
and that immediately after,

Mr. Welles in Answer to Mr. Weed 19

On the afternoon of April 18th, I received from the
Secretary of the Navy instructions to proceed to Norfolk
with the Pawnee. I left Washington on the evening of the
19th of April in the Pawnee, and arrived at Fortress Monroe
on the following day at about four o clock.

Mr. Weed says, after his friend Riddell awakened him early
one morning:

The next day brought us intelligence of the loss of Har
per s Ferry. Soon after this, our first taste of rebellion, I
received information from an equally reliable source that
Gosport, with its vast supply of munitions of war, was in
danger. Of this I informed the Secretary of the Navy at the
breakfast table of Willard s Hotel. Believing from his
manner that he attached but little importance to my infor
mation, I reiterated it with emphasis, etc.

This interview, if it ever took place, of which, however, I
have no recollection, must have been on the morning of the
19th, succeeding the adandonment of Harper s Ferry, which
was on the 18th of April. When, therefore, Mr. Weed came to
me with his "reliable information," which was no news to me,
whatever it may have been to him, my "manner" did not indi
cate excitement or sensational alarm. I heard his story, and its
reiteration with emphasis, calmly and, I trust, respectfully; for
I knew, what he did not know, that Commodore Paulding had
at that moment my orders in his pocket, directing him to pro
ceed to Norfolk, investing him with full power to protect the
public property, and that he had been and was then collecting
his forces to proceed as soon as his vessel and men could be got
ready for the service. These facts I did not communicate to
Mr. Weed, although he had given me what information he
possessed.

The President, on whom Mr. Weed represents he called
with his information, was cognizant of these facts, and appears
to have been equally uncommunicative, and, in order to rid
himself of an inquisitive and perhaps troublesome gentleman
who had no information to impart, dismissed him with the

20 Civil War and Reconstruction

remark that he would see me. In point of fact, .the President
and myself had been two or three times in consultation the
preceding day one a very lengthened interview with General
Scotton the subject of the danger and defences of Norfolk
Navy-yard.

These frequent interviews were necessary in consequence of
the avalanche of duties and difficulties that were precipitated
upon us in that eventful week, which commenced with the fall
of Sumter and the issuing of the proclamation calling for troops;
but was especially necessary on the 18th, from the fact that
Chief Engineer Isherwood had arrived on the morning of that
day, and reported the strange and unaccountable conduct of
Commodore McCauley, and the unfortunate condition of affairs
at the yard under his command. Immediately on receiving this
report, I went with the President to General Scott with a view
of getting a military force and a competent military officer to
defend the station. I had some time previously had interviews
with General Scott on this subject, who uniformly said, as he
now repeated, that he would send troops for the shore defence,
as was his duty, if he had them. But Congress had provided
neither men nor means for -this great and terrible crisis. On
this occasion he bewailed the necessity which compelled him to
leave Harper s Ferry and its armory and arms to destruction
a military station in which his duty and his honor as the head
of the army were concerned; but he had no men to send for
their protection, and the Massachusetts volunteers, who were
directed to report there and at Fortress Monroe, had none of
them arrived. The property there and at the navy-yard must,
he said, be sacrificed.

Mr. Weed says he "repaired to the White House" after see
ing me. Mr. Lincoln, however, had driven out to visit some
fortifications. There were, unfortunately for the autobiography,
no fortifications about Washington at that time for the Presi
dent to drive out and visit. Mr. Weed remembers too much,
an unhappy infirmity with which he is sadly afflicted. As the
President was "out," he called "early the next morning," the
20th, "stated the danger that threatened Gosport, and how, as
I feared, I had failed -to impress the Secretary of the Navy with

Mr. Welles in Answer to Mr. Weed 21

the accuracy of my information or the necessity of immediate
action." Commodore Paulding quietly left Washington in the
Pawnee on the evening of the 19th, and was well on his way to
Norfolk when this interview with the President purports to have
taken place. I know not that the President was at that time
aware of this fact, but he was fully conversant with all of the
attending circumstances, at the same time knowing that special
injunctions were imposed to give no publicity to the movement.
He must have been amused when Mr. Weed related his inter
view with me, my manner, and his fears that he had failed to
impress me. The President on his part was reticent as myself;
but allowed the author of the autobiography to cheer himself
with the belief that he had impressed -the President, if he had
failed with the Secretary of the Navy, by an assurance that we
could not afford to lose all those cannon, and he would "see
Father Welles/

The appellation "Father Welles" was at a later period often
applied to me by naval officers, sailors, and others, but not at
that early period of the administration, and never, that I am
aware of, by President Lincoln. Nor would he then or at any
time, be likely to use the expression as regards myself, when
three of the members of the Cabinet Messrs. Bates, Cameron,
and Seward were my seniors. The term was sometimes kindly
and affectionately applied by him to Attorney-General Bates,
the eldest of his political family, for whom he had a tender
regard. The remark which is quoted in the autobiography may
have been made by the President; but it is more likely to be the
offspring of that prolific and fertile memory to which I have
adverted, which could recollect details that never took place,
and manufacture facts with facility for any emergency.

Mr. Riddell may have awakened Mr. Weed "early one morn
ing/ and he may have gone immediately to Secretary Cameron
with tidings that Harper s Ferry was in danger; but in doing so
he communicated no more information than when he told the
Secretary of the Navy that Gosport was in danger. Mr. Cameron,
like the Secretary of the Navy, was not as much excited as Mr.
Weed expected he would be. He therefore went to General
Scott, who "promptly said -that my information was confirmatory

22 Civil War and Reconstruction

of that which he had received the previous evening/ Each of
the Secretaries might with a truth have given him the same
answer as General Scott, for he told them nothing new. The
-truth is, the Government had other, earlier, and more authentic
sources of information than Mr. Weed. The information which
the Departments received did not always come through him,
strange as it may seem to him, and to those who read and credit
the pages of his autobiography. Despatches sometimes reached
the Secretaries direct, without passing under his inspection, or
through his hands, and there were, as he well knows, depart
ments of the government which never made him their confidant.
I do not question that he was as active, as officious, and as in
trusive as he describes; but he was of vastly less consequence
than his imagination led him to suppose. In the matter of the
autobiography, due allowance must be made for one who is the
hero of his own story, and a mind never endowed with a very
scrupulous regard for facts in a partisan practice of half a
century of fierce and reckless party warfare.

I had not, as already stated, during the eventful years of the
war, the leisure to correct the errors and misrepresentations
which were made by unscrupulous partisans, some of which have
been, in ignorance of the facts, incorporated into what purport
to be the histories of those times.

This occasion is not inappropriate to bring out the facts in
relation to the condition and capture of the navy-yard at Nor
folk, the policy of the Government, the course which the Ad
ministration pursued, and the attending circumstances, all of
which have been much misrepresented and only imperfectly
understood.

At the time of Mr. Lincoln s inauguration, and for several
weeks thereafter, he and others indulged the hope of a peaceful
solution of the pending questions, and a desire, amounting
almost to a belief, that Virginia and the other border States
might, by forbearance and a calm and conciliatory policy, con
tinue faithful to the Union. Two-thirds of the Convention then
in session at Richmond were elected as opponents of secession,
and the people of that State were in about that proportion op
posed to it. But the Union element, in the Convention and out

Mr. Welles in Answer to Mr. Weed 23

of it, was passive and acquiescent, while the secessionists were
positive, aggressive, and violent; and, as is almost always the
case in revolutionary times, the aggressive force continually in
creased in strength and exactions at the expense of those who
were peacefully inclined. It was charged that the new Adminis
tration was inimical to the South, was hostile to Southern insti
tutions, and would use its power to deprive the people and
States of their rights by coercive measures. In order to counter
act these unfounded prejudices and to do away with these
misrepresentations, which were embarrassing to the Adminis
tration just launched upon a turbulent sea, and to conciliate
and satisfy the people of Virginia and the Convention then in
session, the President desired that there should be no step taken
which would give offence; and, to prevent any cause of irrita
tion, he desired that not even the ordinary local political changes,
which are usual on a change of administration, should be made.
In regard to the navy-yard at Norfolk, he was particularly
solicitous that there should be no action taken which would
indicate a want of confidence in the authorities and people, or
which would be likely -to beget distrust. No ships were to be
withdrawn, no fortifications erected. We had reports from that
station and from others that there were ardent secessionists
among the civil and naval officers, and assurances, on the other
hand, that most of them were patriotic and supporters of the
Union. It was difficult, there and elsewhere, to distinguish be
tween the true and the disaffected officers of the service. Some
had already sent in their resignations; others, it was understood,
proposed to do so if any conflict took place between the State
and Federal Governments; and there were many who occupied
an equivocal and doubtful position. Among those who hesitated
to avow themselves on either side, and were undetermined how
to act, were officers who subsequently took a firm stand and
rendered gallant service in the war which followed.

Commodore McCauley, who was in command of the Norfolk
yard, I had personally known in former years, and esteemed as
a worthy and estimable officer. His reputation as a Union man
in 1861 was good, and all my inquiries in relation to him were
satisfactorily answered. His patriotism and fidelity were beyond

24 Civil War and Reconstruction

doubt; but events proved that he was unequal to the position
he occupied in that emergency.

Commodore Alden, whom I sent to Norfolk in special trust
on the llth of April, with orders to take command of and bring
out the Memmack, but who was prevented by Commodore
McCauley, wrote me the succeeding November, six months after
the abandonment of the navy-yard, in regard to Commodore
McCauley:

I believe, indeed I know, that the old hero who has
fought so well for his country could have none but the best
and purest motives in all he did; but he was surrounded
by masked traitors whom he did not suspect, and in whose
advice he thought there was safety. The cry, too, was raised,
and in everybody s mouth, officers and all, "If they move
that ship, the Merrimack, it will bring on a collision with
the people outside, who are all ready, if anything of the
kind is done, to take the yard." Besides, Commodore Pauld-
ing, whom I accompanied to Norfolk, expressed the idea
that if we could not do anything better, she (the Merri
mack), with her guns on board, would make a good battery
for the defence of the yard. This opinion influenced Com
modore McCauley not a little.

If Commodore McCauley had not the activity and energy
which were essential to a revolutionary period, he was an old
trusted officer, who had not served out one-third his term as
commandant of the station. To remove him would have neces
sitated extensive changes, involving an entire reorganization of
the government of the yard, and consequently a departure from
the President s policy of permitting things to continue undis
turbed in Virginia. Whatever negotiations, complications, or
correspondence were going forward at that period to insure
harmony and peace, though connected more or less with the
occurrences here related, need not be now detailed. It is suf
ficient to say that no military force was ordered to Norfolk;
no fortifications were erected for the defence of the navy-yard;
a passive course was enjoined upon the Navy Department, and
the military also, in relation to that station. A large amount

Mr. Welles in Answer to Mr. Weed 25

of property had been accumulated at the navy-yard, and a
number of vessels were then in a dismantled condition, without
armament or crews. To attempt to refit them or put them in
condition to be removed, or to remove the stores, would, it was
thought, indicate distrust, and give the secessionists an argument
to be used against the Administration, accused of a design to
subjugate and coerce Virginia.

Not until the last of March did the President fully and
finally decide to attempt to relieve Fort Sumter. He never pro
posed or intended to order it to be evacuated; but certain
assurances and committals which had been made embarrassed
him, and a hope that in some way there would be an adjustment
of difficulties without a resort to arms caused him to hesitate,
and delayed his final decision. The condition of that fort and
the garrison had received immediate attention after the inaugu
ration, and the Cabinet was earnest and almost unanimous for
its prompt reinforcement. Numerous consultations were held on
the subject, to some of which Generals Scott and Totten were
invited. The deliberate and united opinion of these officers
was unqualified against any attempt to reinforce or supply the
garrison, which they pronounced utterly impracticable, and
which, if attempted, would result in a failure, with a waste of
blood and treasure.

These arguments, and an elaborate written report which
they submitted by order of the President, had an influence on
him and several of the members of the Cabinet, who felt that
the opinions of military men should have weight on a military
question. It is generally known, however, that one of the mem
bers of the Cabinet had from the first opposed any attempt to
relieve the garrison, and one had been and continued through
out persistent and emphatic in its favor. For some days the
President was undetermined what course to take. Delay was
moreover important until the Administration could get in
working order; but the supplies at Sumter were getting short,
and he finally decided, on the 30th of March, that an effort
should be made to send supplies to the garrison.

The attempt to relieve Major Anderson, though a military
question, was a political necessity. It became a duty of the Gov-

26 Civil War and Reconstruction

ernment after all conciliatory efforts were exhausted. The expedi
tion to supply the garrison was under the direction of the War
Department, in which the navy cooperated. But the whole
combined military and naval force of the Government was feeble.
Congress had adjourned on the 4th of March without making
any provision for increasing the naval strength, although the
danger of a civil war was imminent; no increased appropria
tions were made. The navy was restricted to a strictly peace
establishment, with a force limited by law to eight thousand
five hundred men. But five vessels were in commission in all
our Atlantic ports.

The Navy Department had quietly commenced recruiting,
and on the 29th of March Commodore Breese, then in command
of the Brooklyn Navy-yard, was ordered to send two hundred
and fifty seamen to Norfolk, a vulnerable point if Virginia
should attempt to secede. On the next day, however, the 30th
of March, the President informed me that he had come to the
conclusion that supplies should be sent to Major Anderson, and,
if resistance was made, that the garrison should be reinforced.
To execute, and, if it became necessary, to enforce his orders,
a naval force would be required. As we then had but three
naval steamers that were available two having a few days
previous been sent to the Gulf by special request of General
Scott the Harriet Lane, a revenue cutter, was transferrred by
the Secretary of the Treasury to the navy to form a part of the
expedition. The two hundred and fifty seamen on the receiving-
ship at Brooklyn, whom I had directed on the 29th to be sent
to Norfolk, were transferred to the Powhatan, which was to be
the flag-ship of the squadron. The Pocahontas, one of the
vessels of the Home Squadron, which I had detained and ordered
to Norfolk by way of precaution early in March, was one of the
three vessels temporarily detached and detailed for the expedi^
tion. To supply her place I, on the 30th of March, the day I
received the President s decision, ordered the sloop~of-war Cum
berland, then at Hampton Roads, destined for the West Indies,
to proceed to Norfolk. The Cumberland was a sailing vessel
which could not be made available for the Sumter expedition.

Mr. Welles in Answer to Mr. Weed 27

She was the flag-ship of Commodore Pendergrast, who was in
command of the Home Squadron, and it was a satisfaction that
so experienced an officer could be associated with Commodore
McCauley, with a full crew, in case of an emergency. The Presi
dent and Secretary of State proposed that Commodore Pender
grast should go to Vera Cruz, in consequence of certain complica
tions in that quarter; but the condition of affairs at home made
it advisable that he and his flag-ship should be detained in the
waters of Virginia. With the exception of the Cumberland, the
Sumter expedition took from the Navy Department on the 6th
of April every available naval vessel. It was at this culminating
period that vessels were most wanted in the Chesapeake and
on the Potomac; for, in case of a conflict at Charleston, it was
uncertain what would be the attitude of Virginia. I felt hopeful,
however, that the Cumberland would be adequate for the pro
tection of the yard from any attack by water. The defence by
land was a military measure, in which she could also participate,
and render efficient assistance, if necessary.

There were many circumstances attending the Sumter ex
pedition which are interwoven with this subject, -that are not
generally known; but, as I have said, they belong to the history
of those times. Allusion to some of them cannot be wholly omit
ted in stating the proceedings of the navy and the Navy De
partment, and the policy and acts of the Administration at
tending the destruction of the navy-yard at Norfolk. The men
on the receiving-ship at Brooklyn, whom Commodore Breese
had been directed on the 29th of March to send to Norfolk,
were diverted to that expedition, and placed on the Powhatan.
This important vessel, by an irregular and most extraordinary
proceeding, and against the final and express orders of the Presi
dent, detached from the expedition she was to lead after she
left the Brooklyn Navy-yard, and withdrawn for several weeks,
until after Sumter fell and Norfolk was abandoned, from the
control of the Navy Department, and sent to the Gulf, where
she was not needed, instead of going to Charleston and then
returning North, where she was most wanted.

On the 6th of April every available naval steamer at the

28 Civil War and Reconstruction

disposal of the Department, and all the men excepting those on
the Cumberland, sailed for Sumter. What was to be their re
ception, what would be the determination of the secession or
ganization at Charleston, and what the result of the attempt to
relieve the garrison, were matters uncertain, but of deep anxiety.
In a few days all doubts were removed. The secessionists, on
being apprised of the determination of the Administration, and
of the departure of the expedition, commenced immediate
hostilities. They opened fire on Sumter on the 12th of April,
before the vessels reached Charleston. The fort was evacuated
on the 14th. Three days after the evacuation of Sumter, the
Virginia Convention joined the Confederates. In that period
of uncertainty, while hoping for the best, but in anticipation
of the worst, I wrote Commodore McCauley, in command of the
Norfolk Navy-yard, on the 19th of April, the squadron being
then on its way to Charleston, that, "in view of the peculiar
condition of the country and of events that have already tran
spired, it becomes necessary that great vigilance should be exer
cised in guarding and protecting the public interests and prop
erty committed to your charge. ... If other precautions are
required, you will immediately apprise the Department/

In the same communication he was informed, in view of the
President s policy and the attitude of Virginia, "it is desirable
that there should be no steps taken to give needless alarm; but
it may be best to order most of the shipping to sea or to other
stations"; and he was further directed to "keep the Department
advised of the condition of affairs; of any cause of apprehension,
should any exist."

On the llth of April I directed Commodore Breese to send
two hundred men to Norfolk, if that number had been enlisted.
Commander now Commodore Alden, the present Chief of the
Bureau of Navigation, was ordered on the same day, the llth,
to report to Commodore McCauley, to take charge of the steamer
Merrimack, and deliver her over to the commanding officer at
Philadelphia. Orders were sent to Commodore McCauley at the
same time to have the Merrimack and Plymouth prepared im
mediately for removal, and that there should be no delay. Mr.
Isherwood, Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, was

Mr. Welles in Answer to Mr. Weed 29

directed on the following day, the 12th, to proceed to Norfolk
and give his personal attention to putting the engines of the
Merrimack in working condition.

On the 14th of April Fort Sumter was evacuated, and on the
15th President Lincoln issued his proclamation calling for
seventy-five thousand troops. On the succeeding day the follow
ing letters were sent, respectively, to Commodore McCauley,
commanding the navy-yard, and to Commodore Pendergrast,
commanding the above squadron, by the hands of Commodore
Paulding:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 16, 1861
SIR:

The events which have transpired since my confidential
communication to you of the 10th instant impose additional
vigilance and care in protecting the public property under
your charge, and placing the vessels and stores, if necessary,
beyond jeopardy. Referring to my letter of the 10th, you
will continue to carry out the instructions therein contained.
The Engineer-in-Chief, B. F. Isherwood, who was despatched
to Norfolk to aid in putting the Merrimack in condition to
be moved, reports that she will be ready to take her de
parture on Thursday. It may not be necessary, however, that
she should leave at that time unless there is immediate
danger pending. But no time should be lost in getting her
armament on board; and you will also place the more
valuable public property, ordnance stores, etc., on shipboard,
so that they can at any moment be moved beyond the reach
of seizure. With diligence on your part, it is not anticipated
that any sudden demonstration can be made which will
endanger either the vessels or stores. The Plymouth and
Dolphin should be placed beyond danger f immediate as
sault at once, if possible. The Germantown can receive on
board stores and ordnance from the yard, and be towed out
by the Merrimack if an assault is threatened. Men have been
ordered from New York to man and assist in moving the
vessels; but recent demands have left an insufficient number
to meet the requisition. Under these circumstances, should
it become necessary, Commodore Pendergrast will assist you
with men from the Cumberland. You will please submit this
letter and and my confidential communication of the 10th

30 Civil War and Reconstruction

to Commodore Pendergrast who will assist and cooperate
with you in carrying the views of the Department into
effect. As it is difficult to give instructions in detail, the
Department has thought proper to despatch Commodore
Paulding to Norfolk, who will be the bearer of this com
munication, and explain to yourself and Commodore Pend
ergrast the views and purposes of the Department. You
will be pleased to advise with him freely and fully as to
your duties and the interests of the Government in the
present threatening emergency. The vessels and stores under
your charge you will defend at any hazard, repelling by
force, if necessary, any and all attempts to seize them,
whether by mob violence, organized effort, or any assumed
authority.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours, etc.,

GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy.
Commodore C. S. McCAULEY, Norfolk, Virginia.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 16, 1861
SIR:

A state of things has arisen which renders the immediate
departure of the Cumberland, as originally intended, inex
pedient. Events of recent occurrence, and the threatening
attitude of affairs is some parts of our country, call for the
exercise of great vigilance and energy at Norfolk. Confi
dential communications have been heretofore made to Com
modore McCauley on these subjects, which he will submit
to you; and Commodore Paulding, who brings -this letter
to you, will verbally and more in detail explain the views
of the Department. Please to advise freely and fully with
both these gentlemen, and cooperate with them in defend
ing die vessels and public property at the navy-yard. As
it may become necessary to render assistance from the force
under your command.

Until further orders the departure of the Cumberland
to Vera Cruze will be deferred. In the mean time you will
lend your assistance and that of your command toward the
vessels now in the yard in condition to be moved, placing
the ordnance and ordnance stores on board for moving, and
in case of invasion, insurrection, or violence of any kind, to

Mr. Welles in Answer to Mr. Weed 31

suppress It, repelling assault by force If necessary. The
Cumberland can render effective service, and it is deemed
fortunate that the Government is enabled to avail itself of
your service and that of your command, at this juncture,
at Norfolk.

I am sir respectfully, your obedient servant,

GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy.
Commodore G. J. PENDERGRAST, commanding U. S. sloop
Cumberland, Norfolk Virginia.

Commodore Paulding was at that time attached to the Navy
Department as its detailing officer; and lest there should be
some misapprehension, neglect, or wrong, I gave him verbal
orders to go to Norfolk, personally inspect the condition of the
navy-yard, satisfy himself of the fidelity and vigilance of the
officers and men, and to consult and advise at his discretion
with Commodore McCauley and Pendergrast. Many of the most
important orders given at that early day were verbal, unwritten
instructions, for great infidelity pervaded the departments. Con
fidence was impaired, distrust prevailed, and, when treachery
was so extended and deep, penetrating every branch of the
Government, extreme caution became necessary in regard to
every movement.

Commodore McCauley wrote me on the 16th that the Merri-
mack would probably be ready for temporary service on the
evening of the next day. Commodore Paulding returned on the
17th, and made a favorable report of affairs, of the fidelity
and Union feeling of the officers in command; said that the
engines of the Merrimack were in order, and she would leave
on the following day. But Chief Engineer Isherwood returned
to Washington the next morning the 18th and reported that
Commodore McCauley had refused to permit the Merrimack
to depart after her engines were in order and men to move her
were on -board, and had directed the fires that were kindled
to be drawn.

Immediately on receiving this report I went with the Presi
dent to General Scott to procure a competent military officer,
and, if possible, a military force, for the shore defences of the

32 Civil War and Reconstruction

navy-yard. Information had readied us that the Convention at
Richmond had yielded to secession. We also heard of the rapid
rising of the insurgents, and of their intention to seize at once
Harper s Ferry, the navy-yard at Norfolk, and Fortress Monroe,
not one of which had a proper military support. There were
no fortifications whatever to defend the navy-yard from the
insurgents, no military force was there, and the expectation
that the Cumberland and the small number of sailors would be
able to temporarily hold the yard until military assistance could
arrive was shaken by the intelligence that morning received,
and the further fact that vessels were being sunk to obstruct
the channel. General Scott, on our application for military aid,
said we were asking an impossibility. He assured us he had no
troops to send for the defence of the navy-yard, and that it was
not susceptible of defence if he had them; that any men he
might order there would almost certainly be captured; that
it was enemy s country, without fortifications or batteries for
them to occupy; that seamen and marines who might be on
shipboard for water defence could perhaps do something toward
protecting the public property, and escape if overwhelmed,
provided the obstructions which we heard were being sunk in
the channel did not prevent, but there could be no escape for
for soldiers. The General stated, with a heavy heart, that he had
no troops to spare for the defence of Harper s Ferry, and that
the arms and stores at that place must inevitably be lost.

The garrison at Fortress Monroe was, he feared, insufficient
to repel the force which it was understood was organizing to
attack it. He had not, he said, men sufficient to protect Wash
ington if a formidable demonstration was made. At length he
promised to send Colonel Delafield of the Engineer Corps, and
I think consented, before the Pawnee left, that a battalion of
the Massachusetts volunteers, raised under the proclamation of
the 15th, might accompany Commodore Paulding, provided
they had reached Hampton Roads. They were, he said, un
disciplinedwould be good for nothing as yet for serious fight
ing, but would be serviceable in throwing up batteries under
the direction of the engineer. For the present, his first great
duty, with his feeble force, was to defend Washington, and next

Mr. Welles in Answer to Mr. Weed 33

to Washington, Fortress Monroe, which was the key to Washing
ton, Norfolk, Baltimore, Chesapeake Bay, and the rivers which
entered it. He therefore could not, and would not, consent to
part with a single regular for either Harper s Ferry or the Nor
folk Navy-yard; and his opinion frankly expressed to us was
that the public property in each of those places must, in case
of an attack, be sacrificed. The most that could be done was to
prevent the vessels and stores from passing into the hands of
the insurgents.

Harper s Ferry was abandoned that evening.

As but little assistance could be derived from the military,
I lost not a moment, after parting from the President and
General Scott, in giving the following order to Commodore
Paulding:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 18, 1861.
SIR:

You are directed to proceed forthwith to Norfolk and
take command of all the naval forces there afloat.

With the means placed at your command, you will do
all in your power to protect and place beyond danger the
vessels and property belonging to the United States. On no
account should the arms and munitions be permitted to
fall into the hands of the insurrectionists, or those who
would wrest them from the custody of the Government;
and, should it finally become necessary, you will, in order
to prevent that result, destroy the property.

In carrying into effect these orders, you are invested
with full power to command the services of the entire naval
force, and you will, if necessary, repel force by force in
carrying out these instructions. It is understood that the
War Department will detail Colonel Richard Delafield, or
some other competent officer, with a command to aid and
assist in protecting and guarding the yard and property at
Gosport and vicinity, and you will cooperate with that
officer in .this object.

I am sir, respectfully, etc.,

GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy.
Commodore HIRAM PAULDING, Washington, D. C.

34 Civil War and Reconstruction

This order was to repel, not to assail; the Administration
continued to be forbearing, and to the last was not aggressive.
Extreme men were dissatisfied and censorious because the Ad
ministration did not attack, though not prepared. On to Sumter
was the word, as at a later period the cry, equally inconsiderate,
was "On to Richmond."

Commodore Alden, who, as already remarked, had been sent
on special duty to Norfolk on the llth of April, returned on
the morning of the 19th, and confirmed the statements of Chief
Engineer Isherwood. The Cabinet was in session when he ar
rived. The loss of Harper s Ferry the preceding evening, and
the movements at Norfolk, with the threatened attack upon
the navy-yard and upon Fortress Monroe, were among the mat
ters under consideration. When Commander Alden arrived he
went to the Navy Department, and finding me absent, followed
to the Executive Mansion, and, calling me from the council,
related the strange condition of things at Norfolk, and the
bewildered and incapacitated state of mind of Commodore Mc-
Cauley. After hearing his statement I introduced him to the
President and Cabinet, to whom he recapitulated the statement
which he had made to me. He was immediately attached to the
expedition under Commodore Paulding, and returned to Nor
folk that evening.

The Pawnee reached Washington from the Sumter expedi
tion just in time to be despatched to Norfolk. She was placed
at the disposal of Commodore Paulding, with all the naval
officers, men, and means that were at command, and left Wash
ington on the evening of the 19th. Captain Wright, of the
army engineers, now Brevet Major-General Wright, was substi
tuted for Colonel Delafield, and accompanied the expedition.
The Pawnee reached Fortress Monroe on the afternoon of the
20th. Commodore Paulding procured from Colonel Dimmick,
in command, three hundred and fifty Massachusetts volunteers,
who had been enlisted, embarked at Boston, and reached Hamp
ton Roads within four days after the proclamation of the
President of the 15th.

When Commodore Paulding arrived at Norfolk on the
evening of the 20th, he found that the vessels at the yard had

Mr. Welles in Answer to Mr. Weed 35

been scuttled and were sinking. Nothing in his opinion, re
mained but to burn them and destroy such property as could
not be carried away by the Cumberland and Pawnee, as General
Scott had said would be inevitable, to prevent it from passing
into the possession of the insurgents.

Of the manner in which the orders of the Navy Department
were executed, or of the expediency and necessity of the measures
taken in the first instance by Commodore MoCauley, after con
sulting with and being advised by Commodore Paulding to
scuttle the vessels and destroy the guns, and of the completion
of the work of destruction thus commenced by Commodore
Paulding when he arrived, it is unnecessary to speak at this
time. The whole was an exercise of judgment and of authority
by three experienced, brave, tried, and faithful officers in a
great emergency, for which Congress had not provided and the
country was not prepared. Great censure has been bestowed
upon them by persons who know little of the circumstances, and
who had none of the responsibilities. Whether the conclusions
of these officers were right or wrong, they were such as in
their judgment were best and were precisely such as General
Scott had said would be inevitable.

These proceedings, it will be borne in mind, were all of
them before a blockade had been ordered. The first proclama
tion of the President, directing a blockade or closing of the
Southern ports, was issued on the 19th of April, the day on
which Commodore Paulding went a second time to Norfolk,
invested with plenary powers. But this proclamation did not
include Virginia; that State and North Carolina were exempted
from its operation. The Administration was determined to
occupy no hostile attitude toward Virginia so long as a single
hope remained that her Government and people would con
tinue faithful to the Union. It was not until the 27th of April
that her ports were ordered to be put under blockade, just
one week after the abandonment of Norfolk.

2

Fort Sumter

FACTS IN RELATION TO THE EXPEDITION

ORDERED BY THE ADMINISTRATION OF

PRESIDENT LINCOLN FOR THE RELIEF OF

THE GARRISON IN FORT SUMTER

One of the strangest episodes of the Civil War was
Secretary of State Seward s diversion of the Powhatan
from Fort Sumter to Fort Pickens. Welles s reactions
to this interference with his department, his explana
tions of Seward s motives, and his appreciation of the
President s troubles constitute the subject matter of the
following article.

N

QUESTION that presented itself during the four event
ful years of his administration gave President Lincoln greater
annoyance and embarrassment than the difficult one relating
to Fort Sumter and its garrison, which met him at the very
threshold of his Presidential career. He had said in his inau
gural address, and honestly and sincerely intended, that "the
power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess
the property and places belonging to the Government, and to
collect die duties and imposts; -but beyond what may be neces
sary for these objects there will be no invasion, no using of
force against or among the people anywhere/

On the day succeeding the utterance of these solemn as-

The Galaxy, X (November, 1870).

36

Fort Sumter 37

surances, he was informed that the garrison in Fort Sumter,
which had been threatened for months, was short of provisions,
and that this, the only fortress or place in South Carolina, the
State which for more than thirty years had been discontented
and anxious for a disruption of the Union which had taken
the open lead in secession which was active in fomenting and
promoting sectionalism and insurrection in the cotton, and, if
possible, in all the slave States that this last remaining property
and post of the Federal Government in South Carolina could
not, in the opinion of Major Anderson and his officers, be
relieved and reinforced with less than twenty thousand efficient
and well-disciplined men. The Government had no such army,
and it was utterly impossible to collect and organize one in
season, even if there were authority to raise one before resist
ance was made or any actual hostilities existed. The retiring
Administration had taken no step to sustain or enforce its
authority; had thrown almost the whole military force of the
Government in broken fragments on the distant frontiers; had
stationed no strong military force in the States when they be
held this vast conspiracy organizing. A few regiments placed
at one or two points early, could not only have asserted and
maintained the Federal authority and deterred rebellion, but
would have served as a nucleus or rallying point to encourage
and inspire confidence in the patriotic Union men, who were
at least a moiety of the whole population. If the Administra
tion of Mr. Buchanan did nothing, as is claimed, to encourage
the rebellion, it did little to prevent or suppress it. Under the
plea or pretext that he did not possess authority to coerce a
State, Mr. Buchanan had failed to maintain the national in
tegrity. He had witnessed the rising insurrection, had seen forts,
navy-yards, custom-houses, and public property wrested from
the possession of the Government and pass into the hands of
the insurgents, without any serious attempt to prevent it. That
he and those in whom he confided intended to excite, or that
they anticipated the terrible civil war which ensued, may not
be true; but it is not to be denied that .they took no decisive
steps against it. The political sympathies of the Buchanan Ad
ministration were with the secessionists, as opposed to those

38 Civil War and Reconstruction

who succeeded them in the administration and to the party
which elected Mr. Lincoln. With these feelings and this policy,
the Administration o Buchanan had been passive and indif
ferent; had, through the four months which intervened between
the election in November and the inauguration in March, lifted
no hand, had certainly performed no efficient act toward sup
pressing one of the most formidable insurrections that was ever
instituted, and which was openly and avowedly maturing. To
no small extent had the Democratic party, which opposed the
election of Mr. Lincoln, permitted itself to be led astray by the
policy of Mr. Buchanan. The secessionists attempted to justify
their movements by an abuse of the doctrine of State rights and
of a strict construction of the Constitution, which was the
basis of the old Democratic organization. As the Federal Con
stitution contained no clause prohibiting a State from with
drawing from the Union, it was denied that the Federal Govern
ment was endowed with power to compel or coerce a State to
remain in the Union. For a time, and in the absence of any
argument, this absurdity, which was not even specious, had an
influence under impassioned party excitement with many Demo
crats, who, having opposed the election of Mr. Lincoln, per
mitted themselves to be hurried along by the Buchanan policy
and the influence of party organization into dangerous and
unjustifiable opposition, which for a time countenanced and
aided in giving impulse to the secession movement. It is no
doubt true that many of the Democrats began to hesitate and
ultimately to dissent from the extremists of their party, as the
object, purpose, and ends of the secessionists were developed;
but at the commencement of his administration. Mr. Lincoln
had these party opponents who disavowed secession to meet, as
well as the actual disunionists.

Under the influence and madness of party the secessionists,
acting with an ulterior purpose, had contrived to secure posses
sion of the organized political and constitutional governments
of each of the Southern States. Those in insurrection had,
therefore, the form of legal State authority to sanction their
acts. The Administration of Buchanan conceded this form of
resistance to the Federal Government as legitimate, and by its

Fort Sumter 39

non-coercive policy had made the secession movement powerful
and the Federal Government almost powerless.

The new Administration was denounced in advance of any
act, and even before the President was inaugurated, as hostile
to the Souththe enemy of Southern institutions the opponent
of State rights intent on the abolition of slavery, and desiring
to oppress the people by coercive and arbitrary measures. The
stability and power of the national Union began to be doubted.
Men of all parties saw that no vigorous or efficient measures
were taken to suppress the insurrection; that the Administra
tion of Buchanan was weak and feeble, when strength and
power were necessary; and this obvious feebleness, with the
impression that the Administration was an exponent of the
constitutional authority, weakened and impaired confidence in
the ability and strength of the Government itself. It was under
these circumstances, when strange theories were prevalent, when
State rights doctrines and strict construction principles were
perverted and abused, when those who administered the Federal
Government declared it was destitute of power to maintain its
supremacy or enforce the laws, that Mr. Lincoln, constitutionally
elected, but by a majority vote, entered upon his duties as
Chief Magistrate. A factious and partisan, not a patriotic and
national spirit, had actuated the Congress which had just ad
journed without adopting measures to strengthen the hands
of the Government. The new Administration that was, at the
commencement of its career, to meet the rebellion which had
been long maturing, was left by the Thirty-sixth Congress with
out resources, preparatory measures, or additional authority for
the crisis. The new President was an untried public man, com
paratively unknown to his countrymen, and liable to be mis
represented. Not only the secessionists in the South, but his
political party opponents in the North, availed themselves of
these circumstances to create distrust in his abilities and in
tentions. Many even of those who aided in electing him were
anxiously waiting and watching, not without some misgiving,
yet in hopeful confidence that he would fulfil their expecta
tions; but they were unable to dissipate doubts and refute the
calumnies against him by any official acts. Neither time nor

40 Civil War and Reconstruction

opportunity was given him to demonstrate his capacity and
fitness, or to make known his intentions, for his oath was not
registered when he was compelled to act.

The attention of the whole country had for some time been
directed toward Fort Sumter, in the harbor of Charleston, The
feeble attempt by the Star of the West a chartered steamer
to relieve the garrison, made by the Buchanan Administration
in the winter, had been repelled, and this result was submitted
to by the Government without effort, and with an understanding
that reinforcements should not be sent to strengthen Major
Anderson s command. The State of South Carolina, elated by
this repulse and submission, demanded that the important for
tress in her principal harbor should be surrendered to the State.
The fortress belonged to the United States, had been built at the
expense of the Federal Treasury, and could not be peaceably sur
rendered by the Federal Government even to a foreign power,
much less to persons or State authorities in insurrection.

In order to excite enmity against the new President, it was
charged that he designed to make war upon the South, and
there was a purpose to compel him, in the maintenance of his
authority, to strike the first hostile blow which was to be the
justification of the rebels for resistance. None expected the
Administration to imitate the passive policy which Mr. Buchanan
had pursued.

Mr. Lincoln adopted a forbearing and conciliatory course,
and indulged a hope, longer than most of his friends, that a
reconciliation could be effected. He persisted in his resolution
to exhaust all peaceable means, and under no circumstances to
be aggressive. But the question in relation to Sumter and the
condition of the garrison was embarrassing. If he sent troops
and attempted to reinforce Major Anderson, it would be claimed
on one hand to be a fulfilment of the assertion that he in
tended to subjugate the South. On the other hand, many of his
impulsive but inconsiderate supporters demanded that he should
adopt instant measures to reinforce the garrison the very step
which his opponents wished him to take.

On the morning of the 6th of March, 1861, two days after
the inauguration, the Hon. Joseph Holt, who continued to dis-

Fort Sumter 41

charge the duties of Secretary of War, called on me at the Navy
Department, with the compliments of Lieutenant-General Scott,
and requested my attendance at the War Department on
matters of special importance. I went with him immediately
to the office of the Secretary of War, where were several persons,
convened, as I soon learned, by order of the President. Among
them were Generals Scott and Totten and -two or three mem
bers of the Cabinet.

General Scott commenced by stating that important des
patches had been received from Major Anderson in relation to
the condition of the garrison at Fort Sumter, which the Presi
dent had directed him to submit to the Secretaries of War and
Navy. He proceeded to comment on the perilous situation of the
country, and the difficulties and embarrassments he had ex
perienced for months; related the measures and precautions he
had taken for the public safety, the advice and warnings he had
given to President Buchanan, which, unfortunately, had made
less impression than the emergency demanded. Other counsels
than his had prevailed. Instead of meeting the crisis at the com
mencement, or preparing for the storm which threatened us,
a passive course had been adopted, and the public mind was
now greatly inflamed. He had, he said, with the knowledge of
Secretary Holt, taken the responsibility of organizing and order
ing a small military force to be present at the inauguration, for
the protection of the Government, and for the security of the
archives and public property. This force was, however, insuf
ficient for the public safety should a conflict take place, and
he would not conceal from us his apprehensions that one was
imminent, and perhaps inevitable.

The despatches from Major Anderson, which were received
on the 4th of March, contained intelligence of a distressing
character. They informed the Government that his supplies were
almost exhausted, and that unless provisions could be received
within six weeks the garrison would be destitute and must
evacuate the fort.

To most of us the information was unexpected and astound
ing, and there was on the part of such of us as had received no
previous intimation of the condition of things at Sumter an

42 Civil War and Reconstruction

earnest determination that immediate and efficient steps should
be taken to relieve and reinforce the garrison. General Scott,
without assenting or dissenting, related the difficulties which
had already taken place, and stated the formidable obstacles to
be encountered from the numerous and well-manned batteries,
some of which the Government had permitted to pass into the
possession of the secessionists, and others had been erected, the
Government not preventing, in Charleston harbor. He did not,
I think, in this first interview, communicate certain memoranda
of Major Anderson and his officers on the practicability, or
rather impracticability, of reinforcing the garrison. These were
submitted, with his own prepared opinion, a few days later.
He said, however, there was not in his entire command a
sufficient military force to relieve Major Anderson, nor could
one be collected and organized within the time limited to
accomplish that object. If any relief could be extended, it
must be by the navy. An attempt had been made by water, which
failed. Commander Ward, a gallant officer, had, he said, tend
ered his services to join Major Anderson on a former occasion
when .the subject was considered, and was ready at any time to
take command of an expedition if one were now ordered. These,
however, were matters for the naval authorities to decide, but
it was not expected any definite conclusion would be arrived
at on this occasion. The subject was of paramount importance,
deserving of deliberate consideration; at the same time the
exigencies of the case required prompt decision. It was, he said,
a satisfaction to him to relieve his mind of overburdened care
and responsibilities with which it had been loaded for months.
He especially requested me to consult with some of the dis
tinguished naval officers who were at the seat of government
in regard to the practicability of reinforcing the garrison by
water.

A court-martial was in session at that time in Washington,
convened for the trial of Captain Armstrong, who had sur
rendered the Pensacola Navy-yard to the insurgents. On this
court were some of the most intelligent and experienced officers
in the service, and I availed myself of the opportunity to obtain
their views and opinions on this interesting and absorbing ques-

Fort Sumter 43

tion. Among others whom I consulted were Rear-Admirals
Stewart, Gregory, Stringham, and Paulding. Each of them
thought the relief of the fort practicable, though it would doubt
less be attended with some sacrifice and loss of life should there
be resistance. All of them, I think, expressed their readiness to
undertake the work, except Rear-Admiral Stewart, whose age
and infirmities precluded him but no one was more earnest
and decisive in his opinion that it could and should be done
than that veteran officer. He lamented that he was not forty
years younger, to render this service, and related an incident
which he had witnessed in Barcelona, where an English naval
force passed under the fire of Spanish forts and performed a
successful achievement. Few of the younger officers were taken
into confidence and consulted, for the subject was one on which
publicity was not desirable, and in the general demoralization
which prevailed it was sometimes difficult to determine who
were and who were not reliable. Commanders Ward and Jen
kins were made aware of the proceedings, and both concurred
with their seniors. The former, who had been summoned to
Washington, was put in immediate communication with Gen
eral Scott, who had consulted him under the late Administra
tion, and had great influence over him. Commodore Stringham,
whom I had selected as an assistant in matters of detail in the
Navy Department, had two or three conferences with General
Scott and Commander Ward in my presence, and it was not
difficult to perceive that the General had no confidence what
ever in any successful effort to reinforce Sumter either by land
or water. In successive Cabinet meetings the subject was fully
discussed generals Scott and Totten and Commodore String-
ham being sometimes present. At one of these conferences Gen
eral Totten read by direction of General Scott an elaborate
argument or report which had been prepared by these two
officers in obedience to orders from the President. In this care
fully-prepared paper they stated the impracticability of relieving
the garrison should the insurgents resist by force, and that ulti
mately Sumter must inevitably fall. Some discussion took place
between them and Commodore Stringham as to the capability
of naval vessels to encounter or pass batteries which the military

44 Civil War and Reconstruction

gentlemen consider impossible, but Commodore Stringham,
while he did not decisively contradict, did not fully assent to
their views. Memoranda were submitted from Major Anderson,
in which all of -the officers under his command united, ex
pressing his professional opinion that Fort Sumter could not
be relieved and reinforced with less than twenty thousand good
and well-disciplined men. These views were fully endorsed by
the military gentlemen who were consulted, and had great
influence on the President and Cabinet.

Mr. Seward from the commencement doubted not only the
practicability of reinforcing Sumter, but the expediency of any
attempt to provision the garrison, therein differing from every
one of his colleagues, though in perfect accord with General
Scott. The subject in all its aspects was less novel to him than
the rest of us, and from some cause his conclusions were wholly
unlike the others. If not indifferent, he had none of the zeal
which inspired his colleagues, but seemed to consider it an un
important or settled question. The insurgents had possession of
Fort Moultrie, Castle Pinckney, and in fact all the defences of
Charleston: what benefit, he asked, could we derive from re
taining this isolated fortress if it were possible to do so?

Mr. Blair, on -the other hand, who was scarcely less familiar
with the whole subject than Mr. Seward, was emphatic and
decisive from first to last in his opinion that Sumter should be
reinforced at any cost or any sacrifice. He insisted that the time
had arrived when the Government should assert its power and
authority, and not pursue the feeble and pusillanimous policy
of the late Administration, which, by yielding everything, had
encouraged secession until it had become formidable. There
was direct antagonism between these two gentlemen one be
lieving that hostilities could not be avoided, that tampering and
temporizing had been a great and fatal mistake on the part of
the Government the other still hopeful that by a conciliatory
course and skilful management, a peaceful adjustment of dif
ficulties could be effected.

The President was greatly disturbed by the intelligence from
Major Anderson, and the conclusion of the military officers,
that the garrison could not be reinforced before their supplies

Fort Sumter 45

would be exhausted. He did not relinquish the hope that if
time were given the Administration just entering upon its
duties, there might be a satisfactory adjustment of impending
difficulties. In this he was strengthened and encouraged by the
views and representation of the Secretary of State, who had dur
ing the winter been in communication with members of the
Buchanan Administration and leading secessionists. In order
that the door to conciliation should remain open, the President
felt it important that the Government should be forbearing,
not aggressive; and he considered it essential that the Ad
ministration should not strike the first blow. Yet the fact was
before us that Sumter must be abandoned if not soon succored,
and the military experts, whose advice he sought, and by which
he felt it was his duty to be governed, pronounced it im
practicable.

The members of the Cabinet, with the excepion of Messrs.
Seward and Blair, coincided in the views of the President, and
like him were embarrassed by the question presented. They
were united in the opinion that the Federal authority must be
asserted and maintained, but under the circumstances depre
cated hasty coercive measures, and, unless it became absolutely
necessary, were unwilling in view of the military counsels to
resort to force to provision the fort.

Commodore Stringham and Commander Ward, after in
vestigating the subject, ascertaining the number of batteries to
be encountered and obstacles to be overcome, and listening to
the arguments of General Scott, united with him in the ex
pression of their opinion that it would be unadvisable to at
tempt to relieve Sumter. Commander Ward therefore returned
on the 12th of March to his duties in Brooklyn.

Mr. Seward s views and policy had undoubtedly an influence
on the military and naval gentlemen and on members of the
Cabinet in forming their conclusions. General Scott deferred
to him greatly, and had acted in concert with him for months.
Commander Ward was a favorite with General Scott, and was
probably governed by him in his final decision in this instance.

If Mr. Seward supposed the question was disposed of when
the naval and military gentlemen so advised and all the Cabinet

46 Civil War and Reconstruction

but one deferred to it, and when Commander Ward abandoned
it, he soon learned his mistake; for Mr. Blair on the very day
that Commander Ward returned to Brooklyn telegraphed to
Mr. G. V. Fox, who had interested himself in this question
during the winter, requesting that gentlemen to come to Wash
ington. This summons Mr. Fox promptly obeyed, and arrived
in Washington on the evening of the following day, the 13th of
March. He was immediately introduced by Mr. Blair to the
President, to whom he made known his plan and his readiness
to carry it into effcet.

Mr. Fox was a brother-in-law of Mr. Blair, they having
married daughters of Mr. Levi Woodbury, formerly Secretary
of the Navy, afterwards Secretary of the Treasury, and at the
time of his death one of the Judges of the Supreme Court.
Although then engaged in manufacturing in Massachusetts, Mr.
Fox had in early life been an officer of the navy. The preceding
winter he had volunteered his services to the Buchanan Ad
ministration to carry supplies to Sumter, but his services were
then declined. General Scott, who had favored Mr. Fox s proposi
tion in February, declared it was now an impossibility; but Mr.
Fox was unwilling to relinquish it without first visiting Sumter.
To this the President assented, and he left Washington for
Charleston on the 19th of March. In an interview which he
had with Major Anderson within the fort, that officer declared
it was impossible for the navy to obtain ingress to him, and
that relief could be furnished by no other means than by landing
an effective army on Morris Island. His views coincided in all
respects with those of General Scott, and confirmed the position
of Mr. Seward. But Mr. Fox dissented and adhered to his plan,
which was in accordance with the policy of Mr. Blair, In several
consultations with the President, .the Cabinet, General Scott,
and Commodore Stringham, he developed his plan by which
the fort could in his belief be provisioned and reinforced wth
boats by night. He proposed that Commodore Stringham should
command the naval expedition; but when I suggested this to
the Commodore, he decided it was to late to be successful, and
assured Mr. Fox it would jeopard the reputation of any officer
who should undertake it.

Fort Sumter 47

Time was valuable to the Administration, which, had not
yet gained confidence, which its own Congressional supporters
distrusted, and in a great crisis had neglected to clothe with any
extraordinary or discretionary powers. Without means, without
unity and confidence among those of the different parties who
opposed secession, the President was slow and deliberate. Some
of his partisan friends began to denounce his delay as weakness
and imbecility.

The supplies in the fort were getting low when Mr. Lamon,
the former business partner of the President, who had been sent
as a special and trusty messenger to Major Anderson, after the
visit and report of Mr. Fox, returned on the 28th of March and
stated it would be impossible to reinforce the garrison, and
that the provisions on hand would be exhausted by the 15th of
April, but a little over two weeks from that date. On receiving
this information from Lamon, the President declared he would
send supplies to the garrison, and if the secessionists forcibly
resisted, on them would be the responsibility of initiating hos
tilities. This conclusion, though it conflicted in some degree
with the views of the military gentlemen, he felt to be a political
necessity. He could not, consistently with his convictions of his
duty, and with the policy which he had enunciated in his inau
gural, order the evacuation of Sumter; and it would be inhuman
on his part to permit the heroic garrison to be starved into a
surrender without an attempt to relieve it.

The Secretary of State was the only member of the Cabinet
who did not cordially concur in these conclusions, and he could
not successfully controvert them. He did not, however, give his
earnest approval, but in acquiescing reiterated what he had
previously urged that the attempt if made would prove a
failure; that the failure would strengthen the secessionists and
weaken the Government; that in the attitude of parties it would
be viewed as the commencement of hostilities; would foreclose
all measures of conciliation, and place the Administration in
a wrong and false position. But the President was decided in
the opinion that whatever might be the military aspect of the
question, the political necessities and his duty required that
there should be an attempt at least to reinforce the garrison.

48 Civil War and Reconstruction

On the next day, therefore, I received the following com
munication:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 29, 1861.
Honorable Secretary of the Navy.

SIR:

I desire that an expedition to move by sea be got ready
to sail as early as the 6th of April next, the whole according
to memorandum enclosed; and that you cooperate with the
Secretary of War for that object.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

(Memoranda.)

NAVY DEPARTMENT. The Pocahontas at Norfolk, the
Pawnee at Washington, and revenue cutter Harriet Lane
at New York, to be ready for sea with one month s stores.

Three hundred seamen to be ready for leaving the re
ceiving ship at New York.

WAR DEPARTMENT. Two hundred men at New York
ready to leave garrison.

One year s stores to be put in portable form.

This communication and memoranda from the President
were my authority for proceeding to fit out an expedition in
conjunction with the War Department to reinforce Fort Sumter.
As the object was to relieve a military garrison, the expedition
was made a military one, and was under the control and direc
tion of the War Department. The Secretary of War specially
commissioned Mr. Fox then a private citizen of Massachusetts,
but some weeks after the termination of the Sumter expedition
made Assistant Secretary of the Navy and gave him his written
instructions.

The steamer Powhatan, Captain Mercer, which arrived in
New York while these matters were pending, and had been
ordered out of commission, was added to the vessels enumerated
in the memoranda, as her boats and crew were deemed indis
pensable for landing the supplies. This vessel had just returned
from a cruise and greatly needed repairs, but she could, it was

Fort Sumter 49

believed, be made available for this service to Charleston. I
therefore sent the following telegram on the 1st of April to the
commandant of the Brooklyn Navy-yard revoking the order
by which her officers were detached and she was put out of
commission:

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 1, 1861
Received at Brooklyn 4:10 P.M.

To Commodore S. L. BREESE, Navy-yard.

The Department revokes its orders for the detachment
of the officers of the Powhatan and the transfer and dis
charge of her crew. Hold her in readiness for sea service.

GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy.

After consultation with the Prseident, who was earnest and
deeply interested in the expedition, I sent the following addi
tional and -peremptory telegram:

WASHINGTON D. C., April 1, 1861
-Received at Brooklyn 6:50 P.M.

To Commandant of Navy-yard.

Fit out Powhatan to go to sea at the earliest possible
moment.

GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy.

Great credit is due the late Rear-Admiral Foote, who was
at that time the executive officer of the Brooklyn Navy-yard,
for the energy and activity with which he carried these orders
into effect, and caused the Powhatan, which had been partially
dismantled, to be fitted for sea within the time limited.

There were daily interviews between the President and my
self on this subject, and also with the Secretary of War and the
Secretary of State. There were also frequent consultations at
which other members of the Cabinet were present. Mr. Seward
was not entirely reconciled to the enterprise, and suggested,
when the President s determination was fixed, that it would
promote harmony to inform the South Carolina authorities of
the intention to send supplies peaceably to the garrison, and

50 Civil War and Reconstruction

that if not resisted it would not be reinforced. This had been
the Buchanan policy, but was not consistent with a rightful
exercise of Federal authority, nor with the idea of a quiet,
legitimate movement, the object of which was not to be an
nounced, and to which there should be given no more publicity
than was absolutely necessary. The right and the duty of the
Government to furnish supplies to its soldiers in its own fort,
or to reinforce the command, was undoubted. To inform the
secessionists of the intended expedition would be impolitic, for
it would give them time to make preparations to defeat it.
But Mr. Seward was very persistent, declaring at the same time
it would be much more advisable to reinforce Pickens than
Sumter. It was, he claimed, practicable to save Pickens, but
should there be a conflict it was confessedly impossible to retain
Sumter. One would be a waste of effort and energy would be
considered a hostile demonstration, inititating war while the
other would be a peaceable and effective movement.

It was admitted that, in the event of a war, there would be
a necessity to strengthen both positions; but there was no im
mediate call for additional forces at Pickens, for a large part of
the home squadron was already off Pensacola. The Brooklyn,
the Sabine, the St. Louis, and the Wyandotte were on that
station on the 4th of March, and the Crusader and the Mohawk
had subsequently been sent to the Gulf by special request of
Lieutenant-General Scott. There was in addition to these naval
vessels a military force under Captain Vogdes, which had been
detained for some time on board the Brooklyn. Instructions
had, however, gone forward two weeks previously directing the
troops to be landed in order to reinforce Lieutenant Slemmer,
who, when Armstrong and Renshaw gave up the navy-yard, had
refused to surrender, but like Anderson evacuated the fort
(McRea) in which he was stationed, and took possession of the
more important fortress of Pickens on Santa Rosa Island, which
he had strengthened. Reinforced by Vogdes s command, and
aided and supplied by the squadron, Pickens was in no im
mediate danger, while the condition of Sumter was imminent.
The expedition destined to relieve the latter required every
naval steamer in commission in the Atlantic ports, and might

Fort Sumter 5!

then be insufficient. It would leave Norfolk almost defenceless
should Virginia join the secessionists. Aid to Pickens was not
therefore further discussed, though the subject was not wholly
relinquished.

On the 30th of March, the day succeeding my instructions
from the President, orders were issued to the commandants of
the Brooklyn, Washington, and Norfolk yards to prepare the
vessels named for service. Seamen on the receiving ship whom
the Navy Department had destined for Norfolk were diverted
to the Sumter expedition, and energy and activity stimulated
all who in any way were conversant with the subject.

Whatever arrangements had been made by die retiring Ad
ministration to abstain from the exercise of Federal authority
in the seceding States, or whatever understanding may have
existed between the Buchanan Cabinet and the insurgent lead
ers, with the knowledge and assent of any one or more persons
who became members of the Lincoln Administration, are mat
ters which it is unnecessary to discuss at this time. It has been
stated by Senator Wilson of Massachusetts that Mr. Stanton,
while a member of Mr. Buchanan s Cabinet in the winter of
1861, "put himself in communication with the Republicans in
Congress and kept them well informed of what was going on
in the councils of the Administration directly relating to the
dangers of the country." And Mr. Thurlow Weed has avowed
and commended "the coalition then formed by Messrs. Seward
and Stanton." I have no doubt, although I was not aware of
the fact at the time, that Mr. Stanton communicated "what was
going on in the councils of the Administration" in the winter
of 1861, notwithstanding his colleague, Mr. Black, questions
the truth of Senator Wilson s statement. As to the motives which
influenced Mr. Stanton and his conferees, whether secessionists
or Unionists, and of the wisdom and ultimate effect of the
course pursued and policy adopted by the managing men of all
parties who coalesced or had an understanding to suspend
active operations during the last three months of the Buchanan
Administration, there may be differing opinions. The men who
instituted the passive or non-coercive policy of the Federal
Government after South Carolina passed her ordinance of seces-

52 Civil War and Reconstruction

sion, may have been actuated by good motives, and yet have
committed a fatal error. They undoubtedly delayed active hos
tilities, when prompt, energetic, and well-directed action by the
National Government might have prevented or crushed in the
bud the civil war which for four years drenched the land with
fraternal blood. While the Federal Government had been in
activepreserving the status doing nothing, under the agree
ment or undersatnding that was made, the secessionists were
active in fomenting hostile feelings against the Union, organ
izing rebellion, seizing forts, erecting batteries, purchasing arms,
and preparing for the conflict. It is not necessary here to inquire
who of the managing leaders of the three parties of the coalition
were victims to the game that was played whether the Adminis
tration, the secessionists, or the few friends of Mr. Lincoln who
were in communication with them, were deceived: there was
an understanding that the Government should be passive dur
ing the winter of 1861, and it was so; but no injunction or re
straint was imposed on the insurgents, who were active. Inaction
on the part of the Federal Government and activity on the part
of the secessionists was the prevailing policy down to the exodus
of Mr. Buchanan and the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln on the
4th of March. Congress had been in session until that period,
and, amid factious tumult, had witnessed the formidable prep
arations which were making by the seceding States for a dis
ruption, without adopting any efficient means to prevent it,
or even to strengthen the hands of the new Executive. On the
5th of March Messrs. John Forsyth, Martin J. Crawford, and
A. B. Roman, purporting to be commissioners "duly accredited
by the Government of the Confederate States of America as
commissioners to the Government of the United States/ ap
peared in Washington, and on the llth asked, through a dis
tinguished Senator, an unofficial interview with the Secretary
of State. This request was "respectfully declined"; and on the
same day they addressed him a written communication, which
was received at the State Department on the 13th, stating that
"seven States of the late Federal Union having, in the exercise
of the inherent right of every free people to change or reform
their political institutions, and through conventions of their

Fort Sumter 53

people, withdrawn from the United States and reassumed the
attributes of sovereign power delegated to it, have formed a
government of their own." They proceeded to say that a speedy
adjustment of all questions, etc., and asked an early day to
present their credentials to the President of the United States.
An answer dated the 15th of March was, it is stated in a post
script, by consent of parties, not delivered until the 8th of
April. Personal understanding commenced under Buchanan ap
pears to have been continued into the administration of Lincoln.
The memoranda when delivered declined to comply with the
request of "the commissioners," and informed them the Secre
tary of State "has no authority nor is he at liberty to recognize
them as diplomatic agents or hold correspondence or other
communication with them." In the interim, however, between
the 13th of March and the 8th of April, communication, it has
been admitted, was had by the Secretary of State with the
commissioners through the Hon. John A. Campbell, then an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, in
the presence of Judge Nelson of New York, also one of the
Judges of the Supreme Court. The memoranda of Mr. Seward,
delivered on the 8th of April, called out an answer on the fol
lowing day the 9th of April from the commissioners, who
state: "In the postscript to your (the Secretary of State s) memo
randum you say it was delayed, as was understood, with their
(Messrs, Forsyth and Crawford s) assent. This is true; but it is
also true that on the 15th of March Messrs. Forsyth and Craw
ford were assured by a person occupying a high official position
in the Government, and who, as they believed, was speaking
by authority, that Fort Sumter would be evacuated within a
very few days. . . . On the first of April we were again informed
that there might be an attempt to supply Fort Sumter with pro
visions, but that Governor Pickens should have previous notice
of the attempt. There was no suggestion of reinforcements."

The following is part of a published letter of Judge Camp
bell to the Secretary of State, dated April 13, 1861, relative to
these negotiations or communications between the Secretary of
State and the insurgents:

54 Civil War and Reconstruction

WASHINGTON CITY, April 13, 1861.

SIR:

On the 15th of March ultimo, I left with Judge Craw
ford, one of the commissioners o the Confederate States,
a note in writing to the effect following:

"I feel entire confidence that Fort Sumter will be evac
uated in the next five days. And this measure is felt as
imposing great responsibility on the Administration.

"I feel entire confidence that no measure changing the
existing status prejudicially to the Southern Confederate
States is at present contemplated.

"I feel an entire confidence that an immediate demand
for an answer to the communication of the commissioners
will be productive of evil and not of good. I do not believe
that it ought at this time be pressed."

The substance of this statement I communicated to you
the same evening by letter. Five days elapsed, and I called
with a telegram from General Beauregard to the effect that
Sumter was not evacuated, but that Major Anderson was
at work making repairs.

The next day, after conversing with you, I communi
cated to Judge Crawford in writing that the failure to
evacuate Sumter was not the result of bad faith, but was
attributable to causes consistent with the intention to fulfil
the engagement, and that as regarded Pickens I should
have notice of any design to alter the existing status there.
Mr. Justice Nelson was present at these conversations, three
in number, and I submitted to him each of my written
communications to Judge Crawford, and informed Judge
C. that they had his (Judge Nelson s) sanction. I gave you
on the 22d of March a substantial copy of the statement I
had made on the 15th.

The 30th of March arrived, and at that time a telegram
came from Governor Pickens inquiring concerning Colonel
Lamon, whose visit to Charleston he supposed had a con
nection with the proposed evacuation of Fort Sumter. I
left that with you, and was to have an answer the following
Monday (1st of April). On the 1st of April I received from
you the statement in writing: "I am satisfied the Govern
ment will not undertake to supply Fort Sumter without
giving notice to Governor Pickens." The words "I am

Fort Sumter 55

satisfied" were for me to use as expressive of confidence in
the remainder of the declaration.

The proposition as originally prepared was, "The Presi
dent may desire to supply Sumter, but will not do so, etc.;
and your verbal explanation was that you did not believe
any such attempt would be made, and that there was no
design to reinforce Sumter.

There was a departure here from the pledges of the
previous month, but with the verbal explanation I did not
consider it a matter then to complain of. I simply stated
to you that I had that assurance previously.

On the 7th of April, I addressed you a letter on the sub
ject of the alarm that the preparations by the Government
had created, and asked you if the assurances I had given
were well or ill-founded. In respect to Sumter your reply
was, "Faith as to Sumter fully keptwait and see." In the
morning s paper I read, "An authorized messenger from
President Lincoln informed Governor Pickens and General
Beauregard that provisions will be sent to Fort Sumter
peaceably or otherwise by force" This was the 8th of April
at Charleston, the day following your last assurance, and
is the evidence of the full faith I was invited to wait for
and see.

Very respectfully,

JOHN A. CAMPBELL,

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, U. S.
Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

If any such pledge as indicated in this correspondence was
given, or any understanding was had I was not aware of it, nor
do I think it was known at the time to other members of the
Administration. My orders were given, and my acts also were
in perfect sincerity and good faith, and with the hope that
Major Anderson and the garrison in Sumter would be relieved.
A knowledge of the facts set forth in the foregoing correspond
ence, is essential to a correct understanding of the proceedings
and circumstances attending the expedition to Sumter.

Late in the afternoon of the 1st of April, while at my dinner
at Willard s, where I then boarded, Mr. Nicolay, the private

56 Civil War and Reconstruction

secretary of the President, brought me a large package from the
President. I immediately broke the envelope, and found it con
tained several papers of importance, some of which were of a
singular character, being in the nature of instructions or orders
from the Executive relative to naval matters of which I knew the
President was not informed, and about which I had not been
consulted. One of these papers relating to the government of
the Navy Department was more singular and extraordinary than
either of the others, and was as follows:

(Confidential.)

EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 1, 1861.
To the Secretary of the Navy.

DEAR SIR:

You will issue instructions to Captain Pendergrast, com
manding the home squadron, to remain in observation at
Vera Cruz important complications in our foreign rela
tions rendering the presence of an officer of rank there of
great importance.

Captain Stringham will be directed to proceed to Pensa-
cola with all possible despatch, and assume command of that
portion of the home squadron stationed off Pensacola. He
will have confidential instructions to cooperate in every
way with the commanders of the land forces of the United
States in that neighborhood.

The instructions to the army officers, which are strictly
confidential, will be communicated to Captain Stringham
after he arrives at Pensacola.

Captain Samuel Barron will relieve Captain Stringham
in charge of the Bureau of Detail.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

P. S. As it is very necessary at this time to have a per
fect knowledge of the personal (sic!)* of the navy, and to be
able to detail such officers for special purposes as the exigen
cies of the service may require, I request that you will in
struct Captain Barron to proceed and organize the Bureau of
Detail in the manner best adapted to meet the wants of the
navy, taking cognizance of the discipline of the navy gen-

* The misspelling of personnel was not Lincoln s. See below.

Fort Sumter 57

erally, detailing all officers for duty, taking charge of the
recruiting of seamen, supervising charges made against
officers, and all matters relating to duties which must be
best understood by a sea officer. You will please afford
Captain Barron any facility for accomplishing this duty,
transferring to his department the clerical force heretofore
used for the purposes specified. It is to be understood Chat
this officer will act by authority of the Secretary of the
Navy, who will exercise such supervision as he may deem
necessary.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

On reading this extraordinary letter and more extraordinary
postscript, I went without a moment s delay to the President
with the package in my hand. He was alone in his office writ
ing, and raising his head as I entered he inquired, "What have
I done wrong?" I replied that I had received with surprise the
package containing, among other things, his instructions re
specting the navy and die Navy Department, and I called for
an explanation. I then read the foregoing document, the body
of which was in the handwriting of Captain Montogomery C.
Meigs of the army, the postscript in that of Lieutenant D. D.
Porter of the navy. The President expressed as much surprise
as I felt that he had signed and sent me such a document.

He said Mr. Seward with two or three young men had been
there through the day, on a matter which Mr. Seward had much
at heart; that he had yielded to the project of Mr. Seward, but
as it involved considerable detail and he had his hands full,
and more too, he had left Mr. Seward to prepare the necessary
papers. These papers he had signed, some of them without
reading, trusting entirely to Mr. Seward, for he could not under
take to read all papers presented to him; and if he could not
trust the Secretary of State, whom could he rely upon in a
public matter that concerned us all? He seemed disinclined to
disclose or dwell on the project, but assured me he never would
have signed that paper had he been aware of its contents, much
of which had no connection with Mr. Seward s scheme. I asked
who were associated with the Secretary of State. "No one," said
the President, "but he had these young men here as clerks to

58 Civil War and Reconstruction

write down his plans and orders/ Most of the work, he said,
was done in the other room. When I inquired if he knew the
young men, he replied, "One was Captain Meigs; another was
a companion with whom he seemed intimate, a naval officer
named Porter."

Without further inquiry I informed the President that I had
no confidence in the fidelity of Captain Barron, who was by this
singular order, issued in his name, to be forced into official and
personal intimacy with me, and virtually to take charge of the
Navy Department. He said he knew nothing of Barron, though
he had a genreal recollection that there was such an officer in
the navy, and believed he had seen him in Washington. I called
his attention to the order, if I was so to consider it, to organize
a Bureau of Detail in the Navy Department, and to transfer to
a naval officer a portion of the clerical force and civil adminis
trative duties which by law belonged to the Secretary of the
Navy duties which the Secretary had no right to evade and no
legal authority to depute to another. The bureaus of the De
partment, he was doubtless aware, were established by law and
not by an executive order. That this proposition to make a
naval officer Secretary de facto, to transfer him from his pro
fessional to civil duties without responsibility, was illegal, and
in my view monstrous. It conflicted with the whole theory of
our Government and the principles on which the Navy Depart
ment was organized and established. The Senate was entitled to
a voice in the appointment of chiefs of bureaus. The selection
of a trusted officer by the Secretary for advisory and confidential
purposes was a different matter. I might, as I had, call an ex
perienced officer to my assistance, with whom I could consult
and advise in regard to the personnel of the navy, which was
greatly demoralized, and to assist me in detailing officers of
fidelity and patriotism; but Barron was one of the last men I
could trust in this emergency with these matters of detail and
departmental business. Neither the President nor Secretary had
power to create a new bureau or to bring a professional naval
officer into the Department, and devolve on him the functions
which the law imposed on the Secretary. Such detailing and
consulting officer as Commodore Stringham, whom I had called

Fort Sumter 59

to my side in this great emergency, ought to have the implicit
confidence of the Secretary, should be subordinate to him and
be selected by him. To all of which the President assented most
fully. I then went on to say that Captain Barron was an ac
complished officer and gentleman with whom I had personally
pleasant relations, but that his feelings, sympathies, and asso
ciations were notoriously with the secessionists; that he was
prominent in a clique of naval exclusives, most of whom were
tainted with secession; that I was not prepared to say he would
desert in the crisis which seemed approaching, but I had my
apprehensions that such would be the case; that while I should
treat him courteously and with friendly consideration, and
hoped most sincerely he would not prove false, I could not con
sent he should have the position nor give him the trust which
his instructions imposed.

The President reiterated they were not his instructions, and
wished me distinctly to understand they were not, though his
name was appended to them said the paper was an improper
one that he wished me to give it no more consideration than
I thought proper treat it as cancelled, as if it had never been
written. He remembered, he said, that both Mr. Seward and
Porter had something to say about Barron as superior to almost
any officer in the naval service, but whatever his qualifications,
he would never knowingly have assigned him or any other man
to the position named in the Navy Department without first
consulting me. There was at that time a clique of prominent
naval officers, as there has been on more than one occasion,
anxious to take possession of and control the Navy Department.
Many of them were in Washington, and most of them were
inclined to secession, of whom Barron was perhaps chief. As
suming to be the elite of the navy, they were intimate with and
favorites of the secession leaders, and belonged to and moved in
their social and political circle. Some of them had resigned be
fore the change of administration; some, it was understood,
would throw up their commissions whenever the organized au
thorities of their States came in conflict with the Federal Govern
ment; there were others of this court clique who hesitated to
abandon the service, but sought orders which would place them

60 Civil War and Reconstruction

remote from the threatened conflict. Barron, conspicuous as
a courtier, was the agent who had negotiated and -perfected the
agreement between Messrs. Holt and Taucey, of Buchanan s
Cabinet, and Messrs. Mallory and Colonel Chase on the part of
the secessionists, by which the Government was not to reinforce
Fort Pickens unless it should be attacked. He was a cunning and
skilful manager, possessed of considerable diplomatic talents,
and was deep in all the secession intrigues in Washington at that
period. A few weeks after this attempt to thrust him into the
Department, the greater portion of this clique of exclusives sent
in their resignations, deserted the flag, and were dismissed the
service. Barron, foremost among them, was placed by the rebels
in Richmond in command of Fort Hatteras, and on the 29th
of August following was captured by Commodore Stringham,
the officer whom, by the strange proceedings and surreptitious
orders of the 1st of April, he was to have superseded. If I mis
take not, this officer, who, by the order which President Lincoln
unwittingly signed, was to have had almost absolute control of
the Navy Department, and to have been made acquainted with
all its operations, was the first of the naval officers that deserted
who was made prisoner. It is sufficient here to state that the
extraordinary document of the 1st of April was treated as a
nullity. Barron, who took rank as captain in the Confederate
naval service from the 26th of March, five days before this
executive order to create a new bureau and establish him as
regent of the Navy Department was "extracted" from the Presi
dent, was not assigned to duty in the Department, as the in
structions directed. Pendergrast did not go to Vera Cruz nor
Stringham to Pensacola.

When I inquired the object of detaching Commodore String-
ham from duty in the Department where I had placed him, the
President said he had no reason to give, and in regard to issuing
instructions to Commodore Pendergrast he was equally ignorant.
He knew no cause for either. There was, however, a manifest
purpose in some quarter to get rid of the presence of these ex
perienced and trusted officers, and also to get Barron into a
responsible position. I stated to him that the expedition to
Sumter, which we were actively fitting out, would leave us not

Fort Sumter 61

a vessel in commission east of Cape Hatteras, except the Cumber
land, the flag-ship of Commodore Pendegrast, which vessel I had
ordered to Norfolk on the 29th of March, the day that I had
received his instructions to send the Pocahontas, then at that
navy-yard, on this expedition. I protested against sending the
Cumberland away at this juncture. She could, I assured him,
render better service to the country in the waters of Virginia in
this period of uncertainty and danger than at Vera Cruz, and
it seemed to me proper she should be detained at Norfolk,
where Commodore Pendergrast could advise with Commodore
McCauley, who was in command of the station, and be prepared
with a full and efficient crew to render him assistance if neces
sary. The President concurred with me unqualifiedly, depre
cated the interference which had been made in naval affairs,
and said the idea of sending the Cumberland away was not his.
In directing me, without previous consultation or notice, to
detach and send off Commodore Stringham, I confessed to the
President I felt annoyed. The Commodore I knew to be true and
reliable, and had called him to confidential duties on that
account, but he had expressed to me his preference for service
afloat, especially if there should be active duty. I was giving
the subject consideration, and could not object to it, unless
he had been instrumental in procuring this executive order by
indirect management, which was wholly unlike him. The Presi
dent was confident, and I became satisfied on inquiry that
Commodore Stringham had no part in the matter; but there
had been an improper movement, I will not say intrigue, in
some quarter to set him, who had my confidence, aside for
Barron, who had not. It is not necessary to probe these strange
proceedings further. I state the facts. The President wholly dis
avowed and disapproved them; they were not consummated,
and never from that day to the close of his life was there any
similar interference with the administration of the Navy De
partment, nor was any step concerning it taken without first
consulting me.

For a day or two after these proceedings of the 1st of April
there was a delay in issuing final orders for the Sumter expedi
tion. The President continued to hesitate or met opposition.

62 Civil War and Reconstruction

It was still persistently urged that the authorities at Charleston
should be notified of the President s intention to send supplies
to the garrison, a measure which was opposed as likely to defeat
the purpose of the expedition. Mr. Fox, who was to be in com
mand, had, under orders of the President, gone to New York
on the 30th of March, to make necessary preparations; but not
receiving expected instructions, which the discussion in the
Cabinet delayed, he returned to Washington on the 3d of April.
Only twelve days then remained until the supplies in Sumter
would be exhausted. Further postponement would defeat the
object of the expedition. The result was a compromise. The
President decided he would send a messenger to Charleston
when the expedition sailed, but not before, to notify Governor
Pickens of the fact, and that the object was peaceful, and that
no force would be used unless the attempt to provision the
garrison was resisted.

Immediately on this final decision the following orders were
prepared and issued by the Secretaries of War and Navy. My
instructions to Captain Mercer, in command of the Powhatan,
were submitted by myself personally to the President, and by
him were carefully scrutinized and approved:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, April 4, 1861.
Captain G. V. Fox, Washington, D. C.

SIR:

It having been decided to succor Fort Sumter, you have
been selected for this important duty. Accordingly, you
will take charge of the transports in New York, having the
troops and supplies on board, to the entrance of Charleston
harbor; and endeavor, in the first instance, to deliver the
subsistence. If you are opposed in this, you are directed to
report the fact to the senior naval officer of the harbor, who
will be instructed by the Secretary of the Navy to use his
entire force to open a passage, when you will if possible
effect an entrance and place both the troops and supplies
in Fort Sumter.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.

Fort Sumter 63

(Confidential.)
NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 5,1861.

Captain SAMUEL MERCER,

Commanding U. S. steamer Powhatan, N. Y.

The United States steamers Powhatan, Pawnee, Poca
hontas, and Harriet Lane will compose a naval force under
your command, to be sent to the vicinity of Charleston,
S. C., for the purpose of aiding in carrying out the objects
of an expedition of which the War Department has charge.

The primary object of the expedition is to provision
Fort Sumter, for which purpose the War Department will
furnish the necessary transports. Should the authorities of
Charleston permit the fort to be supplied, no further par
ticular service will be required of the force under your com
mand; and after being satisfied that supplies have been
received at the fort, the Powhatan, Pocahontas, and Harriet
Lane will return to new York, and the Pawnee to Wash
ington.

Should the authorities at Charleston, however, refuse to
permit, or attempt to prevent the vessel or vessels having
supplies on board from entering the harbor, or from peace
ably proceeding to Fort Sumter, you will protect the trans
ports or boats of the expedition in the object of their
mission, disposing of your force in such manner as to open
the way for their ingress, and afford as far as practicable
security to the men and boats, and repelling if necessary
all obstructions toward provisioning the fort and reinforc
ing it; for in case of a resistance to the peaceable primary
object of the expedition, a reinforcement of the garrison
will also be attempted. These purposes will be under the
supervision of the War Department, which has charge of
the expedition. The expedition has been intrusted to Cap
tain G. V. Fox, with whom you will put yourself in com
munication, and cooperate with him to accomplish and
carry into effect its object.

You will leave New York with the Powhatan in time to
be off Charleston bar, ten miles distant from and due east
of the light-house, on the morning of the llth instant, there
to await the arrival of the transport or transports with
troops and stores. The Pawnee and Pocahontas will be

64 Civil War and Reconstruction

ordered to join you there at the time mentioned, and also
the Harriet Lane, which latter vessel has been placed under
the control of this Department for this service.

On the termination of the expedition, whether it be
peaceable or otherwise, the several vessels under your com
mand will return to the respective ports, as above directed,
unless some unforseen circumstance should prevent.
I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 5, 1861.
Commander S. C. ROWAN,
Commanding U. S. steamer Pawnee, Norfolk, Va.

SIR:

After the Pawnee shall have been provisioned at Norfolk
you will proceed with her to sea, and on the morning of the
llth instant appear off Charleston bar, ten miles distant
from and due east of the light-house, where you will report
to Captain Samuel Mercer, of the Powhatan, for special
service. Should he not be there you will await his arrival.
I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy.

Sealed instructions similar to those issued to Commander
Rowan were sent to Commander Gillis, of the Pocahontas, and
to Captain Faunce, of the revenue cutter Harriet Lane, which
vessel had been transferred for the occasion by the Secretary
of the Treasury to the Navy Department.

I also learned that the President had himself sent the fol
lowing telegram to the commandant of the Brooklyn Navy-yard
on the 1st of April in relation to the Powhatan, corresponding
with mine of that date, and received at the same moment with
it. This, it will be observed, was on the 1st of April, when he
was signing papers, many, as he said, without reading, and some
hours before my interview with him concerning the papers
brought me by Mr. Nicolay. The telegram was probably pre
pared for his signature and signed by him under the arrange
ment of Mr. Seward and his associates, who had entirely dif-

Fort Sumter 65

ferent objects in view from the legitimate one of the War and
Navy Departments.

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 1, 1861
Received at Brooklyn 6:50 P.M.

To the Commandant of the Navy-yard.

Fit out the Powhatan to go to sea at the earliest possible
moment. Orders by a confidential messenger go forward
to-morrow.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

The time specified for the squadron to rendezvous off
Charleston light was brief, but the emphatic preparatory orders
enabled us to get them off with unprecedented despatch. I
congratulated myself on the energy and activity with which this
work had been accomplished, and was prepared to await re
sults, when Mr. Seward and his son Frederick called at Willard s
about eleven o clock at night on the 6th of April with a tele
gram from Meigs and Porter at New York, the purport of which
was, that there was difficulty in completing arrangements, in
consequence of conflicting orders from the Secretary of the
Navy. I asked an explanation, for I knew of no movement with
which my orders conflicted. Mr. Seward said he supposed the
telegram related to some difficulty about Lieutenant Porter s
taking command of the Powhatan. I insisted this must be a
mistake, that Captain Mercer was in command of the Powhatan;
that she was as he knew the flagship of the Sumter expedition,,
and had, I presumed, left that evening for her destination; that
Lieutenant Porter had no orders to join that expedition; that
he had sought and was under orders for the Pacific on coast
survey service, and I supposed had left for that duty; that he
was not from his rank entitled to any such command as the
Powhatan, and I knew not what business he had in New York
interfering with the measures of the Department, and embar
rassing his superior officer, Captain Mercer, in the performance
of his duty. Mr. Seward said there was some mistake, some
misunderstanding; that Lieutenant Porter had been sent to
New York under special orders from the President, of which

66 Civil War and Reconstruction

I had probably not been informed. I questioned whether the
President would detach and send away an officer without at
least informing the Department, certainly not to take command
of a ship that was in commission; that such irregular proceedings
would throw the departments and government into confusion,
and were wholly inconsistent with correct and systematic ad
ministration. There were, it seemed, naval orders issued with
out the knowldege af the head of the Navy Department, or of
any one connected with it. He suggested that perhaps Com
modore Stringham had some facts. Barron was, by the instruc
tions of the 1st of April, which Mr. Seward and his friends had
prepared, to have been then in Stringham s place. I at once
sent for Commodore Stringham, who had retired for the night.
On his appearance he disclaimed all knowledge of this extra
ordinary proceeding.

Mr. Seward, without making any disclosure of the object
in which Meigs and Porter were engaged, declared it was a
measure of the President s. Late as it was, I insisted it was
indispensable that we should have an immediate interview with
him in order to prevent the failure of the Sumter expedition,
as well as to have a right understanding of what the Govern
ment was about, and to clear up any clashing of orders. We
accordingly repaired to the executive mansion, Commodore
Stringham and Mr. Frederick Seward accompanying us. On our
way thither, Mr. Seward remarked to me that, old as he was,
he had learned a lesson from this experience, which was that
he had better attend to his own business, not interfere with
others, and confine his labors to his proper Department. To
all of which I assented.

The President, who had not retired, although it was nearly
midnight, was astonished and perplexed in regard to the state
ments which we made. He looked first at one and then at the
other; read and re-read the telegram, and asked if I was not in
error in regard to the flag-ship. I assured him I was not, and
reminded him that I had read to him my orders to Captain
Mercer on the day they were written, and they had met his
approval. He recollected that circumstance, but not the name
of the officer or the vessel said he had become confused with

Fort Sumtcr 67

the names of Pocahontas and Powhatan. Commodore Stringham,
to whom I had communicated the instructions, confirmed my
statement; but to satisfy the President beyond peradventure, 1
went to the Department, although it was past midnight, and
procured the press copy. On reading it, he distinctly recollected
all the facts, and turning promptly to Mr. Seward said the
Powhatan must be restored to Mercer; that he had never sup
posed he was interfering with the Sumter expedition; that on
no consideration should it be defeated or rendered abortive.
Mr. Seward thought it was now too late to correct the mistake;
said he considered the other project the most important, and
asked whether that would not be injured if the Powhatan was
now withdrawn. The President would not discuss the subject,
but was peremptory said there was not the pressing necessity
in the other case, which I learned was an enterprise for Pickens.
As regarded Sumter, however, not a day was to be lost that the
orders of the Secretary of the Navy must be carried out, and he
directed Mr. Seward to telegraph to that effect to New York
without a moment s delay. Mr. Seward thought it might be
difficult to get a telegram through, it was so late; but the
President was imperative.

I learned from the President then, and more fully thereafter,
that Mr. Seward, after the final decision to relieve Sumter, had
been more solicitous and importunate than ever to send re
inforcements to Pickens; that this had been the great object in
view on the 1st of April, when those strange orders had been
issued which he had incautiously signed; that it was considered
important the Pickens movement should be secret none of the
Cabinet even had been advised of it. Mr. Seward had under
taken to get up that enterprise and give the necessary military
and naval orders without consulting the War and Navy De
partments. With this view, and to possess himself of techni
calities, he had selected Captain Meigs, of the army, and
Lieutenant Porter, of the navy, as his assistants and agents, and
by the aid of these subordinate officers the Secretary of State
had fitted out a combined military and naval expedition.
Captain Meigs says, in a letter which he has published, "Mr.
Seward carried me to the President, merely saying that he

68 Civil War and Reconstruction

thought the President ought to see some of the younger officers,
and not consult only with men who, if the war broke out, could
not mount a horse," alluding to General Scott, whose age and
infirmities precluded him from active duties. When I questioned
whether the officers of either service would obey the orders of
the Secretary of State, the President said Mr. Seward had pro
vided for that by persuading him to sign or countersign the
orders. Such a practice, I stated, would lead to confusion in the
Government. The head of each department was responsible for
its own expenditures, and must know the status and acts of its
own subordinates. If the Secretary of the Navy should need the
immediate service of Lieutenant Porter, and were to send him
orders demanding instant execution, and he could not be found,
but was absent by the secret interference of the Secretary of
State, or any other Secretary, without leave or knowledge of the
Department, great embarrassment and confusion must follow.
So in regard to Captain Meigs and others of the army. We had,
moreover, a record in the Navy Department of every naval vessel,
and of the service on which each ship in commission was de
tailed. By our record the Powhatan, under command of Captain
Mercer, had gone to Charleston, and was thence to return. But
this official record was not a true one. The vessel was lost to us.
We knew nothing of her whereabouts, except what I inci
dentally learned through the Secretary of State. He was not
responsible for the funds of either the Navy or War Depart
ments, yet he had taken upon himself a large expenditure from
each, and had issued naval and military orders without the
knowledge of the heads of those departments. In doing this he
had committed something more than a discourtesy towards his
associates in the Cabinet. It was an assumption and exercise of
authority that did not legitimately belong to him. The Secretary
of State had cuddled with subordinates of other departments,
and had I thought unfortunately, induced the President to
sanction these strange proceedings by his signature.

The President never attempted to justify or excuse these
transactions; always spoke of the doings of that 1st of April as
unfortunate; said that we were all new in the administration;

Fort Sumter 69

that he permitted himself, with the best intentions, to be drawn
into an impropriety without sufficient examination and reflec
tion, but he was confident no similar error would again occur.

It has been said that the detachment of the Powhatan from
the Sumter expedition was a deliberate contrivance to defeat
it, by secretly withdrawing the flag-ship, without which success
was impracticable if there was resistance to sending in supplies.
The published correspondence of the rebel Commissioners and
of Judge Campbell is cited as corroborating this assumption
that the Powhatan was purposely detached in order to compel
evacuation, and enable the Secretary of State to preserve "faith
as regards Sumter" with the rebel leaders. A comparison of
dates in that correspondence, when pledges and assurances are
alleged to have been given, with the proceedings and consulta
tions of the Administration in cabinet from time to time in the
months of March and April, goes far to verify the charge that
there was an understanding between certain parties which made
it necessary to defeat the Sumter expedition by detaching the
flag-ship after all other measures to prevent relief had failed.
It is not necessary here to inquire whether the Confederate Com
missioners appeared in Washington on the day after the inau
guration by any preconcert, or whether they delayed visiting
Washington until the expiration of Mr. Buchanan s term pur
suant to arrangement or previous understanding of which the
new Administration was ignorant.

The Hon. Montgomery Blair, in a speech of much historical
interest, delivered by him at Clarksville, in Maryland, in August,
1865, declares that "Mr. Seward acted in concert with the
Buchanan Administration during the last three months of its
term. He was no doubt advised through Mr. Stanton, who was
in Buchanan s Cabinet, of the policy it had adopted in refer
ence to the seizure of everything that appertained to the nation
in the South. It was owing to the coalition then formed between
Mr. Seward and Mr. Stanton that the latter became Secretary
of War to Mr. Lincoln. He apprised Mr. Seward of this treaty
of the War and Navy Departments under Buchanan to make
no resistance to the policy of dissolving the Union to offer no

7Q Civil War and Reconstruction

coercion to impede its march to independence; and Mr. Se-
ward s course showed that he approved and adopted that

policy."

Mr. Blair, on the authority of Judge Campbell, charges Mr.
Seward with giving a pledge to evacuate Fort Sumter; and Mr.
Thurlow Weed, die intimate friend, companion, oracle, and
organ of Mr. Seward, in some semi-official remarks on the rebel
correspondence, justified the coalition, and says: "That Gov
ernor Seward conversed freely with Judge Campbell we do not
deny, nor do we doubt that in these conversations, at one period,
he intimated that Fort Sumter would be evacuated. He certainly
believed so, founding his opinion upon a knowledge of General
Scott s recommendation/

The assurance claimed to have been given on the 15th of
March, that Sumter would be evacuated, it will be noted, was
immediately after Commander Ward had abandoned the idea
of relieving the garrison, and after Gen. Scott pronounced Mr.
Fox s plan which was feasible in February-now impracticable.
It was repeated with a qualification on the 1st of April, the
day on which orders were "extracted" from the President con
ferring on Meigs and Porter unlimited authority, and placing
all the naval vessels at their disposal. It was reaffirmed on the
7th of April, the day after the Powhatan had sailed for Pickens.
instead of Sumter. The notification to Governor Pickens that
supplies would be sent, which was officially communicated to
him on the 8th, as soon as the squadron sailed; the secret and
mysterious detachment of the flag-ship without the knowledge
of the Secretary of the Navy or any one connected with the
Navy Department or with the Sumter expedition, which the
author of the proposition must have known would render the
expedition abortive and the evacuation of the fort inevitable,,
have 5 all of them the appearance of one persistent and connected
purposewhether in fulfilment of any pledge or understanding,
is a point I shall not here discuss. They were matters of which
I was at the time of their occurrence wholly uninformed, and
when I learned them I could not, with a proper regard for the
public service in that period of difficulty, have exposed them.

Fort Sumter 71

I therefore submitted to be blamed, while those who secretly
brought them about escaped responsibility and censure.

There was certainly no necessity for taking from Captain
Mercer his vessel and sending her to Pensacola, where most of
the naval force of the home squadron was collected. She was,
however, absolutely indispensable to the success of the Sumter
expedition. Yet General Meigs says, in his published letter, "An
order was extracted (from the President) on the recommendation
of Secretary Seward, detaching the Powhatan from the Sumter
expedition and sending her to Fort Pickens."

By this "extracted" order she was withdrawn from duties
where her presence was all-essential, and sent to the Gulf, where
she was not required. The ostensible object of this military and
naval enterprise to Pickens, undertaken by the Secretary of
State without the knowledge of the Secretary of War or the
Secretary of the Navy, was the importance of strengthening that
fortress; but the Secretary of State well knew that measures had
already been taken to reinforce that post. The troops on the
Brooklyn, lying off Pensacola, and destined to strengthen the
garrison, which had been detained on board since January, in
accordance with the agreement or understanding between
Messrs. Holt and Toucey and some of the rebel leaders, had
been ordered to disembark. As early as the 12th of March I had
sent the Crusader, with orders from General Scott to Captain
Vodges to land his command and assist Slemmer in defending
Pickens. This order from the Lieutenant-General the senior
naval officer on the station, Captain Adams, would not recog
nize, nor permit to be executed, in consequence of the agree
ment of the previous winter, that the Government would not
reinforce its own garrison provided the insurgents would not
attack it. Doubting, however, the correctness of his position,
he sent Lieutenant Gwathmey, a special messenger, overland to
Washington, stating his embarrassment, and asking of me
specific orders. This messenger reached Washington on the 6th
of April, and I that evening sent Lieutenant Worden, of sub
sequent Monitor fame, with a brief but explicit order to Captain
Adams to land the troops. This was on the very evening, and

72 Civil War and Reconstruction

but a few hours before Mr. Seward, with his son, called on me
with the telegram from Meigs and Porter in regard to the
Powhatan. My order Lieutenant Worden committed to memory
between Washington and Richmond, and then destroyed the
writing, lest he should be arrested and searched. Travelling
day and night, he reached Pensacola on the 12th of April, and
the troops were disembarked and Pickens reinforced on the
evening of the day that fire was opened on Sumter, and while
that fort was being bombarded. The Powhatan, under command
of Lieutenant Porter, which had been withdrawn from the Sum
ter expedition ostensibly to relieve Pickens, did not arrive off
Pensacola until the 17th of April, five days after the fort had
been reinforced and made safe by landing Vogdes s command,
pursuant to the order sent from the Navy Department by Lieu
tenant Worden. There was, doubtless, an object in sending the
Powhatan to Pensacola, and there was, of course, an object in
secreting the fact, and withholding all knowldege of the enter
prise from both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the
Navy, who, of all others, should have known it. If that object
was, as has been stated, not so much to relieve Pickens as to
prevent the relief of Sumter and necessitate the evacuation, the
object was attained. The pledge "Faith in regard to Sumter
wait and see," will be understood. Faith may thereby have
been kept with the rebel leaders, though faith towards the
Secretaries of War and Navy may be less susceptible of ex
planation.

The following are the orders from the President which led
to the withdrawal of the Powhatan from her destination, to the
breaking of Captain Mercer s orders, and to his detachment
from his vessel by a lieutenant without the knowledge of the
Secretary of the Navy, and without any record of the transaction
in the Navy Department:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 1, 1861.
Lieutenant D. D. Porter, U. S. Navy.

SIR:

You will proceed to New York, and, with the least pos
sible delay, assuming command of any naval steamer avail-

Fort Sumter 73

able, proceed to Pensacola harbor, and at any cost or risk
prevent any expedition from the main land reaching Fort
Pickens or Santa Rosa Island.

You will exhibit this order to any Naval officer at Pensa
cola, if you deem it necessary, after you have established
yourself within the harbor, and will request cooperation
by the entrance of at least one other steamer.

This order, its object, and your destination will be com
municated to no person whatever until you reach the
harbor of Pensacola.

Recommended WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN*

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, April I, 186L

Lieutenant D. D. Porter will take command of the
steamer Powhatan, or any other U. S. steamer ready for sea
which he may deem most fit for the service to which he
has been assigned by confidential instructions of this date.

All officers are commanded to afford him all such facili
ties as he may deem necessary for getting to sea as soon as
possible.

He will select the officers to accompany him.

Recommended WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

WASHINGTON, EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 1, 1861.

All officers of the army and navy to whom this order
may be exhibited will aid, by every means in their power,
the expedition under the command of Colonel Harvey
Brown, supplying him with men and material, and co
operating with him as he may desire.

A true copy:

M. C. MEIGS, Captain of Engineers,

Chief Engineer of said Expedition.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

74 Civil War and Reconstruction

These orders, signed by the President, were part of the
papers prepared by Mr. Seward, with the assistance of Captain
Meigs and Lieutenant Porter, on the 1st of April, when the
Executive order to create a new bureau, and directing me to
take Barron, the agent and mediator in the Pickens intrigue
and captain in the rebel service, into my confidence, and make
him the detailing officer of the Navy Department, was "ex
tracted" from the President and sent to me. The papers relating
to the Pickens expedition were not disclosed to me, however,
until after the midnight interview of the 6th of April, and
after the Sumter expedition had sailed on an abortive mission.
Apprehensive, it would seem, that the general order of the 1st
of April to Lieutenant Porter might not be conclusive with
Captain Mercer, who was a strict disciplinarian, and would
hesitate to obey any order that did not emanate regularly from
or pass through the Navy Department, the following specific
letter was prepared on the 2d of April, and the President s
signature thereto procured:

WASHINGTON CITY, April 2, 1861.
Captain S. MERCER, U. S. Navy.

SIR:

Circumstances render it necessary to place in command
of your ship (and for a special purpose) an officer who is
fully informed and instructed in relation to the wishes of
the Government; and you will therefore consider yourself
detached. But in taking this step the Government does not
in the least reflect upon your efficiency or patriotism, but
on the contrary have the fullest confidence in your ability
to perform any duty required of you. Hoping soon to be
able to give you a better command than the one you now
enjoy, and trusting that you will have full confidence in
the disposition of the Government towards you,

I remain, etc.,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

A true copy:

M. C. MEIGS, Captain of Engineers,

Chief Engineer of Expedition of Colonel Brown.

Fort Sumter 75

Captain Mercer wrote me on the 8th the following letter,
explaining under what circumstances he had given up his vessel:

NAVY-YARD, New York, April, 8, 1861.
To the Hon. GIDEON WELLES,,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington City.

SIR:

Your "confidential" instructions of the 5th instant were
received on the next day, and I was on the eve of carrying
them out when Lieutenant D. D. Porter, of the navy, and
Captain Meigs, of the army, came to ine, showing such
written instructions from the President, and verbally com
municating other facts showing their authority from this
high source, that Lieutenant Porter s being placed in com
mand of the Powhatan was virtually necessary, and that the
President s positive commands to both of these officers were
that no deviation from his instructions should be made
unless by his own direction.

Under these circumstances, I regarded the order from the
President of the United States as imperative, and accord
ingly placed Lieutenant Porter in command of the Pow
hatan.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

SAMUEL MERCER, Captain.

Mr. Seward, in obedience to the midnight mandate of Presi
dent Lincoln, on the 6th of April sent the following telegram
to Lieutenant Porter, but the Powhatan had left the Navy-yard
when the despatch was received:

Give up the Powhatan to Captain Mercer. SEWARD.

Commander, subsequently Rear-Admiral Foote was at that
time Executive Officer of the Brooklyn Navy-yard, and on
receiving this telegram of Mr. Seward, he despatched a tug in
pursuit. But this despatch was a mere telegram signed "Seward/ 1
while Lieutenant Porter had full written power from the Presi
dent, which, even if there were no other understanding, he felt
would be his justification in retaining the Powhatan from her

76 Civil War and Reconstruction

legitimate commander. He therefore continued on with the
vessel, and the Sumter expedition was robbed of its flag-ship.
These extraordinary proceedings, wherein the Secretary of
State assumed the duties and functions of the War and Navy
Departments, without the knowledge of the head of either of
those departments, caused surprise and for a time some little
dissatisfaction. The President did not conceal his mortification
and regret at the occurrence, but with characteristic unselfish
ness assumed all the blame, declared it was his neglect, and in
a letter to Mr. Fox, who felt annoyed that his plan had failed,
President Lincoln said: "By accident, for which you were in no
wise responsible, and possibly I to some extent was, you were
deprived of a war vessel with her men, which you deemed of
great importance to the enterprise." It was, however, no fault
originating with him, but a piece of maladministration, of im
proper and inexcusable interference by one department with
others, of apparent distrust where there should have been un
restricted confidence, andaside from any pledge to or compli
city with the rebel leaders had other serious objections, which
the President assured me more than once would never be re
peated. It was not. Nor had I ever after a like experience.
Neither then nor ever during our subsequent intimate personal
and official relations, in many and great trials, was there any
misunderstanding between us, nor did I ever have occasion to
doubt the upright sincerity and honest intentions of that extra
ordinary man, who to the last moment of his life honored me
with his confidence and friendship. He had, however, been once
led into error, and there had been manifested by the head of
one department a disposition to interfere with and manage
other departments, so subversive of correct administration that,
to guard against future similar proceedings so far as the navy
was concerned, and to prevent the confusion that must in
evitably follow from such irregularities, I took occasion, as
opportunity presented, to caution naval officers in regard to
the orders which they might receive. Commodore Paulding was
going at that time to New York, and I sent by him to Com
mander Foote, an old and valued friend from the days "when

Fort Sumter 77

we were boys together," a word on the importance of receiving
orders from the proper source. When these suggestions were
communicated I had not seen the secret orders signed by the
President, nor was I aware how far he had been committed to
these irregular proceedings. Commander Foote wrote me, after
his interview with Commodore Paulding, the following letter:

(Private.)

NAVY-YARD, New York, April 9, 1861.
Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR:

Commodore Paulding quietly informed me this morning,
that you had suggested to him to say to me in a kind way,
that I had better execute no orders unless coming from you.

I fully appreciate the delicate manner in which you have
communicated your impressions to me, but I beg to say,
most respectfully, in my own vindication, that in reference
to the sailing of the Powhatan, specially referred to, I did
detain that vessel as far as I had authority to do it, on re
ceiving your telegram to do so, and until Captain Mercer,
my superior officer, informed me that he should transfer
his ship to Lieutenant-Commander Porter, who would sail
with her, as he did, on the 6th instant. Again, in referring
to the events of the past week, I believe that in a personal
interview I could fully show that I have pursued the only
course which could possibly have accomplished the work
which has been executed; and in case of the Powhatan, after
preparing her for sea in the shortest space of time, agreeably
to your orders, as I was only a commander and not the
commandant, my authority over her ceased, and she was
controlled by my superior officer. In fact, I was not con
sulted, nor was I even present, when Captains Mercer,
Meigs, and Porter in consultation concluded that the ship
should be placed in the hands of Captain, or rather Lieu
tenant-Commanding Porter.

I have the honor to be, with much respect and esteem,
your obedient servant,

ANDREW H. FOOTE.

78 Civil War and Reconstruction

When the President, after much hesitation, finally decided
that an attempt should be made to supply Fort Sumter, it was
coupled, as stated, with the further decision that the authorities
at Charleston should be informed of his intention that supplies
would be sent peaceably or otherwise by force. This notification
and qualification was acquiesced in, though none of the Cabinet
except Mr. Seward were advised of any pledge, or pledges, or
understanding with the rebel Commissioners, and that he was
a party I have no knowledge except what is communicated in
the statements of the rebel Commissioners, the remarks of Mr.
Blair, and the semi-official admissions of Mr. Thurlow Weed,
the confidential friend of Mr. S., and I may add also by the
attending circumstances. Indeed, it was understood those Com
missioners were not to be recognized or treated with. If, as is
claimed, any promise was given them, directly or by implication,
that Fort Sumter should be evacuated, it was unauthorized.
At one time, after hearing the views of Generals Scott and
Totten, and Major Anderson and his officers, the opinion of
each of the members of the Administration was obtained, and
all, with the exception of Mr. Blair, came to the conclusion
that it would be impossible to provision the garrison. The
pledge or assurance that the fort should be evacuated is claimed
to have been given through Judge Campbell at that time. It
was, if made, a communication of Cabinet consultations and
understandings that were yet in embryo, and which the results
showed were not conclusive. In fact, the final decision was in
direct opposition to and in conflict with such a pledge, for it
was decided the fort should not be evacuated without an at
tempt to relieve it. The first assurance, given in March, is
claimed to have been unqualified that Sumter should be evacu
ated. But Judge Campbell says he received on the 1st of April,
from the Secretary of State, the following statement in writing:
"I am satisfied the Government will not undertake to supply
Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor P." On the very
day of its date the order to Porter was given, and on the suc
ceeding day the further order which displaced Mercer and with
drew the Powhatan from the Sumter expedition was, to use the
word of General Meigs, "extracted" from the President without

Fort Sumter 70

his being aware of the effect of those orders. Judge Campbell
and the Commissioners appear to have rested quietly under the
modified assurance of the 1st of April; but alarmed by the prep
arations which the Government was making in New York, Judge
C, on the 7th of April, addressed a note to Mr. Seward and
received in reply: "Faith as to Sumter fully kept-wait and see."
When this pledge was given the Powhatan had left, not for
Sumter as ordered by the Government under command of
Captain Mercer, but for Pensacola under Lieutenant Porter.

The expedition, without the flag-ship, sailed on the 6th
and 7th of April. On the 8th Governor Pickens was officially
advised of the fact, and, as the vessels were to rendezvous ten
miles off Charleston light on the llth, there was ample time
allowed the insurgents to make preparations for resistance.
There would seem to have been a deliberate purpose to render
the Sumter expedition the first of the war abortive; to prevent
the garrison from receiving supplies; to compel Major Anderson
to surrender and evacuate the fort; for every step taken, every
measure adopted, was met and thwarted by counteracting meas
ures, most of them secret, emanating from or sanctioned by the
President, who was unsuspectingly made to defeat his own orders
and purposes. How far the conferees of different parties who
held counsel or were in communication on these matters in the
winter of 1861, had become committed to or were complicated
in any scheme or policy in relation to the final disposition of
Fort Sumter, has never been stated. The relief of the garrison
and the abandonment of the fortress were questions earnestly
discussed in the Buchanan Cabinet; but action was postponed
until his retirement. Under what arrangement, pledge, or under
standing, if any, that postponement took place, is not publicly
known. Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet, with one exception per
haps, were not parties to it.

The secessionists seem to have anticipated there would be
a peaceful surrender of the fort; that the Confederate Com
missioners would be eventually received and their diplomatic
character recognized; that the wayward sisters would be per
mitted to go in peace; and it was prophesied that a satisfactory
adjustment would take place in ninety days. But hopes proved

80 Civil War and Reconstruction

delusive and prophecies failures, for scarcely half that number
of days elapsed after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln when the
great conflict commenced at Sumter.

An interesting history of the Sumter expedition has been
given by Mr. Fox, who commanded it, and is published in
Boynton s "History of the Navy during the Rebellion," which
I should be glad to incorporate into this statement, but am
prevented by its length. The squadron encountered a gale
soon after leaving Sandy Hook, and none of the vessels readied
the place of rendezvous until the morning of the 12th of April.
The rebels had been informed on the 8th of the intention of
the Administration to send supplies to the garrison, and a cor
respondence was immediately opened on receiving this notice
between Beauregard, in command of the insurgent forces, and
the rebel government at Montgomery, ending with a demand of
immediate surrender. On the refusal of Major Anderson, fire
was opened at 4:30 A.M. of the 12th on the fortress, and Mr.
Fox, who arrived in the army transport Baltic, found only the
Harriet Lane at the rendezvous. The Pawnee arrived a 6 A.M.
Mr. Fox at once boarded her and requested her commander to
stand in to the bar with him; but Commander Rowan replied,
"that his orders required him to remain ten miles east of the
light and await the Powhatan." The Baltic and the Harriet
Lane therefore proceeded, and as they neared the land the
firing was heard and the smoke and shells from the batteries
were visible. No other vessel of the squadron arrived that day,
but, says Mr. Fox, "feeling sure that the Powhatan would arrive
during the night, as she had sailed from New York two days
before us, I stood out to the appointed rendezvous and made
signals all night. The morning of the 13th was thick and foggy."
No Powhatan appeared. In the course of the day he "learned
for the first time that Commander Rowan had received a note
from Captain Mercer, of the Powhatan, dated at New York on
the 6th, the day he sailed, stating the Powhatan was detached
by superior authority from the duty to which she was assigned
off Charleston, and had sailed for another destination. I left
New York two days afterwards without any intimation of this
change."

Fort Sumter 81

Mr. Fox adds: "My plan for supplying Fort Sumter required
three hundred sailors, a full supply of armed launches, and three
tugs. The Powhatan carried the sailors and launches, and when
this vessel was about to leave in obedience to the orders of the
Secretary of the Navy, two officers, Lieutenant D. D. Porter,
U. S. Navy, and Captain M. C. Meigs, U. S. Engineers, presented
themselves on board with an order from the President of the
United States, authorizing the former to take any vessel what
ever in commission and proceed immediately to the Gulf of
Mexico. This order did not pass through the Navy Department,
and was unknown to the Secretary of the Nav^ and when
signed by the President he was not conscious that his signature
would deprive me of the means to accomplish an object which
he held to be of vital importance." The squadron with supplies,
but without flag-ship and men and launches which had been
provided on her, was powerless. It might have been unavailing
after the gale separated it, and the insurgents were notified and
had time to prepare for its reception. But the strange detach
ment of the Powhatan would, under any circumstances, have
rendered the expedition fruitless. Whatever unpleasant feeling
may have existed at the moment on the part of any member of
the Cabinet or of the President himself in regard to the failure
of the Sumter expedition, or the fitting out of a military expedi
tion by the Secretary of State to strengthen the already rein
forced garrison at Pickens, to which was surreptitiously and
needlessly added an important naval vessel, ordered to other
duty, was of short duration. It was, however, an experience
not without its lesson, and resulting benefits to the Administra
tion, for it contributed to settle in some degree and define the
province of the different departments of the Government under
President Lincoln. Until these occurrences there was, in some
quarters, an impression, not to say assumption, that the Secre
tary of State occupied in the Administration a position analo
gous to that of the Premier in Great Britain; that he was
virtually the Executive the acting President; and that his orders
extended to and controlled the other departments. The Presi
dent soon corrected these great errors. He let it be understood
that he was President in fact as well as in name, and though

82 Civil War and Reconstruction

not exempt from the influence of associates, he was particularly
careful thereafter that no one of the Secretaries should arrogate,
and, without assent or knowledge, exercise the functions of
another. His trust and confidence was given to each one of his
political family without reserve or limitation. Each was but a
part of the Executive, of which the President was chief.

Prior to these events there had been no regular stated
Cabinet meetings. The members were frequently convened,
almost invariably by special invitation through the Secretary
of State, sometimes in full session; sometimes only such as were
particularly interested in the subject-matter were invited, with
the exception of the Secretary of State, who usually issued the
notices to the heads of departments to assemble, and was always
present on every occasion and whatever were the measures under
consideration. To obviate difficulties and prevent a recurrence
of such proceedings as had taken place, as well as to avail him
self of the views of each and all his Cabinet on public affairs,
the President soon after directed that there should be regular
Cabinet sessions at meridian on Tuesdays and Fridays, at which
important measures of administration should be submitted.

The attempt by the Government, in the discharge of its
imperative duty, to send supplies to a garrison in one of the
forts belonging to the United States, met, it will be seen, with
many embarrassments, and when finally made, was forcibly
resisted by the insurgents at Charleston, who then and there
placed themselves in open, defiant rebellion, fired the first gun,
committed the first act of war, and commenced the first assault
on the flag, the troops, and a national fortress. After a bombard
ment of two days, Fort Sumter was evacuated on the 14th of
April, and on the next day, the 15th, President Lncoln issued
his proclamation calling for seventy-five thousand men, and con
vening Congress in special session on the 4th of July.

3

Fort Pickens

FACTS IN RELATION TO THE REINFORCEMENT
OF FORT PICKENS, IN THE SPRING OF 1861

The most important fort along the Gulf Coast which
the Federal navy retained throughout the Civil Wat
was Fort Pickens in Pensacola Harbor. To demonstrate
clearly that the Navy Department had taken steps to
secure this installation in Florida long before David
Dixon Porter arrived aboard the Powhatan, the Secre
tary of the Navy here recalls the details connected with
the relief of the Fort.

I? LORIDA, IN MANY particulars a favored State, became
from the time of its admission into the Union almost a de
pendency of South Carolina, and followed and seconded that
nullifying and seceding commonwealth in all its wayward move
ments. From its locality as a key to the Gulf of Mexico, the
maritime outlet of the great central valley of the Union, and
as regards the interests of commerce and navigation generally,
the southern peninsula was of value and importance to the
country. The limited population of the territory, which at the
time of its admission was hardly equal to what was requisite for
a single representative district, gave it little claim to recognition
as a State. The territory was originally purchased from Spain,
during the Monroe administration, at a cost of several millions;
but many times the amount of the first purchase had been ex
pended from the Federal treasury in subduing and expelling

The Galaxy, XI (January, 1871).

83

84 Civil War and Reconstruction

the wild and refractory population, consisting of Indians, ne
groes, mixed breeds, piratical adventurers, and outlaws, who
had made the swamps and everglades a place of refuge so long
as it was a province of Spain. In 1845 the few and not yet
homogeneous inhabitants, were organized and admitted into
the Federal Union as a State. The act was premature and un
wise, but it was done in order to preserve what the politicians
of that day termed "the equilibrium of the States." This theory
of the "equilibrium" was one of the many strange compromises
or expedients which were resorted to by certain conspicuous
party leaders, who made it a study to evade or postpone im
mediate action on difficult and exciting questions as they arose,
instead of boldly meeting and honestly disposing of them. By
this particular compromise or theory of "equilibrium," no free
State, whatever might be the number of its inhabitants, its
claims, or its self-sustaining ability as a distinct community,
could be recognized and admitted as a State into the Federal
Union, unless there was corresponding slave territory also ad
mitted, no matter how few its inhabitants, or small their ability
to support a government, nor how meagre their claim to State
recognition. Florida, petted and nursed for nearly thirty years
after its acquisition, a constant draft and drag on the Federal
treasury, with an insufficient population, and with no claims
whatever to be a State, was admitted into the Federal Union
in 1845, as an offset to Iowa, in order to preserve the equilib
rium compromise; a compromise which served to beget and
foster that sectional hostility which eventuated in civil war
that had for its object, and which threatened the destruction
of the Union.

The delegate from Florida when a territory, and at the time
of its admission as a State, was David L. Yulee. He was elected
its first Senator, and held that position until the passage of
the ordinance of secession, which assumed to sever the con
nection of that purchased territory and feeble community with
the Federal Government, when he resigned Ms seat and with
drew from Congress. Yulee was of Hebrew origin. His father,
if I mistake not, was a Barbary Jew. He first took his seat in
Congress under, the name of David Levy, to which he subse-

Fort Pickens gg

quently appended the name of Yulee. He was not destitute of
ability, but like too many of our legislators, his views were
narrow and mercenary, and his talents and efforts were to a
great extent employed in obtaining local favors from the Govern
ment for his State and himself, rather than in national legisla
tion, and measures of broad and expansive statesmanship. Fa
vored by circumstances, he had great influence over the sparse
and heterogeneous .population, composed in a great measure of
adventurers, and was active and potent in the secession move
ment. Yulee is brother-in-law of the Hon. Joseph Holt, the
present Judge-Advocate-General of the Army, and Secretary of
War when Florida seceded; each had married a daughter of
Charles A. Wickliffe of Kentucky, who was Postmaster-General
under John Tyler.

The ordinance of secession, which declared this feeble and
scattered community "a sovereign and independent nation,"
was passed by a State Convention which had been assembled
on the 10th of January, 1861, and the Navy-yard at Pensacola
was seized by the rebels on the 12th, two days after. Lieutenant
Adam J. Slemmer, who was at the time in command of Fort
McRae, hastily evacuated it when he became aware of the
treason and treachery on foot, and with about eighty men took
possession of Pickens, a more important and formidable fortress,
on Santa Rosa Island. This post, with Fort Jefferson at the
Dry Tortugas, and Fort Taylor at Key West the two last lying
off the Florida coast remained in possession of the Government
when the change of administration took place on the 4th of
March. It was asserted on the 10th of January, by the Conven
tion which adopted the ordinance of secession, that "the State
of Florida is hereby declared a sovereign and independent na
tion." But, by an understanding which the Federal Government
soon after entered into with certain rebel leaders, the "sovereign
and independent nation" of Florida consented to abstain from
extending its authority over the forts of the United States by
any belligerent act, provided the Federal Government would
in the mean time remain inactive. Under this understanding or
truce with those who were plotting the disruption of the Union,
the dignity, power, and rightful authority of the Federal Gov-

86 Civil War and Reconstruction

ernment during the winter of 1861 seemed to the conspirators
and to the world like the expiring Administration near their
termination.

In the exercise of its power as a "sovereign and independent
nation," Florida had taken possession of the Navy-yard and
forts at Pensacola, with the exception of Pickens, which the
"nation" and its abettors forbore to attack for the time being
under the truce referred to; and from the same cause, or from
lack of ability and means, the winter passed away without that
"nation s" occupying Forts Taylor and Jefferson, on the Tor-
tugas and at Key West.

Several statements, official, semi-official, and otherwise, have
been made in relation to the relief of these forts, and especially
in regard to the first reinforcement of Fort Pickens, in the spring
of 186L None of the published accounts present a full and
correct narrative of all the facts and circumstances connected
with the relief and reinforcement, on two several occasions, of
that fortress. The differing statements may be accounted for,
in part at least, by the fact that there were several movements
at different dates, and by different parties, to effect that object,
and to provide for the security of Pickens and points off the
Florida coast.

The Buchanan Administration, after the surrender of the
Navy-yard at Pensacola, had as early as January sent out an
artillery force under Captain Vogdes, on board the steamer
Brooklyn, to reinforce the garrison in Fort Pickens; but before
the troops were landed the truce was entered into that the
Government would pursue a policy of inaction, provided the
rebels would make no assault. This truce or armistice, though
not reduced to writing, seems to have been faithfully observed
by those who were administering the Government, and, as
regards Pickens, by those who were plotting its overthrow. At
Pensacola, as at Charleston, the Government under Mr. Bu
chanan remained passive, while the conspirators were active
and unrestrained. This non-coercive policy of the Government
appears to have been adopted after the troops to reinforce
Pickens had embarked at Fortress Monroe upon the Brooklyn,
but before that vessel reached Pensacola. Consequently, Captain

Fort Pickens 87

Vogdes s command was not permitted to land, but was detained
on board until after the expiration of Mr. Buchanan s term
of service. This suspension of action by the Government, and
abstinence from the exercise of rightful power a compromise
with those who were openly resisting and defying Federal au
thoritythis arrangement by which the Government agreed not
to reinforce its own garrisons in its own forts, as at Sumter and
Pickens this consenting that the troops should be restrained
from landing, and detained for weeks on shipboard within
sight of their destination had a most unhappy and depressing
influence on the friends of the Union, and tended to inspire
and encourage those who were opposed to it.

When the change of administration took place on the 4th
of March, and Mr. Lincoln entered upon his duties as Chief
Magistrate, he found the Government without extra means or
preparation to maintain its power or enforce its authority. The
retiring Administration had done nothing to suppress the in
surrection, while the rebels, under the quasi-armistice, had been
active and untiring in promoting it. A change of policy, as well
as a change of administration, took place on the inauguration
of President Lincoln; but some little time and preparation
were necessary to get the Government on a permanent footing
and in working order. As rapidly as possible, the new Adminis
tration took up the various subjects, civil, military, and politi
cal, demanding attention. The condition of affairs through the
whole South was deplorable. Among the matters of immediate
interest were those which related to the few military posts at
the South that were still retained by the Government with small
and wholly insufficient garrisons, and the Secretary of the
Treasury was extremely solicitous in regard to the lights and
light-houses on the Southern coast. He early brought the sub
ject to the notice of the President and Cabinet, and a cor
respondence between two officers attached to the Light-house
Board, which had been submitted to him, hastened action. It
seems that while the higher functionaries who administered
the Government had through the winter been tampering with
those who were in insurrection, and entering into a truce or
understanding with them to tide over the few remaining weeks

88 Civil War and Reconstruction

of their official life, there had been vigilance and activity among
officers then in subordinate positions. Commander (now Rear-
Admiral) Jenkins and Captain (subsequently Major-General)
Wm. F. Smith, familiarly known as Baldy Smith, were in the
winter of 1861 attached to the Light-house Board, the former
Naval Secretary, the latter as Engineer Secretary. These two
officers, thus associated, freely interchanged views. Both were
impressed with the danger that threatened Fort Jefferson and
Fort Taylor, which would, if no steps were taken to prevent it,
be likely to pass into the possession of the rebels, to the great
annoyance of our commerce and injury to the country. Privateers
would make the Tortugas and Key West places of refuge in
case of war; and by the destruction of the light-houses in that
dangerous vicinity navigation would be rendered insecure. They
communicated their apprehensions to General Dix, at that time
Secretary of the Treasury, and their purpose to ascertain the
condition of things in that quarter. Their suggestions, without
entering into details, were approved. Captain Smith therefore
took the steamer for Havana, and visited Tortugas and Key
West under the pretext of inspecting the lights. Soon after the
change of administration Commander Jenkins received a letter
from Captain Smith, who had been to Dry Tortugas and Fort
Taylor, saw the danger to which they were exposed, and satis
fied himself what was best to be done for their safety. The con
tents of the letter were communicated to Mr. Chase, who had
relieved General Dix as Secretary of the Treasury, and to whom
it was their duty to report. Secretary Chase was alive to the
importance of the subject, and forthwith made known to the
President and Cabinet the information he had received. Com
mander Jenkins was immediately put in communication with
General Scott and myself in relation to these matters. Prompt
action was required to save the stations off the coast. But more
interesting and important perhaps than either was the condi
tion of things at Pensacola and Fort Pickens. General Scott was
much exercised on these matters, and became particularly so
licitous that Vogdes s command should be disembarked and
Fort Pickens relieved. At a late hour on the llth of March, the

Fort Pickens 89

day, I think, on which Secretary Chase gave the information
received from Commander Jenkins, General Scott made applica
tion to me for a naval vessel to convey a bearer of despatches
from the War Department to Fort Pickens. There were at that
time but two or three vessels in the Atlantic ports that were
available. Which of them was best adapted to the service was
a question, and who of the officers was most reliable for this
duty was to be carefully considered. Secrecy was indispensable;
but the Navy Department, as well as all the other departments of
the Government, was in a demoralized condition. Of those best
informed and most capable of giving an opinion, it was difficult
for me, not then a week in office, to decide in every instance
who were to be trusted. Commander Ward, an old acquaintance
from boyhood, I knew was faithful. He was stationed on the
receiving ship at Brooklyn, but had been summoned to Wash
ington in relation to an expedition to reinforce Fort Sumter.
This project he had relinquished, and was on the point of re
turning to New York when General Scott preferred his request.
On receiving it, 1 sent a messenger, who overtook Commander
Ward at the railroad depot, and requested him to meet me that
evening at the Department. Secretary Chase notified Com
mander Jenkins to join Commander Ward and myself at my
office at nine o clock that evening. Both officers were prompt
in their attendance. No persons except my doorkeeper and the
watchmen were in the building when we came together. The
subject-matter was discussed in confidence; and it was concluded
that the Crusader, Commander T. A. Craven, and the Mohawk,
Commander J. H. Strong, were both available, and each of
their commanders faithful and to be trusted. The Crusader,
Captain Craven, was selected. Three years later this gallant
officer commanded the iron-clad Tecumseh, and went down
and was lost with his vessel, which was destroyed by a torpedo
opposite Fort Morgan, when Farragut entered the Bay of Mobile,
in 1864. The following order was prepared that evening and
intrusted to Commander Ward to deliver personally to Captain
Craven:

90 Civil War and Reconstruction

[Confidential.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT, March 11, 1861.
Commander T. A. M. CRAVEN,
Commanding U.S.S. Crusader.

SIR:

A bearer of despatches from the Government will pre
sent himself to you for passage to the United States steamer
Brooklyn, supposed to be off Fort Pickens, Pensacola harbor.
You will proceed to that locality with all practical despatch,
place the bearer of despatches on board the Brooklyn, and
then make the best of your way to Key West, where you
will communicate with Judge Marvin of the United States
Court, and afford every protection in your power to the
United States authorities, and to the naval stores, light
house, and other United States property there.

The Department desires that you will not absent your
self from Key West or its immediate vicinity, unless ordered
to do so from here, or in your judgment it becomes necessary
to do so to protect the reef lights.

Commander Pickering, U. S. Navy, the Light-house In
spector on the Florida coast, should be conferred with with
reference to the safety of the lights on the Florida reefs;
and any assistance that you may be able and deem necessary
to afford him, without jeopardizing interests at Key West,
should be given to him.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy.

On the following day General Scott informed me that he
might be unable to spare an officer to go to Pensacola with
his orders; and if the naval officer was faithful, he could as
well as a special messenger deliver the despatches to Captain
Vogdes on the Brooklyn. With an assurance that Commander
Graven was reliable, the subject was left at his option. At the
same time when stating his embarrassment, General Scott made
a requisition for another vessel to convoy a transport or trans
ports to Texas, to bring North the troops abandoned by Twiggs
when he deserted. The importance of a sufficient force at Key

Fort Pickens gi

West to retain that important post, suggested the expediency
of leaving a portion of the Texas troops at that station. I re
quested Commander Jenkins to call on General Scott with this
suggestion, which he did. It met the approval of the Lieutenant
General, and he agreed to and did order Major French, and
four companies returning from Texas, to stop at Key West.
In order to comply with the army requisitions for two naval
vessels, one to proceed to Pensacola and one to convoy the army
transport, it became necessary to send both the Crusader and
the Mohawk to the Gulf. I therefore, on the 12th of March,
addressed the following despatch to Commander Foote, execu
tive officer of the Brooklyn Navy-yard Commodore Breese, the
commandant, was absent on other duty:

[Confidential]

NAVY DEPARTMENT, March 12, 1861.
Commander A. H. FOOTE,
Commandant Navy-yard, New York.

SIR:

I sent an order yesterday by Commander James H.
Ward, U. S. N. to Lieutenant-Commanding Craven, to pro
ceed on certain service therein named. It is now necessary
to send either the Crusader or Mohawk to convoy the
steamer Empire City, employed on army duty.

You will please despatch, immediately on the receipt
of this order, either the Crusader or Mohawk to the Quar
antine, and direct the commanding officer to accompany
the Empire City on her voyage, and continue with her as
long as protection may be deemed necessary by the army
or other officer in charge, for the protection of the persons
and public property embarked.

In case you find it necessary to convoy the Empire City,
you will direct Lieutenant-Commanding Craven to return
the order to him dated yesterday by this Department to
you, and you will hand it to Lieutenant-Commanding
Strong of the Mohawk, with instructions to proceed and
execute those orders in the same manner as though the
order had been originally addressed to him.

The War Department may not send a special messenger,

92 Civil War and Reconstruction

as was indicated in the order to the commander of the
Crusader, but in that event a letter will be sent to be de
livered to the commander of the U. S. steamer Brooklyn.

Colonel Tompkins, U. S. A., New York, should be con
ferred with before despatching these vessels.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy.

There was delay in the departure of one or both of these
vessels, in consequence of difficulties in the Adjutant-General s
office in detailing the companies which were to stop at Key
West. The voyage of the Crusader was also somewhat pro
tracted, and after a fortnight and more had elapsed the failure
to receive tidings from Pensacola began to give us great so
licitude. Several days of painful uncertainty were passed when,
on the afternoon of the 6th of April, an officer, travel-stained
and much exhausted, entered my room at the Department, and
announced himself as Lieutenant Gwathmey, with despatches
from Captain Adams, in command of the squadron off Pensa
cola. Unstrapping a belt from beneath his garments, he handed
me a package which contained the following letter:

U. S. FRIGATE SABINE OFF PENSACOLA, April 1, 1861.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter addressed
to me by Captain Vogdes, U. S. A., who is here in com
mand of some troops sent out in January last to reinforce
the garrison of Fort Pickens. I have declined to land the
men as Captain Vogdes requests, as it would be in direct
violation of the orders of the Navy Department under
which I am acting. The instructions from General Scott
to Captain Vogdes are of old date (March 12), and may
have been given without a full knowledge of the condition
of affairs here; they would be no justification. Such a step
is too important to be taken without the clearest orders
from proper authority. It would certainly be viewed as a
hostile act, and would be resisted to the utmost. No one
acquainted with the feelings of the military assembled under

Fort Pickens 93

General Bragg can doubt that it would be considered not
only a declaration, but an act of war. It would be a serious
thing to bring on by any precipitation a collision which
may be entirely against the wishes of the Administration.
At present both sides are faithfully observing the agree
ment entered into by the U. S. Government with Mr.
Mallory and Colonel Chase. This agreement binds us not
to reinforce Fort Pickens unless it shall be attacked or
threatened. It binds them not to attack it unless we should
attempt to reinforce it. I saw General Bragg on the 30th ult,
who reassured me the conditions on their part should not
be violated. While I cannot take on myself, under such
insufficient authority as General Scott s order, the fearful
responsibility of an act which seems to render civil war
inevitable, I am ready at all times to carry out whatever
orders I may receive from the Honorable the Secretary
of the Navy.

In conclusion, I beg you will please to send me instruc
tions as soon as possible, that I may be relieved from a
painful embarrassment.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. A. ADAMS, Captain, senior officer present.
To the Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

U. S, FRIGATE SABINE, OFF PENSACOLA, FLA., April 1, 1861.
To Captain H. A. ADAMS,
commanding naval forces off Pensacola.

SIR:

Herewith I send you a copy of an order received by me
last night. You will see by it that I am directed to land
my command at the earliest opportunity. I have therefore
to request that you will place at my disposal such boats
and other means as will enable me to carry into effect
the enclosed order.

Yours, etc.,

I. VOGDES, Captain First Artillery, commanding.

94 Civil War and Reconstruction

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON,

March 12, 1861.
SIR:

At the first favorable moment you will land with your
company, reinforce Fort Pickens, and hold the same until
further notice.

Report frequently, if opportunities present themselves,
on the condition of the fort and the circumstances around
you.

I write by command of Lieutenant-General Scott.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.
Captain I. VOGDES, IT. S. A., on board the U. S. sloop-of-
war Brooklyn, off Fort Pickens, Pensacola harbor, Florida.

This information and the course of Captain Adams caused
great disappointment. Parts of it were incomprehensible. The
"orders of the Navy Department" alluded to, and the alleged
agreement "entered into by the United States Government with
Mr. Mallory and Colonel Chase," were matters of which the
President and myself were not advised. We were aware, as was
the whole country, that the Administration of Mr. Buchanan had
acted on the do-nothing policy, and it was generally supposed
the rebels permitted his Administration to expire without being
molested, on condition the Government would remain inactive.
We knew, however, of no written orders or truce of the character
mentioned. In declining to recognize the orders of General
Scott, and refusing to land the troops by reason of the truce
referred to, Captain Adams was not altogether satisfied with his
own decision, and hence had despatched Lieutenant Gwathmey
express to me for specific orders.

Some suspicions were entertained of the fidelity of Captain
Adams, whose sympathies were reported to be with the secession
ists. His estate was in the South, and, like some other officers,
it was his misfortune to behold his family taking opposite sides
in the rising conflict. A portion of them were avowed secession
ists. One of his sons became an officer in the rebel service; one

Fort Pickens 95

followed the fortunes of his father and his flag. My position in
regard to him was for a time one of painful responsibility. To
wound the sensibilities of an honorable, sensitive, and patriotic
officer, by depriving him of his command on mere suspicion,
would be keenly felt by him as cruel and unjust, and cause dis
satisfaction on the part of good men who knew and had con
fidence in him; yet to retain him, when his fidelity was doubted,
in a high and trusty post in such a crisis, might, if circumstances
were adverse, subject the Government, and especially myself, to
censure. Embarrassments such as these, when the country was
in a shattered condition, and the political organizations of the
nation were crumbling to pieces, were abundant and hard to
be met. Justice to Captain Adams, a correct officer, who had
great professional pride and patriotic instincts, whatever were
his political or party sympathies, and however he may have
hesitated in this instance, requires it to be stated that he faith
fully performed his duty. He strictly obeyed the orders sent him,
and by his activity and efforts contributed to the safety of Fort
Pickens, when, had he been unfaithful, the place might have
been lost.

Lieutenant Washington Gwathmey, the special messenger to
whom Captain Adams intrusted his important confidential des
patches, was a Virginian, deeply imbued with the false theories
that were prevalent at the South. He conceived that his obliga
tions to his State were paramount to those he owed his country.
Although wearing the uniform, holding the commission, and
receiving pay of the Federal Government, he believed it to be his
duty to obey a factious party then in the ascendant in Virginia,
rather than the legally constituted authorities and laws of the
United States. But these false and erroneous opinions did not
prevent him from faithfully discharging the trust confided to
him by Captain Adams. Virginia had not then attempted to throw
off her Federal obligation. Leaving Pensacola, he travelled night
and day, and passing through Richmond, where he belonged,
without stopping, he reached Washington on the afternoon of
the 6th of April. Without going to his hotel, he came immediately
to the Navy Department and relieved himself of his message, as

96 Civil War and Reconstruction

stated, A few days later this officer tendered his resignation,
which, however, was not accepted. He was dismissed, and soon
after entered the rebel service.

I went with the despatch of Captain Adams at once to the
President. The information received was extremely embarrassing,
for we were at the time actively engaged, and had been for some
days, in fitting out an expedition to relieve Fort Sumter. That
movement could not be delayed; but should the rebels become
aware of it, they, having possession of the telegraph and every
facility for communication, would be likely to attack Pickens be
fore the garrison could be reinforced. It was determined that a
special messenger, with positive orders, should be forthwith sent
overland, through the insurrectionary region, to Pensacola, direct
ing that the troops should be disembarked without delay. Prompt
ness and despatch were necessary. The expedition destined for
the relief of Sumter was to sail that day. The hesitancy of
Captain Adams, whose justification was the truce referred to,
endangered the safety of the fortress and the possession of Santa
Rosa Island; for the rebels were in considerable force at Pensa
cola, and a knowledge of the fact that the Sumter expedition had
sailed would be likely to precipitate an immediate assault on
the little garrison under Lieutenant Slemmer in Pickens. With
out waiting the result of inquiries immediately instituted in
regard to the alleged truce or agreement, my first duty was to
find a reliable messenger to proceed by the earliest conveyance
to Pensacola. It was then past three o clock, and the boat which
conveyed the mail South left at seven o clock that evening. I sent
for Paymaster Henry Etting, then in Washington, in whom I had
confidence, to perform this duty. Although not well, be promptly
prepared to obey orders, but with an understanding, under the
circumstances, that another officer should be substituted, if one
of unquestioned fidelity and energy could be found in season.
Before five he informed me that Lieutenant John L. Worden
had just arrived in Washington, for whom he could vouch; and
such inquiries as I could make of others satisfied me he was
perfectly reliable. I directed that Lieutenant Worden should
immediately report to me; and in a brief interview he was in
formed of my purpose to send him on a secret, responsible, and

Fart Pickens 97

perhaps dangerous mission through the South, and that he must
leave within two hours for Pensacola. He expressed Ms readiness
to obey orders, and although the time was short, and he in
differently prepared, he assured me he would be ready to leave
at the time specified. I directed him to make no mention of his
orders or his journey to any one, but to call upon me as soon
as he could get ready. In the mean time I prepared the docu
ment that was to be confided to him. The fact that he was a
naval officer, passing through the South not a secessionist, nor
in sympathy with secessionists might cause him to be chal
lenged, and perhaps searched. I therefore made the order to
Captain Adams brief. It was as follows:

[Confidential.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 6, 1861.
Captain HENRY A. ADAMS,
commanding naval forces off Pensacola.

Sir:

Your despatch of April 1st is received. The Department
regrets that you did not comply with the request of Captain
Vogdes, to carry into effect the orders of General Scott,
sent out by the Crusader, under the orders of this Depart
ment.

You will, immediately on the first favorable opportunity
after the receipt of this order, afford every facility to Cap
tain Vogdes, by boats and other means, to enable him to
land the troops under his command, it being the wish and
intention of the Navy Department to cooperate with the
War Department in that object.

I am, sir, respectfully, etc.,

GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy.

This order, which I read to Lieutenant Worden when he
called, and gave into his hands unsealed, he committed to
memory before he reached Richmond, and then destroyed the
writing. Hurrying on with all possible expedition, he contrived
to elude detection, and arrived in Pensacola on the llth. Here
he had an interview with General Bragg, the rebel commander,

98 Civil War and Reconstruction

to whom he stated he had a verbal communication from Secre
tary Welles to Captain Adams, and received a pass to visit that
officer. He was put on board the Sabine on the I2th of April,
and communicated my orders to Captain Adams, who promptly
obeyed them. That night the boats of the squadron, under the
command of Lieutenant Albert N. Smith, successfully landed
the artillery company of Captain Vogdes, consisting of 86 men
and a detachment of 115 marines. The garrison in Fort Pickens,
which was previously composed of only 83 men, was reinforced,
and for the time made secure. The success of this movement was
satisfactory, and of immense importance. It saved to the Gov
ernment this important fortress on the Gulf of Mexico, and that
at a critical moment which the delay of a single day would
have imperilled. The expedition for the relief of Fort Sumter
sailed on the night that Lieutenant Worden left Washington
for Pensacola, and President Lincoln had decided that he would,
when the squadron sailed, notify the authorities at Charleston of
his intention to provision the fort in their harbor peaceably, or,
if resisted, by force. The messenger with this communication to
the Charleston authorities left, if I mistake not, by the same
conveyance with Lieutenant Worden. Neither of them knew of
the mission of the other. On the 8th the Governor of South
Carolina was informed of the President s intention to send sup
plies to Sumter. When this information was given, Lieutenant
Worden was pressing forward with all speed, but a vast distance
was to be overcome before he could reach Pensacola.

General Beauregard, in command at Charleston, as soon as
advised that the President had ordered an expedition to Sumter,
telegraphed the fact to the Confederate Government at Mont
gomery. Davis and his associates In the Confederate Government
were not wholly unprepared for the tidings received. They had
been apprised that extraordinary naval and military movements
were being made in New York, and when advised by Beauregard
of President Lincoln s notice to the Charleston authorities, they
concluded that the truce with Buchanan was cancelled, and de
termined to anticipate the action of the Federal Government by
a simultaneous assault on both Sumter and Pickens, in the full
confidence that the surprise upon the feeble garrisons in those

Fort Pickens 99

forts would cause both to fall. The result was, after an inter
change of messages, and a demand and refusal of Major Ander
son to surrender, that the bombardment of Sumter commenced
on the morning of the 12th, the very day on which Pickens was
reinforced. General Bragg was to have made an attack upon
Pickens the night succeeding that on which reinforcements were
thrown into the fort from the squadron; but the additional
strength to the garrison defeated the project.

Lieutenant Worden, instead of remaining with the squadron
and waiting an opportunity to come North by water, commenced
his return journey by land on the 12th, immediately after de
livering his message. General Bragg and the rebels at Pensacola,
when they learned that the troops on the Richmond and Sabine
had been landed, and the garrison in Pickens reinforced, felt
themselves too weak to persevere in the proposed assault. Nor
were they slow in coming to the conclusion that the messenger
who had arrived and departed so suddenly was an agent of the
Government, who had been instrumental in this movement.
Mortified and chagrined that their intentions had been antici
pated and defeated, they at once telegraphed to the Confederate
Government a description of Lieutenant Worden, and on the
morning of the 13th of April, when within five miles of Mont
gomery, Alabama, five officers of the rebel army entered the car
and arrested him. The ground assigned for the arrest was that
he had violated a pledge given to General Bragg, and that he
had been instrumental in the disembarkation of troops, whereby
Fort Pickens had been strengthened, contrary to an agreement
or understanding with Captain Adams. Lieutenant W. had given
no pledge, and the agreement alluded to, instead of having been
made by Captain Adams, was an unwritten, quasi armistice or
truce, mentioned in a communication of Secretaries Holt and
Toucey, on the 29th of January, addressed to the naval officers
off Pensacola, and Lieutenant Slemmer in command at Fort
Pickens. This agreement had been consummated through the
agency of Captain Samuel Barron, who went from Washington
to Florida for that purpose. Captain Adams, in his despatch to
me, makes mention of his having had interviews with General
Bragg, and of the assurances of that gentleman that the con-

100 Civil War and Reconstruction

ditions of the agreement should be observed; but neither then,
nor at any time, did he enter into any agreement, nor was he
authorized to make one. But Bragg was censured for remissness
in giving a pass to the messenger from the Navy Department to
visit the squadron. It had defeated the rebel scheme to obtain
possession of the fort, and the indignation was severe against
Lieutenant Worden, who was detained for seven months a prison
er at Montgomery. Not until the 13th of November, just seven
months from the day of his arrest, was he released from captivity.
He was then sent to Richmond and exchanged for Lieutenant
Sharp, a rebel officer who was captured at Hatteras Inlet, and
in whose behalf the rebel authorities took special interest. Soon
after his release Lieutenant Worden was appointed to the com
mand of the iron-clad steamer Monitor, the first vessel of her
class ever put afloat, and his voyage to Hampton Roads and
encounter with the Merrimack are matters of historic record
and interest

The paper or document of Secretaries Holt and Toucey is
the only written recognition of the truce or agreement entered
into with the rebels which I remember to have seen, and of the
existence of this document I am not aware that any member of
Mr. Lincoln s Administration was informed when orders were
sent to reinforce Pickens. I never saw it nor knew of it until after
the receipt of Captain Adams s letter of the 1st of April. It has
been asserted, and denied, that the Administration of Mr.
Buchanan established an armistice, or entered into an arrange
ment with the rebels by which the functions of the Government
to suppress insurrection and rebellion were suspended. Captain
Adams states the light in which he and General Bragg viewed the
communication of Messrs. Holt and Toucey, which I here insert:

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1861-Received at Pensacola,

January 29, 1861, at 9 P.M.

To Captain JAMES GLYNN, commanding the Macedonian;
Captain W. S. WALKER, commanding -the Brooklyn, or
other naval officers in command; and Lieutenant ADAM J.
SLEMMER, First regiment Artillery, U. S. A., commanding
Fort Pickens.

Fart Pickens 101

In consequence of the assurances received from Mr. Mai-
lory, in a telegram of yesterday to Messrs, Bigler, Hunter, and
Slidell, with a request that it should be laid before the
President, that Fort Pickens would not be assaulted, and an
offer of such an assurance to the same effect from Colonel
Chase, for the purpose of avoiding a hostile collision, upon
receiving satisfactory assurances from Mr. Mallory and
Colonel Chase that Fort Pickens will not be attacked, you
are instructed not to land the company on board the Brook
lyn, unless said fort shall be attacked or preparations shall
be made for its attack. The provisions necessary for the
supply of the fort you will land. The Brooklyn and the
other vessels of war on the station will remain, and you will
exercise the utmost vigilance, and be prepared at a moment s
warning to land the company at Fort Pickens, and you and
they will instantly repel any attack on the fort.

The President yesterday sent a special message to Con
gress, commending the Virginia resolutions of compromise.
The commissioners of different States are to meet here on
Monday, the 4th of February, and it is important that dur
ing their session a collision of arms should be avoided, unless
an attack should be made or there should be preparations
for such an attack. In either event the Brooklyn and the other
vessels will act promptly. Your right and that of the other
officers in command at Pensacola freely to communicate
with the Government by special messenger, and its right, in
the same manner, to communicate with yourselves and them,
will remain intact, as the basis of the present instructions.

J. HOLT, Secretary of War.

I. TOUCEY, Secretary of the Navy.

The construction which Captain Adams put upon what he
calls the "engagement made by Mr. Mallory and Colonel Chase
with the United States Government," and which restrained him
for weeks from landing troops, will be seen by the following ex
tract from a letter written by him under date of the 18th of
March, and sent by Lieutenant Gwathmey:

The officers and men, as I mentioned in my letter of Feb
ruary 19, are kept in readiness to land at the shortest no-

102 Civil War and Reconstruction

dec; but I have received the assurances of General Bragg,
who commands the troops on shore, that he will respect the
engagement made by Mr. Mallory and Colonel Chase with
the United States Government, and will make no disposition
for the attack of Fort Pickens. This engagement, you are
aware, binds us not to reinforce Fort Pickens unless it is at
tacked or threatened. I could easily have thrown any number
of men in it almost any time within the last four weeks.

This communication, written on the 18th of March, Captain
Adams would not trust to the mails, but withheld for other con
veyance; opportunities, however, were rare, and hence the delay
in its reception.

Such, was the first reinforcement of Fort Pickens. The gar
rison, which, under Lieutenant Slemmer, consisted of only 8&
men, was increased to 284 on the 12th of April by a company
of artillery and a battalion of marines. Additional troops and
abundant supplies arrived a few days later under the command
of Colonel (now Brevet Major-General) Harvey Brown; but
Pickens would probably have passed into rebel hands ere the
last expedition reached Pensacola had not the timely mission
of Lieutenant (now Commodore) Worden caused the reinforce
ment from, the squadron on the 12th of April.

The second reinforcement of Pickens was by a secret irregu
lar military expedition initiated under the auspices of the Secre
tary of State, without the knowledge of the Secretary of War.
By law and usage the duty of fitting out such a military expedi
tion devolved on the Secretary of War; but in this instance that
functionary was, for some unexplained cause, studiously exclud
ed from all participation in or knowledge of the important move
ment which was carried forward within the Department of which
he was chief and from the appropriations with which he was
intrusted. There was doubtless a reason or purpose for this ex
traordinary proceeding, and also why the Secretary of State
withheld from every member of the Cabinet all knowledge of
the transaction. It may have been an exhibition of great execu
tive and administrative skill and ability on the part of the Secre
tary of State; it may have demonstrated that if the Secretary of

Fort Pickms 103

the Treasury could, through the instrumentality of an officer
of the army and an officer of the navy attached to the Treasury
Department, prompt military movements, the Secretary of State
could also institute by means of an army and naval officer a still
more formidable expedition; or there may have been other rea
sons and influences for a step that has no parallel. It is without
precedent and without imitation. The President himself had
only indefinite general information that such a project was
maturing. General Meigs, who was the special confidant of the
Secretary of State, selected by him to plan the expedition, says
it "originated with Mr. Seward/ The first intimation which I
received of this irregular proceeding, I obtained at midnight on
the 6th of April, when endeavoring to clear up the confusion
and difficulty occasioned by conflicting orders. I then learned
to my astonishment of this secret enterprise, and that the steamer
Powhatan, the flag-ship of an expedition which was ordered to
relieve Fort Sumter, had been surreptitiously withdrawn from
that duty, and that her legitimate commander, Captain Mercer,
was deprived of his ship, which was transferred to Lieutenant
D. D. Porter, who was to proceed with her to Pensacola. A large
portion of the home squadron was at the time lying off that
harbor with troops which had not been landed. Additional
supplies and men from the army were appropriate, for they
would be wanted; but there was no necessity for the Powhatan to
be added to the squadron in the Gulf. She was indispensable for
the Sumter expedition. The President, so soon as he understood
the condition of things, ordered the restoration of the Powhatan
to Captain Mercer, and that there should be no interference with
or interruption of measures taken in regard to Sumter. His
orders, however, were not effective. A brief telegram of Mr.
Seward to Lieutenant Porter was disregarded by that officer, who
hastened his departure to Pensacola, carrying off the boats,
supplies, and men which had been prepared and were destined
for the relief of Sumter. The result proved that while the supplies
were opportune, there was no reason why the Secretary of State
should have taken upon himself the duties of another Depart
ment, or why the Secretary of War, whose duty it was to furnish
the supplies, should have been kept in ignorance of the enter-

104 Civil War and Reconstruction

prise, or not have ordered the expedition. The mission of the
Powhatan was ill-conceived and ill-advised. The purpose for
which she was taken was a total failure. She accomplished no
one thing specified as an object, intent, or excuse for sending
her to Pensacola. She did not arrive off the harbor until five
days after Pickens had been reinforced by Vogdes and the marines.
The transport Atlantic, having Colonel Brown on board, with
troop and supplies, reached her destination on the 16th of April;
the Powhatan did not arrive until the 17th. Colonel Brown, with
out awaiting the arrival of Lieutenant Porter and the Powhatan,
was, with his force, promptly landed by the boats of Captains
Adams and Poor, and the fort was again relieved and reinforced
before Lieutenant Porter made his appearance on the 17th with
the Powhatan, having on board the launches and men destined
for Sumter.

The detachment of this vessel from the squadron to which
she had been ordered without the knowledge of any one con
nected with the Navy Department, led to no little confusion and
was the cause of very serious embarrassment. She was the most
important of the few vessels in commission in all our Atlantic
ports at that period; but the Government was by these surrepti
tious and irregular proceedings deprived of her services at Charles
ton and at Norfolk at a critical juncture. General Meigs, who was
the special confidant of the Secretary of State in this matter, and
was taken by him to the President as a counsellor and adviser,
when his Cabinet associates were treated as not trustworthy, has
written two communications on the subject. It appears to him,
he says, that it was "within the prerogative of the Commander-
in-Chief of the Army and Navy" to take such a vessel and desig
nate its commander; and the whole irregular expedition in
which he so actively participated seems in his view proper. Had
the Secretary of War by any connivance secretly negotiated a
treaty with a foreign power without the knowledge of the Secre
tary of State, or of any member of the Cabinet, aided by a dis
trict attorney and a consul to advise the President, General
Meigs might have defended such negotiation also, and said, as
he now does, that it was within the prerogative of the Chief
Magistrate. He forgets, however, that the President, so soon as

fart Pickens 105

he learned the facts In the case of the Powhatan, claimed no
such prerogative, but directed the Secretary of State to order
the Immediate restoration of that vessel to her legitimate com
mander and to her designated duty. The President never in
tended to Interfere with and secretly countermand the orders
of one of the Departments, and he promptly directed a correction
of the proceeding which the Quartermaster-General tries to
defend.

It has not been my purpose, In bringing to light certain truths
connected with the destruction of the Norfolk Navy-yard, and the
expeditions to Sumter and to Pickens at the commencement of
the war, to make charges or prefer accusations against any one,
nor to criticise the military plans and operations in those cases.
Statements of facts may in some instances be considered un
pleasant disclosures, but they are not to be classed as charges
and accusations. Truth in these matters should no longer be sup
pressed or perverted; and if in any respect I am in error, I shall
be glad to be corrected. There are records and living witnesses
to sustain or controvert my statements.

General Meigs, at that time a Captain of Engineers, planned
the military part of the irregular expedition to Pensacola which
Colonel (since Brevet-Major General) Harvey Brown was as
signed to command. In the two letters which he has published
on the subject of the relief of Fort Pickens, General Meigs
wholly ignores the reinforcement from the squadron on the 12th
of April, four days before he or any connected with that ex
pedition arrived in sight of the "sand-hills of Pensacola/ and
five days before the Powhatan reached that station. Although
confessedly uninformed on many points with which his advice
and movements interfered, and to that extent perhaps excusable,
he could not have been ignorant of the fact that Vogdes s com
pany of artillery and the marines from the navy had been thrown
into the the fort, and the garrison reinforced, before his arrival.
He makes no allusion to it, however, but takes to himself and
the Secretary of State the exclusive and entire credit of first
reinforcing Fort Pickens.

The following extracts are from the first statement or nar
rative of General Meigs:

106 Civil War and Reconstruction

WASHINGTON, Thursday, Sept. 14, 1865.

My first interview with the President and the Secretary
of State in relation to the matter was on the evening of the
29th of March. The President did not inform me that he
intended to relieve Fort Sumter, but questioned me as to
the possibility of doing it. I advised him in general terms
that I could find him plenty of officers of the navy willing
to try it. He then asked me whether I thought Fort Pickens
could be reinforced. I replied that it could be, provided the
relieving force reached there before it fell, and with the
maps before us the mode of effecting this object was dis
cussed. I advised that if the attempt was made, a fleet
steamer under a young and enterprising officer should be
despatched immediately to run the batteries, enter the har
bor, and prevent any expedition of Bragg s crossing the
harbor in boats to assault Fort Pickens. The President said
he would see me again, if he concluded to go further in
the matter.

I myself suggested to the President the name of the Pow-
hataii and of her commander, and prepared the orders in
relation to the movement for his signature; and this I did
on the 31st of March or 1st of April, three or four days
before the Sumter expedition was resolved upon.

In conclusion, permit me to remark that this, the first
successful military expedition of the war, originated with
Mr, Seward. Until it sailed, the United States had declined
everywhere. Fortresses and harbors had been lost. He carried
me to the President, merely saying that he thought the
President ought to see some of the younger officers, and not
consult only with men who, if war broke out, could not
mount a horse.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. C. MEIGS, Brevet Major-General,
late Captain of Engineers.

Fort Pickens 107

Of the expediency and the necessity of early additional troops
and supplies for Fort Pickens, over and above those which were
landed from the squadron on the 1 2th of April, under the orders
which the Secretary of the Navy sent out by Lieutenant Worden,
there is no< question. The rebels, checked from their first in
tended attack by that timely reinforcement, began soon after
to assemble additional troops for a more formidable assault.
Colonel Brown arrived on the 16th with this increased force.
Promptly on his arrival he landed his troops, and at once set
aside the advice which Captain Meigs had given the President,
"with the maps" before them, that "a fleet steamer under a
young and enterprising officer should run the batteries, enter
the harbor/ etc. The steamer was wanted for no such purpose.
Lieutenant Porter had been given Captain Mercer s vessel to
run the batteries; but this "young and enterprising officer"
never ran them. The Powhatan was, by Captain Meigs s plan and
advice to the President, to have entered the harbor of Pensacola;
but she never entered it nor attempted to enter it. So that the
secret interference with naval arrangements, and the orders of
the Government by which the Sumter expedition was deprived
of its flag-ship, accomplished no other end than to render that
expedition abortive without effecting the alleged purpose for
which she was sent to Pickens.

The best comment on the plan and advice of Captain Meigs
will be found in the following extracts from a communication
of Brevet Major-General Brown in 1867:

The troops on board the Atlantic arrived off Pensacola
on the evening of the 16th of April. The Powhatan did not
arrive until about noon of the 17th. The commanding
officer and a portion of his command were landed by the
boats of Captains Adams and Poor immediately after their
arrival, and the fort was relieved about two o clock on the
morning of the 17th, several hours before Captain Porter
made his appearance. General Meigs did intercept Porter
and did prevent his entering, but not because he wished
him to cover the landing, for all the infantry and a part of
the horses of the battery were landed before Porter s arrival,

108 Civil War and Reconstruction

by the zealous cooperation and able assistance of Captains
Adams and Poor, who commanded the ships of war there.

Now, I frankly assert that Captain Porter could not have
entered Pensacola harbor at that time; that the attempt
would have been followed by the certain destruction of the
vessel, the probable loss of the crew, and the jeoparding the
safety of Fort Pickens; and that if he could have entered,
no valuable results would have followed. He would only
have entered into a trap in which he could not stay, and
from which he could not extricate himself or be extricated.

Captain Porter remained at anchor off the fort for several
weeks, and had full opportunity and facility for ascertaining
the correctness of my statement of its condition and wants.
He did not enter or make any attempt to enter the harbor,
and never afterwards communicated to me a desire or pur
pose to do so.

HARVEY BROWN, Brevet Major-General U. S. A.

These extracts, and the course pursued by General Brown
in his defence of Pickens, demonstrate the value of the naval
part in the plan, and of the advice given by the engineer whom
the Secretary of State "carried to the President," with the re
mark that "he ought to see some of the younger officers, and
not consult only with men who, if war broke out, could not
mount a horse/

In advising that the Powhatan should be taken from the
control of the Navy Department, General Meigs pleads ignorance
of her legitimate orders. It is his justification. For the ill-advised
and abandoned project of running the batteries, perhaps the
same plea should be interposed. He did not then know that it
was, as General Brown demonstrates, an impossibility. In his
two studied communications, he makes no mention of the entire
failure of the naval part of the plan which he so unfortunately
advised. It has been, and is, my object to make public facts in

Fort Pickens 109

relation to certain transactions which have been but imperfectly
understood, no matter who is affected. Whether it was I or others
who extracted from the President orders in relation to a naval
vessel which I had in the performance of my duty put in com
mission, of which I had charge, and her record in my keeping;
whether I or others deceived the President, intrigued to defeat
the Sumter expedition, are matters of which men will form a
correct judgment when in possession of the facts, which have
been hitherto perverted or suppressed. No right-minded person
will construe the publication of truth into an accusation against
any one.

There is no denying the fact that an important vessel was at
a critical period surreptitiously withdrawn from her destination
and deprived of her legitimate commander by an order extracted
from the President. That the President was deceived in this
matter by some one, unintentionally or otherwise, there is no
doubt; for as soon as he was made acquainted with the true state
of the case he countermanded the order which had been extracted
from him, and directed the restoration of the vessel to Mercer.
Now who extracted the order, who deceived the President, and
what was the object, are matters in issue on which the Quarter
master-General volunteers an opinion, pronounces a judgment,
and makes accusations. I merely give the facts and, so far as I
know them, the actors.

The Powhatan, instead of going to Charleston and then
returning North, as was ordered, where, in the then feeble con
dition of the navy, she could have rendered valuable service,
especially at Norfolk, was diverted to a quarter where she was
not needed. Without the knowledge of the Secretary of the
Navy and against the final express order of the President, she
was sent on a useless mission, ostensibly to perform a service that
she did not and could not execute. In this there was error,
irregularity perhaps worseon the part of some one or more.
I for years, in the then condition of affairs, bore the blame and
responsibility of these errors and failures, for which others, whose
secret operations defeated my measures, were justly accountable.
A faithful exposition, now that the condition of the country is
changed, is excepted to by one of the principal actors.

110 Civil War and Reconstruction

In neither of his publications does General Meigs attempt
any explanation of the unwarrantable and inexcusable attempt
to thrust Captain Barron, a well-known secessionist, into the
Navy Department, and into intimate and confidential relations
with the head of that Department without consulting him.
General Meigs declares that "the overt act of interference with
the navy most complained of" is the matter of the Powhatan.
This is a serious mistake. Highly improper as was that inter
ference, it is vastly less exceptionable and reprehensible than
the executive order to create a new naval bureau and make
Barron chief, which was at the same time and by the same parties
extracted from the President. Was Captain Meigs, in whose hand
writing this mysterious order first appeared detailing Barron for
Department duty, the author of this intrigue? Was Lieutenant
D. D. Porter, who wrote the remarkable postscript to that re
markable order directing the Secretary of the Navy to establish
a new bureau and do other illegal acts, guilty of that impropriety,
disrespect, and interference with his superior? Or was there some
one else who attempted thus to interfere with the organization
of the Navy Department, and to place a rebel captain in a posi
tion for "detailing all officers for duty/* whereby the most im
portant commands could be given to rebels; "supervising charges
made against officers," which would enable rebel officers to
escape conviction and punishment? This interference with the
organization and administration of the Navy Department was
attempted by some one. General Meigs would brush it over; says
he has "no distinct recollection" of this order and postscript,
which was published in THE GALAXY for November; that "of
details within the Navy Department, such as are referred to in
the postscript in regard to Captain Barron, he had no knowledge,
and upon them could not have given advice." Nevertheless, this
strange document an executive order, creating without author
ity of law a new bureau in the Navy Department; placing a
rebel captain in charge of its operations, empowering him to
detail all officers for duty, to supervise charges made against
officers, etc., was written by himself and Lieutenant Porter a
joint labor and a divided responsibility. Whether they originated
the measure or were the mere instruments of others, has never

Pickens III

been disclosed. Until recently this mysterious transaction was
not made public. The order, with others, was extracted from the
President, who reposed confidence in those who submitted at
the same time a multitude of orders and matters in detail for
his signature; but this one was promptly disavowed and annulled
by him when he knew its character and purport. Some person
originated this scheme to change the organization of the Navy
Department. It was done by the same parties who extracted the
order in relation to the Powhatan, was done at the same time
and place, was in the handwriting of two of them, and reached
me under the same envelope with other documents of that date.
But who was the author?

For the part taken by General, at that time Captain Meigs
in these transactions he should not perhaps in all respects be held
to a strict accountability. He was acting under orders, was unin
formed in regard to measures of Administration that were then
in progress of fulfilment, and the order which he wrote and
the President signed was evidently penned under dictation. Of
that part which related to the assignment of Captain Stringham,.
he says he has "no distinct recollection," and he of course knew
nothing of "the complications at Vera Cruz," to which he alludes.
When in his recent letter he says his "recommendation to the
President originated in a desire to break the toils in which by
such a convention a former Administration involved the squadron
at Pensacola and Fort Pickens," he forgets that his recommenda
tion was on the 29th of March or 1st of April, and that neither
the President nor any member of the Cabinet knew of any "toils
which involved the squadron at Pensacola" until the arrival of
Lieutenant Gwathmey, on the 6th of April, with despatches from
Captain Adams. It was never doubted by the President or the
members of the Administration, nor by General Scott, that the
order of the latter to Captain Vogdes, on the 12th of March, to
land his command, was carried into effect, and that Pickens was
to that extent reinforced, until a week after Captain Meigs had
made his recommendation and given his advice for a steamer
to run the batteries of McRae and Barrancas.

The position of Lieutenant Porter when off Pensacola was,
doubtless awkward and embarrassing. He had special instruc-

112 Civil War and Reconstruction

lions, written by an engineer, under the direction of the Secre
tary of State, to perform a duty which it was impossible for him
to execute. Having an independent command, his vessel was
not legitimately on the station. The senior officer had no in
structions in relation to him or the Powhatan, did not recognize
him or receive his reports, or forward them to the Department.
He was not in communication with the Secretary of the Navy,
whose orders he had broken, taken from under his control a
vessel which had been duly commissioned, and displaced her
commander, who was his superior. His orders were explicit to
enter the harbor. That alone was the purpose for which he had
been detailed, but that service he could not render. He, there
fore, was lying off Pensacola, but was not one of the squadron.
He had no authority to go or remain. He was isolated, discon
nected with the Navy Department and the naval service. In this
dilemma he wrote letters to the Secretary of State, who knew
not what to do with him or his letters, for naval records were
not kept in the State Department; instructions to naval officers
did not emanate from it, nor was the Secretary of State in a con
dition to send supplies to this independent command which he
had caused to be created.

Feeling his embarrassment, the Secretary of State at length
passed over to me Lieutenant Porter s letters and requested
me to relieve them both from the difficulty in which they
were involved. As the steamer and officer had been irregu
larly withdrawn from the custody and control of the Navy De
partment, I required she should be duly restored. This was done
by the President s order, and on the 13th of May I sent instruc
tions to Lieutenant that the Powhatan would, until other orders,
constitute a part of the Gulf Blockading Squadron, and directed
him to report to the senior officer off Pensacola.

There having been no report received in relation to this
vessel for a number of weeks the Department ascertained from
her log book the records of tthe dates and duty during the interim
while she was away on the irregular and abortive pretext or
project of running the batteries and entering the harbor of
Pensacola.

In conclusion I may be permitted to say that in what I have

Fort Pickens 113

written I have endeavored to forbear the mere expression of
opinion, but have not hesitated to state the truth in regard to
men and measures, although in doing so I may in some instances
have given offence to individuals with whom I have been inti
mate and for whom I have personal regard and friendship. The
three papers which THE GALAXY has published in relation to
events connected with Norfolk, Sumter, and Pickens have brought
to light incidents, naval, military, and civil, which occurred in
the month of April, 1861-a month pregnant with facts of un
surpassed interest in American history.

4

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans

WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN AND
COMMAND OF THE FIRST THREE NAVAL
EXPEDITIONS OF THE WAR.

The capture of New Orleans by Admiral Farragut in
1862 was one of the Union s most spectacular victories.
To counteract widely current impressions that the army
under General Benjamin F. Butler had more to do with
this success than the navy under Farragut, Welles wrote
the following two articles. Emphasizing the leading role
of the navy in all amphibious operations up to 1862,
he discusses the details of the planning and prepara
tions for the assault on the Crescent City. The accuracy
of his version is generally acknowledged today.

PART ONE
T

A HE REBELLION which commenced in the spring of 1861,
though long threatened, found the country almost wholly un
prepared for the conflict. Few in the Free States could be made
to believe there would be an appeal to arms for the alleged or
real grievances of which certain impassioned leaders complained.
There had been severe party strife for years, threats to nullify
or resist Federal laws, which gradually assumed a sectional char
acter; but the real differences or causes of difference were not
such as to lead necessarily to hostilities, had not war or the
subversion of the Government been the design of some of the
ambitious and trusted men in high official position.

But while almost the whole of the people of the Northern
States were disbelievers in any civil war, a very different con-

Tke Galaxy, XII (November, 1871).
114

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 115

dition of things existed at the South. There the apprehensions
were serious and almost universal that a fierce struggle was to
take place. A majority of the people in nearly every State were
opposed to armed resistance to the Government, and opposed
to any scheme for dissolving the Union. Yet they had been
persuaded, and actually believed, that they were greatly wronged
and oppressed by Federal legislation. But their opposition to
violent measures was tame and negative from the very fact that
there was no substantial cause for complaint, while the decisive
element was mischievous, positive, energetic, and belligerent. The
secession or disunion party had by activity and vigilance obtained
possession of the State governments through the South in 1860,
and made extensive preparations to resist the General Govern
ment.

The election of Abraham Lincoln, brought about by the
secession leaders who had deliberately and designedly broken up
the Democratic organization, was made the pretext for seceding
from the Union. As soon as the result of the election in 1860
was known, before any action had been taken, and while the
Democratic party had the President and a majority of Congress,
the State of South Carolina took instant measures for dissolving
her connection with the Federal Government. This extraordinary
and revolutionary movement, unprovoked and uncalled for by
any serious grievance or aggressive action of the Federal Gov
ernment, was followed by other States. Members of Congress
with dramatic ostentation and parade resigned their seats and
left Washington. Scenes similar to those, but not carried to so
great length, had previously occurred, and the Administration
and others from the North appear to have viewed these pro
ceedings, now as then, as an excess of party bitterness which
would exhaust itself in words. No effective measures were taken
to counteract them and strengthen the Government.

When, therefore, Congress adjourned and the change of ad
ministration took place on the 4th of March, 1861, the new
incumbents found the Government wholly unprepared by any
extra-legislative authority or preparation to maintain itself
against the formidable combination that had so long been
maturing schemes for its destruction. The Navy Department

116 Civil War and Reconstruction

was perhaps in the most feeble and deplorable condition of any
branch of the Government for the emergency without vessels,
or armament, or men, and without legal authority to increase
or strengthen either.

A blockade of three thousand five hundred miles in length,
greater in extent than the whole coast of Europe from Cape
Trafalgar to Cape North, was ordered in April; and as we had
not vessels, guns, or men for such a work, a navy had to be im
provised to enforce it. Ships in the merchant service which could
be made available were forthwith procured, guns were manu
factured, men were enlisted, and the whole resources of the
country were put in immediate requisition to meet the crisis.
But although the energies and abilities of the nation were taxed
and called out with wonderful and unexampled rapidity, they
did not satisfy the impatience of the people, who had been
taught, and were willing to believe, the rebellion could be
suppressed and peace be restored in ninety days.

The Government discharged as it best could with the limited
means at its disposal the new and extraordinary duties which,
in addition to ordinary current affairs, devolved upon it. The
change of administration involved in some respects a change of
policy and of men in the civil service. The President and Cabinet
were inexperienced in their new positions, and entitled to en
couragement and support even had the times been propitious.
Coming from old opposing parties, their political principles were
not in all respects homogeneous. Little time was given them,
however, for concert and concentration before war intestine war,
the worst and most to be deplored of all conflicts was precipi
tated upon the country.

The first call for seventy-five thousand men to serve for three
months seems, since the experience we have had through four
eventful years with a million of men under arms, to have been
insignificant in numbers and ridiculous in time for the suppres
sion of that formidable rebellion, which shook the continent,
shattered the framework of the Government, and taxed the
energies of the nation; but without any previous preparation the
call embraced as many as the country could readily arm, equip,
supply, and organize; and few then believed we were to have a

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 117

protracted war. Little, comparatively, was attempted, and but
little was accomplished at the beginning. The rebels, having
resistance in view, were better prepared than the Government for
the conflict. Reverses to the Union cause followed, with murmurs
and general dissatisfaction because the Administration was ap
parently so dilatory and inefficient in its movements, and be
cause our undisciplined troops were not invincible and ir
resistible.

Time was necessary to equip our few naval vessels; to procure
and to prepare the purchased and chartered steamers for naval
service; to recall our foreign squadrons; to manufacture ordnance,
to get supplies, and to enlist seamen. No allowance was made
for these things by the inconsiderate and unthinking, who, under
the impression that vessels were ready and equipped, and crews
enlisted and trained, were loud in their complaints of the inef
ficiency of the navy and the Navy Department. But those who
were intelligent and informed on the subject, instead of com
plaining, were amazed that so much in so brief a period was
accomplished. The rebels felt and acknowledged it. A joint
Committee of the Confederate Congress, "appointed to investi
gate the administration of the Navy Department" of the in
surgents, in their report apologizing for the disasters which had
overwhelmed and annihilated their navy, dwell on the energy
and power which they had encountered. They say: "The vast
naval resources, great commercial school for seamen, numerous
artisans, and vast workshops enabled him to augment this
formidable force with a rapidity unequalled in naval history,
while the naval resources of the world were open to him. It
would have required many years, even under the most favorable
circumstances, for us to have built and equipped as many and
such vessels as the enemy began the war with."

Admiral Du Pont, writing from Port Royal July, 1862, said
to a friend: "1 do not hesitate to say that nothing has ever
come up to the energy of the Navy Department in any country.
The improvised navy for which Mr. Welles was so abused, and
which in my judgment saved us a foreign war by preventing the
blockade from being broken by the English and French, are
among its great deeds."

118 Civil War and Reconstruotion

While most persons anticipated a speedy suppression of the
insurrection and the restoration of harmony and peace, the
Secretary of the Navy came to a different conclusion. He saw
that this was no mere impulsive outbreak. The retiring Ad
ministration, without being specially committed to the secession
movement, had studiously abstained from the exercise of any
authority to prevent or suppress it. It had placed no garrisons
in the forts of the South, though the local authorities were
organizing actively for armed resistance to Federal laws. Were
the new Administration to attempt to send troops or supplies,
which was anticipated and expected by the secessionists and
their sympathizers, the movement would be denounced and re
sisted as just cause of offence. This was made manifest when
the Administration in pursuance of its duty endeavored to send
provisions to the small garrison in Sumter. That peaceful at
tempt of the Government to discharge its duty was made the
pretext for an assault on the fortress and the flag.

While the retiring Federal Administration had done nothing
toward maintaining the national authority in the insurrectionary
region, the State governments which were in the hands and under
the control of the secessionists had been able to organize power
ful laws to obstruct and break down the Federal Union. Their
proceedings had been deliberate, and so extensive and powerful,
and Congress had left the Federal Government so wholly unpre
pared for the conflict, that the Secretary of the Navy was con
vinced the struggle would be severe, and that the duration of
the war would extend far beyond the three months for which
the troops had been ordered out. He took his measures ac
cordingly. Without specific legal authority, he proceeded not
only to buy and charter merchant steamers, but he assumed the
responsibility of immediately ordering, without law and with
out appropriations, the construction of over thirty naval steamers,
none of which could be completed within six months from the
attack on Sumter and long after the terms of the 75,000 men had
expired, which many supposed would close the insurrection. It
is not necessary to speculate on what would have been said and
done had the insurrection been suppressed within ninety days,
with this large increase of our naval force and immense ex-

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 119

penditure. As it was, the first business movement on the first
day of the extra session, before even the message of the Presi
dent had been received stating the object for convening Congress,
was the introduction of a resolution by the then Chairman of
the Naval Committee of the Senate, inquiring by what authority
and at what rates the Secretary of the Navy had increased his
expenditures and made contracts and purchases for the navy.

At home and abroad the blockade was pronounced an im
possibility; but the Navy Department put forth all its energies
to establish and make it effective. There were soon employed
in the various navy and private ship yards, foundries, and ma
chine shops a force of not less than twenty thousand mechanics
and workmen, exclusive of seamen enlisted in the service. As
soon as a small force was placed before the principal ports to
cut off traffic with the rebel States, the Navy Department com
menced projecting expeditions on the coast. The first of these
was for the capture of the batteries which the rebels had con
structed at Hatteras Inlet, from which point they were sending
out small marauding craft to capture vessels engaged in trade
which approached the North Carolina coast. Preparations for the
Hatteras expedition, an enterprise which originated in and was
put in operation by the Navy Department, were begun in July.
General Scott, who was consulted, and of whom military co
operation was asked, consented to spare troops from Fortress
Monroe to accompany the expedition when the navy was ready,
provided the detachment was not detained after the result, what
ever that might be. On the 9th of August I wrote Flag Officer
Stringham in relation to the Hatteras expedition, that "in order
to take the batteries to which you allude, General Scott assures
me he will authorize General Butler to detail a military force
to accompany the expedition/ 1 When this assurance was given
General B. F. Butler was in command at Fortress Monroe; but
on the 13th of August, four days after, General Wool was
ordered to relieve him, which he did on the 19th of August.
The order which General Scott promised on the 9th to issue to
General Butler was promptly given when required to General
Wool, but still on condition and with an express understanding
that the troops should return to Fortress Monroe, and not re-

120 Civil War and Reconstruction

main at the inlet to garrison the forts. General Butler, relieved
by General Wool, sought and was assigned to command the 900
men that were detailed to accompany the navy, and embarked
with Flag Officer Stringham in the Minnesota, which sailed
from Hampton Roads on the 26th of August

The success at Hatteras, the first naval expedition, and it may
be said perhaps the first substantial victory of the war, was fol
lowed by the more important expedition to Port Royal under
Admiral Du Pont. In this expedition the cooperating military
force was commanded by General Thomas W. Sherman. Both
of these expeditions originated in the Navy Department. They
were quietly planned, and matured with a secrecy unknown to
the military operations of that period. Hence probably the cor
respondents and writers of the day, who usually obtained their
first information of events through the War Department or from
army officers, misstated and gave erroneous accounts of these and
other expeditions, and awarded not unfrequently credit to mili
tary officers which strictly belonged to naval commanders. Naval
officers were invariably prohibited from giving information of
naval movements for publication, and newspaper correspon
dents, always inquisitive and generally intelligent, were for this
reason carefully excluded from the expeditions, and as far as
possible from all knowledge in regard to naval operations. This
rigid and restrictive policy of the navy was in such marked con
trast to that of the military, where correspondents were general
ly welcomed and often furnished with every facility to obtain
and publish army operations, was unsatisfactory, led to much
misrepresentation of the Navy Department, and sometimes to
gross injustice to the navy. Many of the perverted statements
which had their origin in pique toward those who excluded,
and favor toward those who received and encouraged them in
their efforts to be the first to lay before the public news which
all desired to know, but which it was impolitic and often in
jurious to publish, have gone into the histories which, hastily
got up, were afterward without examination adopted as authen
tic Nearly every one of these histories passes over the naval com
mander or represents him as a subordinate attached to a military
enterprise. They speak, not of Flag Officer Stringham s expedi-

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 121

tion, but of "General Butler s expedition to Hatteras." Some of
them assume that the expedition originated with and was
achieved by him, when he merely went under orders with two
battalions which were sent in compliance with a request made
by the Navy Department for troops to assist Flag Officer String-
ham, the naval commander, in a naval expedition of which he
knew nothing until he received orders from General Scott direct
ing him to aid and cooperate in a naval enterprise.

The preliminary arrangements for the expedition which re
sulted in the capture of Port Royal, a more important and more
elaborate undertaking, were commenced really before those of
Hatteras. As early as the 25th of June a board was convened in
the Navy Department, composed of Captain, afterward Rear-
Admiral S. F. Du Pont, Professor A. D. Bache, Chief of the Coast
Survey, with whom the Secretary of War associated, by special
request, Major, subsequently General J. G. Barnard of the Corps
of Engineers. Later, Commander, now Rear-Admiral Charles
H. Davis, who officiated as secretary, was added to this board.

The object and purpose of the Navy Department in conven
ing this board, and the date when the expedition under Flag
Officer Du Pont was first contemplated, will be best understood
by publishing the original order, which was on the 25th of June,
only two months after the proclamation of blockade had been
issued and before it had been made absolutely efficient at all
points:

[Confidential.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT, June 25, 1861.
Captain S. F. Du PONT and Prof. A. D. BACHE, Board, etc.

GENTLEMEN:

The Navy Department is desirous to condense all the
information in the archives of the Government which may
be considered useful to the blockading squadrons, and the
Board are therefore requested to prepare such matter as
in their judgment may seem necessary; first, extending from
the Chesapeake to Key West; secondly, from Key West to
the extreme southern point of Texas. It is imperative that
two or more points should be taken possession of on the
Atlantic coast, and Fernandina and Port Royal are spoken

122 Civil War and Reconstruction

o Perhaps others will occur to the Board. All facts bearing
upon such contemplated movement are desired at an early
moment. Subsequently similar points in the Gulf of Mexico
will be considered. It is also very desirable that the practi
cability of closing all the Southern ports by mechanical
means should be fully discussed and reported upon.

Very respectfully, etc.,

GIDEON WELLES.

On the 18th of September a division of the Atlantic squadron
took place. Captain Du Pont was appointed commander of the
South Atlantic blockading squadron. On the 12th of October he
received final orders, and sailed on the 29th.

In his final instructions, which were strictly confidential,
BulFs Bay, St. Helena, Port Royal, and Fernandina were named
as accessible and desirable points; but the preference of the
Department for Port Royal was not put in writing, lest it might
by some means become public and the rebels put on their guard.
The views of the Department in favor of Port Royal were made
known to Flag Officer Du Pont in conversation, but the opinions
of that officer did not at first coincide with those of the De
partment. His choice was Bull s Bay, from an apprehension that
Port Royal was too strongly fortified and that he could not get
his flag-ship, the Wabash, over the bar. But he came into the
measure at the last moment having been finally persuaded, as
he afterward admitted, by the Assistant Secretary, who visited
New York for that purpose before he sailed; and he frankly
said after the result, that to have gone to Bull s Bay, which was
his design, would have been an error. The destination was, how
ever, left indefinite in his orders, and his conclusions were not to
be communicated to the commanders of the various vessels until
they sailed, when the point of rendezvous was indicated in
sealed orders, which were not to be opened until at sea. This un
certainty in regard to the final destination of the squadron pre
vented the enemy from concentrating a formidable force at Port
Royal to resist the Union arms.

As usual with large expeditions, the departure of Du Ponfs
squadron was delayed, and it did not get off until the 29th of

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 123

October. As soon as the arrangements for that enterprise were
completed, and before the squadron left Hampton Roads, the
attention of the Department, previously occupied, was Intently
directed toward New Orleans, the most important place In every
point of view in the Insurrectionary region, and the most dif
ficult to effectually blockade. The whole country, and especially
the great Northwest, was interested In the free and uninterrupted
navigation of the Mississippi, the ocean outlet of the Immense
central valley which contains within its slopes one-half the States
and territory and is the very heart of the Union. New Orleans
is the great depot for Its products, and Forts Jackson and St,
Philip, which protected it, were the gates that barred ocean
communication with the city. To gain possession of the river
and of the city was one of the first objects which addressed itself
to the Administration after the war opened, and was Impera
tively demanded by the great States which were specially in
terested. The unity of the inhabitants and States of the valley
under one government, and the unresisted communication of its
people through the natural and national highway which be
longed alike to those on the upper as well as the lower Missis
sippi, called out the combined energies of all. The Government
sympathized with and responded to the demands that were made
for the assertion and maintenance of this great national right
without restriction or interruption.

Military plans had been projected from the beginning to
obtain control of this national thoroughfare and the city near
its mouth; but all of these schemes contemplated a combined
army and navy movement which should descend from Cairo
on the upper waters of the Mississippi. The idea of a naval con
quest of New Orleans from the Gulf was not entertained by
the army or the Administration. When, therefore, the Navy
Department had perfected its arrangements for the Port Royal
expedition and given final instructions to Flag Officer Du Pont,
it began to consider the embarrassments and difficulty of block
ading the Mississippi Delta, and the practicability of an effective
demonstration in the Gulf. As early as the 31st of July the De
partment had proposed to Commodore Mervine, then in com
mand of the blockading squadron in the Gulf, to establish and

124 Civil War and Reconstruction

hold a battery at or near the head of "the passes of the Missis
sippi/* and he was authorized to take for that purpose naval
guns that were at Tortugas, a large number having been bor
rowed by the War Department and sent out to Fort Pickens on
the recommendation of Captain Meigs of the Engineers, but
never used. These guns were left exposed on the beach at Tor
tugas.

The following is an extract from the communication of the
Department referred to:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, July 31, 1861.
Flag Officer WM. MERVINE,
commanding Gulf Blockading Squadron.

SIR:

.... A large number of naval guns sent out to Fort
Pickens have been landed at Tortugas. If you deem it
practicable in your judgment to establish and hold a battery
at or near the head of the passes of the Mississippi (and the
subject is most earnestly pressed upon your immediate atten
tion), you are authorized to take any number of these guns
and construct such a battery. An engineer officer will
probably be detailed by the senior army officer at your re
quest, and laborers to assist might be hired at Key West.
The necessity of taking measures to effectually close the
river seems to leave no alternative but the construction of
one or more batteries, and any expenditures to accomplish
this will be approved by the Department. . .

Very respectfully, etc.,

GIDEON WELLES.

The capture of the forts and the city by a naval expedition
from the Gulf was at that time entertained by no one, and an
effective blockade of the numerous passes by naval vessels alone
seamed impossible. One or more batteries above the delta was
deemed the best, and perhaps the only effectual method of pre
venting communication. In the mean time the rebels had in
July taken possession of and repaired the fortifications at Ship
Island, tea or twelve miles off the coast, and some sixty miles
from New Orleans, about equidistant from Mobile, and one

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 125

hundred miles from the mouth of the Mississippi. The strategic
importance of this place was felt, and as soon as the Department
became aware of the facts the following communication was

addressed to Flag Officer Mervine:

[Confidential.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT, August 23, 1861.
Flag Officer WILLIAM MERVINE,
commanding Gulf Blockading Squadron,

SIR:

In your despatch No. of the 22d July, you report that
you intend to visit Ship Island.

It has been a matter of surprise and regret that you
should have permitted so important a position as Ship
Island to have been fortified and retained by the insurgents.
At this distance it is difficult to understand the reasons for
the apparent inactivity and indifference that have governed
in this matter. If the force under your command is not all
that we could wish, or all that we intend it shall be, still
it is sufficient for some demonstration, and it would be well
to make up in activity and extra exertion for the want of
numbers.

You have large ships, heavy batteries, young and willing
officers, with men sufficient to dispossess the insurgents from
Ship Island. They might have been prevented entirely from
intrenching themselves upon it. In order to have done this,
smaller vessels would have been necessarily substituted to
guard the passes. This, it would seem, might have been done.

I allude to these matters, not knowing what action you
have taken in the premises since the 22d ult. There is great
uneasiness in the public mind, as well as anxiety in the De
partment, on the apparent inactivity of our squadrons.
I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GIDEON WELLES.

The naval preparations made in consequence of these orders
alarmed the rebels, who during their occupation of Ship Island
had intrenched themselves and rebuilt the fort which had been
previously destroyed.

126 Civil War and Reconstruction

Captain W. W. McKean relieved Flag Officer Mervine of the
command of the Gulf squadron in September. The works on Ship
Island were abandoned by the rebels with some precipitation soon
after, and on the 17th of September Commander Melancton
Smith of the steamer Massachusetts landed a force and took pos
session of the island. Our men proceeded to mount cannon, and
strengthened the fort by a formidable armament of nine-inch
Dahlgren guns and rifled cannon. Barracks were also erected
from the materials which the rebels left on the island when they
fled; and having in view at that early day an effective naval
demonstration in that quarter, the island was held by the navy
until troops could be sent to occupy it. The importance of re
taining the island for naval operations was duly appreciated by
the Government, and on representations from the Navy Depart
ment a military force of 2,500 men was promised for its occupa
tion. This force was intended to relieve the seamen from con
fined shore duty and allow them more active service afloat.
Some effort was required to effect this object, and circumstances
favored the application.

General Butler had rendered important services early in the
war at Annapolis and Baltimore. These services were as much
of a civil as military character, and as such were valued by the
Administration. The leading and educated army officers, while
they recognized the ability of General Butler as a civil magistrate,
municipal officer, or chief of police, did not admit that his
education, training, genius, or capacity were military, or adapted
to his military aspirations or the postion assigned him. He had
been relieved from command first at Baltimore and then at
Fortress Monroe. But his brief administration at Baltimore and
some of his acts and papers had made him popular in that
stormy period. In order therefore that he might have command
commensurate with his office and retain nominal military rank
and position, he was early in the autumn, after he accompanied
Flag Officer Stringham to Hatteras, sent to the New England
States, which were made a distinct military department, to which
he was assigned, with authority to raise by enlistment a force to
serve on the coast wherever wanted. In raising these troops a
difficulty had occurred between him and Governor Andrew of

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 127

Massachusetts, causing additional embarrassment to the Ad
ministration, from which it was felt all would be relieved were
this restless officer sent to Ship Island or the far Southwest, where
his energy, activity, and impulsive force might be employed in
desultory aquatic and shore duty in concert with the navy.
Many of the men to be enlisted by him would come from the
seaboard, and a considerable portion of them were fishermen
and mariners who could, it was said, perform such amphibious
coast duty as might be needed at Ship Island, Beaufort, or else
where. As this duty would be chiefly that of seconding naval
operations acting in cooperation with and to a considerable
extent under the direction of naval officers it was thought a
fortunate circumstance that such an opening presented itself for
the employment of General Butler and the regiments he was
raising in New England. He could, as the navy had obtained pos
session of Ship Island, be detailed with his command for duty at
that station, and in due time elsewhere on the coast.

In a letter to Flag Officer McKean, then in command of the
squadron in the Gulf, that officer was informed on the 2d of
November of this promised military force, and directed to hold
Ship Island until its arrival:

[Confidential.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT, November 2, 1861.
Flag Officer W. W. MCKEAN,
commanding Gulf Blockading Squadron.

SIR:

. . . General Butler with 2,500 men will sail for Ship
Island about the 20th November. You will therefore hold
possession of that island, and, if practicable, move up the
nine-inch guns from Tortugas. . . .

Very respectfully, etc.,

GIDEON WELLES.

The troops did not leave as soon as was promised, and on
the 25th of November a further communication on the same
subject was addressed to Flag Officer McKean, from which I
make the following extract:

128 Civil Wax and Recomtruction

NAVY DEPARTMENT, November 25, 186 1,
Flag Officer WILLIAM W. MCKEAN,
commanding Gulf Blockading Squadron, Key West, Florida,

SIR:

The Constitution sails in a few days with a force to take
possession of Ship Island. You will, therefore, transfer to the
senior officer in command of this force possession of all
Government property not actually required by you for
establishing a naval depot. You will cooperate with this
officer in the protection of this position. . . .

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GIDEON WELLES.

The occupancy of Ship Island by the navy, and the procure
ment of 2,500 troops for the station, were preliminary to other
and more extensive operations which the Government had in
view in that quarter. Representations had been made that a
strong Union feeling existed in Texas, which only needed the
protection and encouragement of an armed Union force to be
fully developed. A demonstration on the coast of Texas was con
sequently entertained. Mobile was, however, a more favored point
with military men, in view of the combined army and navy move
ment which was organizing to descend from the North and ob
tain possession of the Mississippi river and ultimately of New
Orleans. An effort in the direction of Mobile seemed a prefer
able military movement to Galveston or any part of Texas.
But while the attention of others, when turned to the South
west, was divided between Texas and Mobile, the Navy De
partment, on which devolved the duty of establishing an effective
blockade of the coast and the interdiction of all traffic with
New Orleans, felt the necessity of more efficient and decisive
measures than the mere possession of outposts like Ship Island
and the Mississippi Delta to accomplish the object. The diffi
culty of guarding and closing the passes of the Mississippi, and
all water communication with New Orleans, which was as dif
ficult as the blockade of Wilmington at a later period, the escape
of the Sumter, the disaster to the naval vessels commanded by

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 129

Captain Pope and others, the knowledge that formidable iron
clad vessels were being rapidly constructed at New Orleans, the
low alluvial banks of the river, on which the army was disinclined
to attempt to plant and erect batteries and garrison them in
that sickly swamp, were facts keenly felt; and it seemed that a
vigorous blow at the centre by the capture of New Orleans itself
would be less difficult, less expensive, less exhausting, would be
attended with less loss of life and be a more fatal blow to the
rebels, than the most extensive, stringent, and protracted blockade
that could possibly be established. The army movements were
tardy and indefinite, and, regardless of the navy and the
blockade, they began to tend toward Mobile rather than New
Orleans, as a better objective point for military operations. These
uncertain and vacillating military schemes convinced the Navy
Department that it could not rely on the army to aid in enforc
ing the blockade; that what was a primary object with the navy
was a secondary one with the army. While, therefore, we con
tinued to assist in the movement for descending the river,
whatever might be its termination, we felt the necessity of pro
jecting other and more effective and definite measures, having
in view the capture of New Orleans and the possession of the
lower Mississippi by a naval expedition, which should ascend
from the Gulf. But it was not easy to convince others, and par-
particularly military men, that such an enterprise was feasible.
Little encouragement was received from any quarter. In general
and desultory conversation with military and naval men and
others, the passage of the forts and capture of New Orleans was
spoken of as a desirable but not practicable naval undertaking.
Yet it was noted and remembered by the Navy Department that
our steamers had passed and repassed the batteries at Hatteras
and Port Royal, had overcome them without serious injury to
the vessels, and it was asked why could not the forts in the
Mississippi be passed in like manner? There were, it is true, a
narrow channel, a rapid, adverse current, and regularly con
structed forts to be encountered, which might prove more for
midable than the batteries at Hatteras and Hilton Head; but
with steamships the propelling power of the vessel now no
longer dependent on wind and tidewas subject to the com-

ISO Civil War and Reconstruction

iaander f and with some loss of vessels, some sacrifice of life, It
was believed the forts might be run. This was an occasion when
It became necessary to take great risks to accomplish great re
sults. What was early spoken of as a possibility an event hoped
for rather than attainable gradually gained favor with the Navy
Department, until the conclusion was reached that it was not
only practicable, but the best step which could be taken for
perfecting the blockade, getting possession of the river, and to
aid in suppressing the rebellion. The Assistant Secretary, Mr.
Fox, who had been familiar with the river while in the merchant
service, was earnest and unequivocal for a purely naval attack,
and was confident the passage of the forts might be effected
without military assistance. When, therefore, intelligence of the
capture of the forts at Fort Royal was received and the manner
in which it had been effected the squadron under Du Pont,
like that under Stringham, having passed and repassed the
batteries, Du Font s in a cirde, thus incurring double risk, with
out material injury to the vessels or serious loss of life the views
of the Navy Department in regard to the passage of Forts
Jackson and St. Philip and the capture of New Orleans, hitherto
speculative and uncertain, were confirmed, and measures for its
accomplishment were commenced.

President Lincoln was made acquainted with our views and
our programme for passing the forts and the capture of New
Orleans by the navy, and our belief in its success, based on the
fact that steam had wrought a revolution in naval warfare,
practical proof of which was furnished in the achievement of
the navy at Hatteras and Port Royal. If the forts were passed,
the fall of New Orleans was certain. He became deeply interested,
but was at first somewhat incredulous as to the feasibility of
the enterprise. Among the important movements projected, this
had not been one. Military men, of whom there were many in
and about the War Department whom he saw daily, had not
suggested it. They had a different programme, and he had faith
that the combined army and navy descent of the river which
had been resolved upon, and was a favorite scheme in army
circles, would sooner and more easily secure the city than any
naval expedition ascending from the Gulf. His attention had

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 131

been wholly directed to this combined movement for descending
the Mississippi, which seemed more plausible and more power
ful than the proposed ascent, where the fleet must struggle
against a strong current and pass two of the most formidable
forts on the continent. But, it was urged, the very fact that they
were formidable, that the rebels confided in their strength, was
an argument in our favor. On that side of the city they felt
secure, and their chief preparations were and would be to resist
approaches by the immense organizations from above, of which
they had been and would continue to be duly warned. They
were not making extra preparations for an attack from a dif
ferent direction, and their suspicions should not be aroused.
Secrecy would conduce to the success of a naval expedition. If
it were to go forward, it was advisable that the measure should
be discussed as little as possible, and for the time it was not
necessary that the War Department should be made acquainted
with our purpose. The naval success in the two preceding ex
peditions, of which he had known but little and which had been
quietly conducted, inspired the President with confidence In
naval management and naval power, and with very little hesita
tion he came into the project. Difficulty was experienced, how
ever, in getting satisfactory and reliable topographical and hydro-
graphical information, and correct knowledge of the actual
defenses at the time. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, as
already stated, was acquainted with the river and the general
aspect of the place, and felt confident the low shores and
batteries could oppose no insurmountable obstruction, for the
larger vessels could overlook them.

About this time Commander D. D. Porter returned with
the steam frigate Powhatan from an irregular cruise on which
he had been improperly sent. Having wholly failed to carry out
the plan on which he had been surreptitiously despatched, he
was subsequently ordered to the Gulf squadron, and had been
stationed for a period off one of the mouths of the Mississippi.
On his return the Navy Department, having decided to make a
naval attack on the forts and city, was glad to avail itself of his
recent observations, and of whatever information he possessed
in regard to the river and the forts. He was therefore questioned

152 Civil War and Reconstruction

and soon taken into our confidence. He entered with zeal into
the views of the Department, but expressed great doubts whether
the forts could be passed until reduced or seriously damaged.
This he said might be effected by a flotilla of bomb-vessels with
mortars, which could in forty-eight hours demolish the forts or
render then untenable. Commander Porter s proposition was a
departure from the original plan of the Navy Department, and
was strongly objected to by the Assistant Secretary. It would not,
however, have been good administration to have omitted any
means considered by the army and Commander Porter, whom
it consulted, essential to success; and as a mortar flotilla would
furnish additional power and would probably render success
more certain, it received favorable consideration from the Presi
dent and Secretary of the Navy, and was adopted as a part of
the programme.

As a cooperative military force would be necessary, President
Lincoln desired that General McClellan, who had just been
installed General-in-Chief, should be advised of the plan and
his approval and cooperation obtained. He therefore made an
appointment for consultation at that officer s residence. At that
time General McClellan occupied the house of Bayard Smith
on the corner of H and Fourteenth streets, the present Washing
ton residence of the Hon. Samuel Hooper of Boston. I had pro
posed that the conference should take place at the Executive
Mansion, but the President objected that we should be con
stantly interrupted by persons whom he could not refuse to see
members of the Cabinet and others.

The meeting took place not far from the middle of Novem
ber. My impression is, it was on the evening of the 15th. It
was prior to the 18th of that month. I was accompanied to the
conference by Assistant Secretary Fox and Commander D. D.
Porter, both intelligent men in their profession and each ac
quainted with the passes of the Mississippi and aware of the
difficulties to be overcome. These gentlemen called at my house
by previous arrangement to talk over the subject about an hour
before the meeting, and went with me to General McClellan s.
The President, General McClellan, and the two gentlemen

Farragut and New Orleans 133

named, with myself, were the only persons present at the
conference.

General McClellan listened attentively to the proposition,
but I thought with little confidnece in its success. To reduce
the forts and capture New Orleans he seemed to suppose must
of necessity be a military operation, which would require an
army of at least 50,000 men. He could not spare so large a
force, nor had he a competent military officer of high rank
whom he could detail to command such an expedition and con
duct the siege. When, however, he understood it was to be a
naval expedition, and that a military force of 10,000 men to
garrison the forts and hold the city after the navy had obtained
possession was all that was required, he came readily into the
arrangement. We had already obtained the promise of 2,500
men for Ship Island, who were to be largely reinforced for a
descent on Texas or an attack on Mobile, These troops, which
were being recruited, might go forward with that expectation,
and at the proper time when the navy was ready could be
diverted to the Mississippi and New Orleans.

The proposal of Commander Porter for a bomb flotilla met
his decided approval. He deemed such a battery absolutely es
sential to success. As our preparations would be formidable and
consequently attract attention, and as there were spies and rebel
sympathizers among us, it was concluded it would be best that the
impression should continue that Texas or Mobile was the ob
jective point, without specifying which; and to make matters
still more indefinite, Charleston and Savannah were talked of.
Profound and impenetrable secrecy in regard to New Orleans
was enjoined upon each and all.

Major Barnard, Chief Engineer of the Army of the Potomac,
who had been employed on Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and
knew their strength, was by advice of General McClellan con
sulted. This officer fully appreciated the magnitude of the move
ment and its immense importance to the country. He also ap
proved ascending the rives to capture the city, but considered
it all-important that the forts should be reduced before any
attempt was made to go above them. This he recommended

184 Civil Wax and Reconstruction

should be a combined army and navy movement with ironclads
and mortars.

The original proposition of the Navy Department was to
run past the forts and capture the city, when, the fleet being
above and communication cut off, the lower defenses must fall.
But the military gentlemen deemed the reduction of the forts
before the passage of the naval vessels was attempted to be
absolutely indispensable. The General-in-Chief, whose time and
mind were occupied with the immense army then organizing in
front of Washington, designated Major Barnard for consultation
and advice in this naval expedition, to which he could not give
the attention its importance demanded. Major Barnard in suc
cessive interviews, and finally in a private memorandum, after
giving the whole subject consideration, states: "I should consider
necessary, first, a powerful fleet bearing from 300 to 400 guns
(as many XL and IX. guns as can be had); second, half a dozen
ironclad gunboats (or as many more as can be had); third,
10,000 troops (all these might not be necessary in reducing the
works, but they should be with the expedition to take immediate
advantage of its success). I should hope to reduce the works
without regular siege operations; but even if it became necessary
to resort to them, the powerful artillery of the fleet would make
a large siege train unnecessary. . . . The fleet should be ac
companied by say 15 to 20 mortar vessels, such as are now being
equipped. . . . But to pass those works (merely) with a fleet and
appear before New Orleans is merely a raid no capture. New
Orleans and the river cannot be held until communications are
perfectly established/

These were the general views of an officer who appreciated
and always did justice to the navy; who did not think 50,000
men or regular seige approaches necessary; but who called for
half a dozen or more irondads when we had not one, and
deemed fifteen or twenty mortar vessels essential, and the re
duction of the forts before the passage of the vessels was at
tempted to be necessary.

Commander Porter took a similar view in regard to the re
duction of the forts before the passage of the ships. He proposed
to destroy the works in forty-eight hours with a mortar flotilla,

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 135

and was confident lie could effect their destruction in that rime.
In its essential features his proposition corresponded with those
of the army engineer. Both made it a point that the forts should
be first reduced. Both were strongly combated by the Assistant
Secretary, who adhered to the original naval programme, that
the steamers could pass the forts without reducing or even
bombarding them. But in deference to military authority and
the confident assertions of Commander Porter, the proposition
of the latter for a mortar flotilla was adopted as an auxiliary
force, which might render assistance and be of no detriment to
the expedition.

The labor of preparation, especially after the scheme of a
bomb flotilla was adopted, became immense, and was entered
upon with alacrity and energy. Suitable vessels were to be pur
chased and adapted to war purposes; immense mortars and shells
were to be cast and mortar beds prepared; guns, carriages, pro
jectiles, ordnance of every description ordered, and stores and
supplies of all kinds provided.

It was now an interesting inquiry what naval officer should
be selected to command the expedition. An officer was wanted
to carry out a plan already determined upon by the Department
a plan that was not in all respects concurred in by the military
authorities, which had not received their full sanction, nor had
the original programme the approval of any naval officer. The
duty to be imposed upon him was novel, and required courage,
audacity, tact, and fearless energy, with great self-reliance, de
cisive judgment, and ability to discriminate and act under trying
and extraordinary circumstances. He was to be made fully ac
quainted with the object and purpose of the Department, and to
identify himself with them. He was also to be informed of the
deviations which, on the suggestion and recommendations of
others, had from abundance of caution been made. These he
was to adopt or dispose of as he might judge best when on his
post and in full command, but with a distinct understanding
that he would be held accountable for the result. Every prom
inent name in the higher grades of the navy was studied and
scanned. The merits and characteristics of each officer in the
service had been canvassed in every particular after the war

1 36 Civil War and Reconstruction

commenced, and the especial traits and reliability of each one
examined, that we might know his qualities and fidelity, in order
that we might rightly judge to what place or position he was
best adapted. Seniority had its influence, but was not always
satisfactory. Among the few marked for ability, nautical ex
perience, and long and faithful service, but who had never yet
been given a high command nor been fully tested and tried as
chief, was Captain David Glasgow Farragut. Other names were
considered and their merits weighed, examined, and compared.
The important question of earnest, devoted loyalty to the Con
stitution and the Union was of course a primary consideration.
There was little doubt that the naval officers who had continued
in service until the close of 1861, when this subject was under
consideration, were faithful; but there were different degrees
of fidelity as well as of capacity. Some officers had wavered at
the beginning, who became afterward zealous in the cause; some
throughout were cool and indifferent, who nevertheless obeyed
orders as a matter of duty; but most of those who remained in
the navy were patriotic and devoted to the country and the flag.
Such as believed their obligations to their State or section to be
paramount to those they owed their country had, prior to or
at the commencement of hostilities, shown the sincerity of their
convictions by tendering their resignations and leaving the
service. With scarcely an exception, those who withdrew were
Southern men.

But the general demoralization which prevailed throughout
the South caused the Navy Department, and for that matter
every branch of the Government, to hesitate and doubt who
that belonged to that section could be trusted. So general was
the defection that confidence in all was impaired. Such was the
uncertainty in regard to men, and so sectional the conflict, that
the Navy Department felt it a duty at the commencement of
difficulties to supersede every Southern officer in command of a
vessel on a foreign station. But while the great body of Southern
officers left the service in that crisis, those that remained were,
with scarcely an exception, of undoubted and marked fidelity and
patriotism. Sacrifices which others did not and could not make
they submitted to. From a sense of duty and love of country

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 15?

they became aliens, exiles from their homes and kindred. Prom
inent among these was Captain Farragut, a Southern man by
birth, a resident of the South from choice. He had never been
a party man, and the doctrine of secession when introduced
struck him with an abhorrence, as not only an error but a
crime. Nationality is a sentiment with men who are employed
professionally and for life in the Federal service; and among
military, and especially naval officers, there is an undoubted
tendency to centralism. Extraordinary efforts were made by
leaders in the secession movement to enlist the State pride, local
feeling, and personal ambition of naval officers of the South,
and to weaken their Federal attachment. To a considerable
extent these intrigues were successful. Failing to make them
selves acquainted with the true political theory and structure
of our system, many officers, naval and military, educated by
their country and paid from its treasury, became estranged from
the Union and abandoned the flag. Not so with Farragut.
Nothing could shake his fidelity to the country and Government,
which he loved with filial devotion and had served from his
earliest youth. Residing at Norfolk, unemployed, on waiting
orders, in the winter and spring of 1861, he watched with amaze
ment and intense interest the exciting political movements of
the period, and for the first time in his life became an active
partisan. With his whole heart and energies he maintained the
cause of the Union, and contributed to its success in Virginia
by the triumphant vote in February, when the secessionists were
beaten by 60,000 majority. In the belief that this clear expression
of the popular sentiment was conclusive and the State made
faithful, he reposed in comparative yet vigilant security until
the firing on Sumter, when the violence of the secessionists,
followed by the secret action of the Convention at Richmond,
intelligence was received that the ordinance of secession had
warned him that Virginia had swung from her moorings. The
Convention was composed of a majority of nominal Union men,
but many of them were of a passive and negative character, who
trusted there would yet in some way be a compromise. The seces
sionists, who were violent, positive, revolutionary, and wanted
no compromise, cowed and controlled them. On the day when

158 Civil War and Reconstruction

intelligence was received that the ordinance of secession had
passed the Convention, Captain Farragot determined to abandon
Norfolk and the State. His home should be in the Union; he
would recognize and serve under no flag but that under which
he was born, which for fifty years, in every land and clime, he
had supported, and to defend which he had always been ready
to yield his life; his hand should never be raised against it, nor
would he be indifferent to its cause. Collecting hastily a few
valuables, he placed his wife, sister, and their children in a
carriage, put his loaded pistols in his pocket, and within two
hours from the reception of the news that Virginia had decided
to secede he proceeded to the Baltimore steamer, then at the
wharf. Leaving all else behind, he resolved not to be denational
ized or torn from the Union; he would know no country but that
which he had loved and served from his childhood. The next day
he passed through Baltimore, then in that excited insurrection
which followed the massacre of the Massachusetts volunteers.
The ordinary channels of travel by steamers and railroads were
interrupted, and in the general confusion it was difficult to
procure means of transportation or to leave the city. He found
by accident that a common canal boat was leaving the wharf
for Philadelphia. On this boat, which had indifferent accom
modations for about eighteen persons, there were crowded nearly
three hundred-fugitives, like himself and family, seeking refuge
in the North. He reached New York after some annoyance and
inconvenience with but slight pecuniary means to sustain him
self and his exiled and dependent family. Being on waiting
orders for the Department, which did not then know these
particulars, was moving with cautious, vigilant, and wary steps,
careful and guarded whom to trust, and in the employment of
Southern officers particularly circumspect Captain Farragut felt
his pecuniary resources insufficient for his support in the great
metropolis. Always modest and unobtrusive, and almost a stranger
in New York, he found a resting place for a few days under the
roof of a friend whom he had previously known, until he could
obtain a secluded place out of the city, adapted to his limited
means. He succeeded in getting a modest cottage at Hastings on
the Hudson at a rent of $150 per annum, which he plainly fur-

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 139

nished, and to which, with one servant, lie retired to await events
ready, however, and anxious to serve his counrty and give
himself to her cause.

Active employment was not immediately given him, partly for
reasons already stated, and partly because there were not at that
early day naval vessels and positions for all in the higher grades.

A sifting of the naval officers was required to preserve har
mony and render the service efficient. Some of them were old
and infirm; some were physically and others mentally incom
petent; but none would admit infirmity, and all wanted em
ployment. While it might have been wrong to dismiss any of
them from the service, it would have been a greater wrong to
have given some of them active duty. Congress, therefore, at the
extra session in the summer of 1861, took steps to relieve the
Department of this difficulty, and under the act of August 3,
1861, for the better organization of the military establishment,
a board of officers was convened to name such as should be
retired from active service. Captain Farragut was made a member
of that board. The duty was delicate and responsible, requiring
sagacity, just discrimination, impartiality, and decision; for they
were to take the Register and pass on the merits of each and
every officer on the active list of the navy.

I had met and been favorably impressed by Captain Far
ragut some fifteen years previously, during the Mexican war,
when I was officiating in the Navy Department as chief of a
naval bureau. He at that time made what was considered a
remarkable proposition to the then Secretary of the Navy, John
Y. Mason, which was a plan to take the castle of San Juan d Ulloa.
I was present when he stated and urged his plan. It was character
ized by the earnest, resolute, and brave daring which at a later
day was distinctly brought out in our great civil conflict. Secre
tary Mason heard him patiently, but dismissed him and his
project as visionary and impracticable. The officer and the in
terview I remembered; and though we had not met for years,
the impression then made upon me remained and was alluded
to. He was gratified with my allusion to it, and remarked they
thought him crazy, but he was still satisfied the enterprise was
feasible and that he would have taken the castle had he been

140 Civil War and Reconstruction

permitted the opportunity. Naval men in whom I confided
spoke well of him, but I think few, if any, appreciated his high
and really strong qualities, and most of them, if aware of the
New Orleans expedition, and had the choice of a commander
developed upon them, would likely have selected some other
favorite, Farragut was attached to no clique, which is some
times the bane of the navy, was as modest and truthful as he
was self-reliant and brave, had individuality, and resorted to none
of the petty contrivances common with many for position and
advancement.

A division of the Atlantic squadron had been made in the
autumn, when Flag Officer Du Pont embarked for Port Royal;
and the extensive coast west of the Florida peninsula justified
a division of the squadron in the Gulf. Such a division would
throw the contemplated New Orleans expedition within the
limits of the western squadron, and the necessary appointment
of an additional flag officer would serve as a cover to the expedi
tion, and not excite curiosity or comment as to any ulterior pur
pose. In scanning the Register with the Assistant Secretary for
the flag officer to command the expedition he spoke favorably
of Farragut, and his recommendation chimed in with my own
impressions and convictions. Further inquiries were necessary,
however, before deciding so important a question. This was at
tended with some difficulty and embarrasment. There were
rivalries and jealousies in the service to be encountered. The
knowledge of the expedition was confined to a few, and could
not well be imparted to others, even to those whose opinions
it was an object to ascertain. Nor would it do to select and
make known the purpose in hand to one who would hesitate,
or who had not the combined dash, daring, heroism, good sense,
and judgment to excute the important trust. The responsibility
of selecting the commander was great. Everything depended up
on it, and the country would, and ought to, hold the Secretary
of the Navy responsible for the selection. Many excellent officers
in secondary or surbordinate positions, who implicitly obey
orders, fail as leaders or commanders-in-chief . In the long interval
of peace our officers had not had opportunity to develop their
respective peculiar or extraordinary qualities and capabilities,

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 141

nor had the Department the benefit of any such development
to assist in its choice. Farragut had a good reputation, had been
severely trained, and had always done his duty well, but had never
commanded a squadron or achieved eminent distinction. His
name is now a household word, and his fame extends abroad;
but in 1861 he was not more prominent than others of his grade.
Those great qualities which have since been brought out were
dormant. He had a good but not a conspicuous record. All who
knew him gave him the credit of being a good officer, of good
sense and good habits, who had faithfully and correctly discharg
ed his duty in every position to which he had been assigned.
There were others also endowed with these traits, but the ques
tion was, had he, or any one, the higher qualities which are es
sential for a chief, and were indispensable for this the most im
portant naval expedition ever undertaken by the United States,
and which in fact had, in some respects, no precedent or paral
lel in naval annals? Would he adopt the Department plan, make
it his own, carry it into effect? We had at that time no admiral
or chief naval officer to identify himself in our programme, and
whom to consult, and collision and rivalries among the com
manders of squadrons were to be avoided; at the same time sub
ordinates were to be impressed with confidence and zeaL

Flag Officer McKean, who succeeded Commodore Mervine
in command of the Gulf squadron, found his health giving way
under his extensive and exacting duties; it was therefore neces
sary as well as expedient that a division of the squadron should
be made.

The Assistant Secretary, Mr. Fox, was directed to obtain Com
mander Porter s opinion of Captain Farrgut. There had been an
intimacy between the families of Farragut and Porter, dating
back to the administration of Mr. Jefferson, when the father
of Admiral Farragut had conferred essential favors on the
elder Porter, who had reciprocated those favors by assisting
young Glasgow Farragut, then a boy nine or ten years of age,
to obtain a midshipman s warrant. He adopted him as a
protg6, and made him virtually one of his family. In gratitude
and affection young Farragut soon after took the name of David,
and was so baptized in die Episcopal church at Newport. As

142 Civil War and Reconstruction

Commander Porter had been let into the secret of the expedi
tion, and the relations between him and Farragut were such as
here stated, there was propriety in getting his opinions pre
liminary to inquiries of Farragut himself. Admirals Shubrick,
Joseph Smith, and one or two others, spoke well of him for the
position of flag officer, without being at the time aware of the
other and important ultimate design of the Department. It now
became important to ascertain the ideas, feelings, and views of
Captain Farragut himself, and this, if possible, before informing
him of the expedition, or committing the Department in any
respect. Nothing, as has been stated, was put on paper which
related to the actual destination of the expedition, and every
movement was made with caution and circumspection. Under
these circumstances it was thought best to intrust Commander
Porter with a confidential mission to proceed to New York on
business relating to the mortar flotilla, and while there to
ascertain, in personal interviews and conversations on naval mat
ters and belligerent operations generally, the views of Captain
Farragut on the subject of such a programme and naval at
tack as was proposed by the Navy Department, without advising
him of our object or letting him know that the Department
had any purpose in Porter s inquiries or knew of them. The
following letter, written to Commander Porter, is so worded
as to furnish no information of the expedition or the special
object intrusted to him. It is the first preparatory order for bomb
vessels and mortars destined for the Mississippi. His authority
to see and sound Captain Farragut was unwritten:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, November 18, 1861.
Commander DAVID D. PORTER, U. S. Navy,
Washington, D. C.

SIR:

Proceed to Philadelphia and New York and examine at
those places the schooners purchased by the Government,
whether any of them are suitable for bomb vessels. In New
York Mr. George D. Morgan, 54 Exchange Place, and Com
mander Henry H. Bell, will show you what vessels of that
dass are already fitting for service. If, in your judgment,
none of these are capable of being arranged for mortars,

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 145

you are authorized to purchase six suitable vessels, and
Commander Bell will arrange them as you may suggest.
Consult with the Ordnance Bureau before you leave Wash
ington relative to the mortars.

You will also examine the iron-clad vessels now build
ing at Philadelphia, New York, and Mystic, Connecticut,
and report the result on your return. Upon the completion
of this duty, you will return to Washington.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GIDEON WELLES.

Commander Porter s report of Ms interviews with Captain
Farragut was favorable, and that officer was, on the 15th of
December, detached from special duty and ordered to Wash
ington, that the Department, before committing itself in this
important matter, might be fully assured in regard to him in
all respects. The proceedings had reached such a point, the
programme was so well settled and defined, and the prepara
tions were so far advanced, that we could no longer postpone
the selection of the officer who was to command; and it was
equally necessary he should know the fact and the labor, dangers,
and responsibilities he was to assume. Captain Farragut, under
this summons, arrived in Washington on Saturday the 21st of
December, and in order that the Department should continue
uncommitted, the Assistant Secretary was authorized to have
a free, social, and discretionary talk with him on the subject,
before his interview with myself. This he did on the day Captain
Farragut arrived at the house of the Postmaster-General, Mr.
Blair, where he dined, and who, as I afterward learned, was
present at that interview. Captain Farragut entered at once so
heartily into the subject, and was so earnest and enthusiastic,
that Mr. Fox unhesitatingly made known to him the purpose
of the Department, and exhibited a list of the vessels which
were being prepared for the expedition. Then, and In subse
quent interviews with myself, he gave his unqualified approval
of the original plan, adopted it with enthusiasm, said it was
the true way to get to New Orleans, and offered to run by the
forts with even a less number of vessels than we were preparing

144 Ovil War and Reconstruction

for him, provided that number could not be supplied. He was
made acquainted with the project of a mortar flotilla, to be
commanded by Commander Porter. This, though not of his
advisement, he said he would take with him, as it was a part of
the enterprise, and some of the vessels and mortars had already
been procured; but they were of less importance, in his estima
tion, and he placed less reliance on them than others. In every
particular he came up to all that was expected and required.
To obey orders, he said, was his first duty; to take any risk that
might be imposed upon him by the Government, to obtain a
great result, he considered obligatory; and believing it impera
tive that a good officer and citizen should frankly, but re
spectfully, communicate his professional opinions, he said, while
he would not have advised the mortar flotilla, it might be of
greater benefit than he anticipated, might be more efficient
than he expected, and he willingly adopted it as a part of his
command, though he apprehended it would be likely to warn
the enemy of our intentions. He expected, however, to pass the
forts and restore New Orleans to the Government, or never re
turn. He might not come back, he said, but the city would be
ours. Admiral Farragut was never profuse in promises, but he
felt complimented that he was selected, and I saw that in
modest self-reliance he considered himself equal to the emer
gency and to the expectation of the Government. He was, there
fore, on the 23d of December, directed to hold himself in
readiness to take command of the West Gulf squadron and the
expedition to New Orleans.

5

Admiral Fatragut and New Orleans

WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN ANB
COMMAND OF THE FIRST THREE NAVAL
EXPEDITIONS OF THE WAR.

PART TWO

AHEI

IRE HAVE been particularity of dates and detail, and
quotations from official documents, in relation to the preliminary
arrangements for the New Orleans expedition, in order to correct
some of the many strange statements and misrepresentations of its
inception which appear in most if not all the histories that
have been written of the war. Partiality and prejudice almost
universally influence those who undertake to write contempo
raneous history. Partisanship entered largely into the feelings
of most of the writers of the time, and a desire to throw promi
nently forward party favorites, rather, it is to be hoped, than a
wish to do injustice to others or to pervert history, warped their
judgment and led them to ignore facts, to misstate the origi
nators of the enterprise, and also the real commander, to draw
false inferences, and to award undue credit to favored party
leaders, Farragut, the great chief, the actual leader in the fight,
the real hero who commanded the expedition and captured
New Orleans, is represented as an assistant or subordinate to
the General who accompanied him, but who was not under fire,
and to whom, when the fighting was over, he, in pursuance of his
orders from the Navy Department, turned over the forts and
the city that he had captured. But Farragut was not a political

The Galaxy, XII (December, 1871).

145

146 Civil Wax and Reconstruction

partisan, nor the special favorite of a faction was identified
with no party, and would permit himself to be used by none.

In the second volume of Greeley s "American Conflict," pur
porting to give a history of the war, the fifth chapter is devoted to
"Butler s Expedition to the Gulf Capture of New Orleans." It
is not said or intimated that it was Farragut s expedition, though
Farragut commanded it, was engaged in preparation for it, and
had his orders to command it long before Butler was informed
of it, and actually did the fighting, passed the forts, and captured
New Orleans, and several days after its capture gave it into the
possession of General Butler. The principal features and ground
work of that chapter of the "American Conflict," which have
misled others, are, in many respects, and especially as to the
origin of the expedition and the principal commander, mere
partisan conjecture false inference a perversion of history, not
a record of facts. It is said, among other things, that "the substi
tution of Mr. Edwin M. Stanton for General Simon Cameron
as head of the War Department caused some further delay."
This substitution had no influence whatever on the movement,
for the expedition and its object had not been communicated to
the War Department when the change of Secretaries was made.
Mr. Cameron s going out or Mr. Stanton s going into the Cabinet
had nothing to do with it. It was not an enterprise of the War
Department. The first knew nothing of the expedition while
Secretary of War; the last was not advised of it until it was on
the point of consummation. If the author of the "American
Conflict" had anything beyond mere guesswork for his history,
he was egregiously deceived. Among other things he says:

"Mobile had been generally guessed the object of General
Butler s mysterious expedition, whose destination was not abso
lutely fixed even in the councils of its authors. An effort to
re-annex Te^c^s had been considered, if not actually contem
plated. It was^ .finally decided, in a conference between Secretary
Stanton and, General Butler, that a resolute attempt should be
made on New Orleans; and though General McClellan, when
requested to give his opinion of the feasibility of the enterprise,
reported that it could not be prudently undertaken with a less
force than 50,000 men, while all that could be spared to General

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 147

Butler was 15,000. President Lincoln after hearing all sides gave
judgment for the prosecution/*

Truth and error are here blended in a way to sacrifice the
former. Had the author made inquiry, or Investigated the case,
he would have learned that Mr. Stanton was not appointed
Secretary of War until the 13th of January, 1862 two months
after the conference, of which he appears to have been ignorant,
between the President, Secretary of the Navy, and others at
General McClellan s house. At that time it was finally decided
that the plan, which had its first conception in the Navy De
partment as early as September, and had been quietly considered
and canvassed until the capture of Port Royal on the 17th of
November, should be carried out The navy had taken Ship
Island, which may be considered perhaps the first step in this
movement, and held it until troops were sent to occupy it The
naval vessels were in preparation, the bomb-vessels had been pur
chased and were undergoing the necessary alterations for the
mortar beds, and orders for the mortars had been issued in
November, 1861. Captain Farragut had been seen, summoned
to Washington, consulted and directed to hold himself in readi
ness to command the expedition weeks before Mr. Stanton was
appointed Secretary of War consequently, before either he or
General Butler was aware, or could have been consulted, or
had thought of such an attempt, or knew it was to be made.

Mr. Parton, in his book, "General Butler in New Orleans,"
relates that "One day (about January 10), toward the close of
a long conference between the General and the Secretary, Mr.
Stanton suddenly asked: Why can t New Orleans be taken? The
question thrilled General Butler to the marrow. It can/ he
replied. This was the first time New Orleans had been mentioned
in General Butler s hearing, but by no means the first time he
had thought of it. The Secretary told him to prepare a pro
gramme, and for the third time the General dashed at the
charts and books. General McClellan, too, was requested to pre
sent an opinion on the feasibility of the enterprise* He reported
that the capture of New Orleans would require an army of
50,000 men, and no such number could be spared. Even Texas,
he thought, should be given up for the present. But now General

148 Civil War and Reconstruction

Butler fired with the splendor and daring of the new project,
exerted all the forces of his nature to win for it the success of
the Government. He talked New Orleans to every member of
the Cabinet. In a protracted interview with the President he
argued, he urged, he entreated, he convinced. Nobly was he
seconded by Mr. Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, a
native of Lowell, a schoolmate of General Butler s. His whole
heart was in the scheme. The President spoke at length the
decisive word, and the General almost reeled from the White
House in the intoxication of his relief and joy."

The truth is, the President, instead of being urged, entreated,
and at length convinced, in January, as stated, had "spoke the
decisive word" as early as the middle of November, had many
interviews with the Secretary of the Navy in regard to it, had
examined charts and been made acquainted with the opinions
of the Army Engineer, General Barnard, and advised that the
auxiliary bomb flotilla proposed by Commander Porter should
be adopted, before Mr. Stanton was a member of Mr. Lincoln s
Cabinet. Mr. Fox, who is represented as seconding General
Butler, had been engaged for many weeks in earnest, incessant
labors and preparatory arrangements before General Butler was
let into the secret. If General Butler "talked with every member
of the Cabinet" on this subject, it was contrary to the express
understanding which was faithfully observed by all others. Gen
eral McClellan, who, it is represented, was requested by Secretary
Stanton on the 28th of January to give "an opinion upon the
feasibility of the enterprise," had made his views known in No
vember. These views he appears to have repeated in January to
the Secretary of War.

In the biography or autobiography of Admiral D. D. Porter,
published by Headley, a statement is made of the origin of the
expedition widely different from that of Parton, yet about as
erroneous. Headley says:

The Powhatan, having steamed over ten thousand miles with
her condemned machinery, was now obliged to return to the
United States, where she was laid up at about the time of the Du
Pont expedition to Port Royal, and Lieutenant Porter was de-

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 149

tachedL He Immediately sought other active service, and the
capture of New Orleans being proposed by him, he was put in
communication with General McClellan, and General Barnard
of the Engineers, to talk the matter over. They were unanimous
in their opinion that the city could be taken, and preparations
were accordingly made to attempt the capture of the forts at
or near the mouth of the Mississippi river. Admiral Farragut
was ordered to command the naval forces, and Lieutenant Porter,
having recommended a large force of mortar vessels, was directed
to equip them without delay."

Commander Porter was informed that the Navy Department
intended to send an expedition to capture New Orleans two
months earlier than General Butler, but he no more proposed it
than that gentleman. He did, when let into the confidence of
the Department, and made aware of its programme, "recom
mend a large force of mortar vessels," and he is entitled to the
credit of having proposed that appendage to the squadron. It
was not a part of the original programme of the Navy Depart
ment. This statement of Headley is in direct conflict with Greeley
and Parton as regards those who proposed the expedition and
the time of its inception. Headley claims Porter proposed it
in November; Greeley and Parton that Stanton and Butler, in
consultation, suggested it in January, and that the President
then decided it. Neither statement is true. For reasons stated,
Porter was made acquainted with the purpose and the pro
gramme of the Navy Department in November, but he no more
originated it than Stanton or Butler in January. He and General
Barnard should have the credit of appending the mortar flotilla
to the original programme of the Navy Department. The his
torians must have little practical knowledge, and must have made
only superficial investigation, who could come to the conclusion
that such an expedition could have been instituted and com
pleted within the time specified by themselves. The history of
the world may be searched in vain for such an achievement.
The navy programme for the expedition moved on favorably,
though delayed beyond expectation, chiefly by the preparation
of the bomb fleet of mortar vessels for Commander Porter, who

150 Civil War and Reconstruction

was never wanting in energy, and who, as well as others, was
actively employed after the 18th of November in preparations
for the enterprise.

I have no disposition to detract from the credit or real
merits of General Butler. He was preferred to an educated and
trained military officer for the reason that the army plan dif
fered from the naval programme. The course which he pur
sued, and his brief administration of affairs at Baltimore, were
such as to make him acceptable to Farragut in an expedition
where the military General was to receive from the naval officer,
who was the actual commander of the expedition, the captured
city, and govern it, as he had governed turbulent and insur
rectionary Baltimore. It was as acceptable to me as to the mili
tary officers that he should command the military forces which
were to cooperate with Farragut, though perhaps for different
reasons. That expedition was, in its inception and execution,
not a military but a naval affair, in which the army was directed
to assist the navy and in due time to garrison the forts and
occupy and govern the city. Whatever may have been General
Butler s views as to the practicability of taking either forts or
city, or whatever may have been his plan, if he had any dis
tinctive plan, few of the educated and trained military officers
believed that the forts could be passed and the city captured
by a naval force; and many, perhaps most, of the naval officers
were also incredulous in that respect. Nor could it have been
accomplished under the old order of things with sailing vessels
under canvas against the opposing current of the Mississippi.
But steam had wrought a revolution in naval tactics and naval
warfare, and in encountering and passing batteries, which
army officers were slow to realize. The passage of the forts had,
however, been demonstrated to be a possibility, to those who
were not irrevocably wedded to old ideas and usages, at Hatteras
and Fort Royal. Farragut realized, appreciated, and adapted his
tactics to the change. General Butler had confidence in the navy
and the enterprise greater than that of educated and more ex
perienced military commanders. I never understood that he had
any programme or plan, or that he claims to have had any. Nor
do his instructions indicate that there was any military plan at

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 151

headquarters other than that of seconding the navy. On the 21st
of March, Flag Officer Farragut, in a private note written on
his flagship the Colorado, in the Gulf, says: "General Butler
arrived yesterday. I called on him. He appears to have no defi
nite plans, but will hold what we take This is in conformity
with the naval programme and our original understanding. Gen
eral McGlellan had said, at the conference which took place at
his house in November, that to take the forts and capture New
Orleans would require an army of 50,000 men. But when he
said this he supposed it was to be a military movement. When
informed it was to be a naval expedition, and that a cooperative
force of only 10,000 men from the army was asked, to hold what
the navy might take, he readily assented to the plan and promised
us the required military assistance. The subject, however, did
not burden his mind, at that time engaged in vast army move
ments; for being a naval expedition, it imposed on him neither
labor nor responsibility beyond that of furnishing, when the
Navy Department was prepared, the promised aid of 10,000 men.
He evidently was less sanguine than others of us that the ex
pedition would be a success, but he knew that the movement
would give the rebels employment at a distant point, keep them
out of Virginia, where they were concentrating their strength,
and he was not unwilling to be relieved of the Lowell politician,
who had attained high military rank, was restless, and not dis
posed to be idle or set aside.

The embarrassment which was experienced in consequence
of the delay in fitting the vessels, creating the mortar fleet, pro
curing the mortars, shells, iron carriages, etc., rendered it ad
visable to retard the sailing of the troops. In the mean time,
however, the promised detachment of 2,500 men went forward
on the 27th of November, pursuant to previous agreement, in
the transport Constitution, under the command of Brigadier-
General Phelps, to take possession of Ship Island, which had
been held since the 17th of September by the navy. General
Butler, whom the War Department proposed to send out with
the first detachment, and who as yet knew nothing of their
ultimate destination, but supposed they were to move in due
time on Mobile or Texas, was impatient for active service, and

152 Civil War and Reconstruction

to keep him employed, as well as to divert the attention of him
self and others from the object in view, he was directed to pre
pare a paper upon Texas. Information was soon after received
of the hostile attitude of Great Britain, in consequence of the
capture of Slidell and Mason on the Trent, which furnished
reason sufficient to satisfy their commander for detaining the
New England volunteers. Until the naval vessels and the mortar
flotilla were ready, these undisciplined volunteers were better
in camp at the North, and could be better and more easily and
more economically supplied than at Ship Island.

In January, 1862, a change took place in the administration
of the War Department. Mr. Cameron, the retiring Secretary,
had never been apprised of the naval programme and purpose
to capture New Orleans; and his successor, who entered upon his
duties on the 14th of January, was not immediately informed of
it. The little which had been done and promised by the military
branch of the Government up to this date had been by General
McClellan, under the orders of the President. Everything had
moved forward propitiously, but about the period of the change
of Secretary of War an earnest application was made for men
in the sounds of North Carolina and for more troops to carry
on operations in South Carolina and Georgia. The Secretary of
War recognized the application as both necessary and expedient,
and being as yet unaware of the intention to capture New
Orleans, but supposing the expedition to the Gulf was, as had
been given out, to operate against Mobile or Texas, he yielded
to the appeal of General Sherman and others, and orders were
issued that the New England volunteers should go to Port Royal
or North Carolina instead of Ship Island. Information of this
fact first reached the Navy Department through General Butler,
who was greatly disappointed that his coast operations in the
extreme Southwest were to be interfered with. He and his chief
of staff, General Shepley, called on his old neighbor and school
mate, Mr. Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and made
known his disappointment. He said the troops which had been
sent to Ship Island by express request of the Secretary of the
Navy were to be withdrawn, and the second instalment, then
on board the steamer Constitution at Hampton Roads, instead

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 153

of going to the Gulf, were ordered to be disembarked or to
remain on the Atlantic coast. Comprehending the difficulties
that must follow from these untimely and conflicting orders, Mr.
Fox hastened at once to the War Department with a view of
getting the orders intercepted and countermanded. He found
Mr. Stanton alone, and astonished that gentleman by stating to
him the preparations that for more than two months had been
on foot for the expedition, its object, and that the troops already
at Ship Island, as well as those embarked on the Constitution,
were a part of the enterprise, and essential to its success. They
were regiments belonging to a military force of 10,000 men which
General McClellan, with the knowledge and approval of the
President, had promised the Secretary of the Navy as a co
operating military force in the proposed naval attack upon the
Mississippi forts and New Orleans. Secretary Stanton took him
by the hand in amazement. "An attack upon New Orleans by
the navy?" said he. "I never have heard of it. It is the best news
you could give me." An orderly was sent immediately for Gen
eral McClellan, who on his arrival confirmed the statement, said
there was an understanding by which the army, when the Navy
Department had its arrangements completed, was to furnish the
force named, and if the naval preparations were sufficiently
advanced the troops must be forthcoming. So quietly had the
preparations progressed, and so little had he been consulted in
this naval expedition, that General McClellan was surprised
when informed of the facts, the progress that had been made,
and that Flag Officer Farragut had been selected and received
his orders. This was the first knowledge Mr. Stanton had of
the expedition. It was on the 28th of January, a fortnight after
he entered upon his duties in the War Department, and more
than two months after the expedition had been determined upon
in the conference which took place at the house of General
McClellan. The whole intervening time had been actively and
unremittingly employed in making the necessary naval prepara
tions.

So large a squadron as that which composed the expedition
could not be prepared and fitted without time. Most of the im
mense mortars and shells were to be cast; some of the naval

154 Civil War and Reconstruction

vessels were on the stocks when the enterprise was first ordered,
and even the Hartford, which became the flagship of Admiral
Farragut, had not been refitted after her return from the East
Indies when Commander Porter was sent off to prepare the
mortar fleet. The whole energy and power of the Navy Depart
ment had been thrown into the work, and it is questionable
if so large a force under similar circumstances was ever so
speedily called out, prepared, and organized by any government.

Although Mr. Stanton first learned of the expedition in
directly as stated, he entered into it warmly and gave us a larger
cooperating military force than had been promised by General
McClellan. In an interview between him and myself immediately
after his conversation with Mr. Fox and General McClellan,
I explained, as did the President also, why the latter had been
early consulted, and was our military confidant, and also the
necessity for continued secrecy. The importance of secrecy he
appreciated, but was not entirely satisfied that General McClellan
should have been exclusively the confidant of the Government
in a military movement. It is known that for some unexplained
reason he and General McClellan had become estranged, and
this may have been the beginning of that estrangement which
resulted soon after in positive alienation.

If, as stated by Mr. Parton, General Butler "talked New
Orleans to every member of the Cabinet," it was not with the
approval of the head of the army, nor in unison with the views
and convictions of Mr. Stanton or the President, and was in
direct opposition to the injunctions of the Navy Department.
There was reticence on the part of all others. In the orders of
the Gommander-in-Chief to General Butler, three weeks later,
secrecy was still strictly enjoined, as will be seen by the first
paragraph of General McClellan s orders:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Feb. 23, 1862.
Major-General BUTLER, United States Army.

GENERAL:

You are assigned to the command of the land forces
destined to cooperate with the navy in the attack on New
Orleans. You will use every means to keep the destination

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 155

a profound secret, even from your staff officers, with the
exception of your chief of staff and Lieutenant Weitzel of
the Engineers. . . .

GEORGE B. MCCLELLAND
Major-General commanding, etc

These rigid orders of the General-in-Chief to keep secret the
destination of the expedition even from his staff officers would
scarcely have been enjoined so late as February, if General Butler
had, as stated, been rushing around Washington in January
"talking New Orleans." It is doubtless one of the many mistakes
of a partial biographer, who, in his efforts to give his subject
undue and excessive praise, does him a positive injury. General
Butler needs no false credit or manufactured notoriety in regard
to the part taken by him in the New Orleans expedition and the
measures attending and following it. He did not originate the
expedition, nor urge or convince the President or any one having
authority, as his biographer represents, for the project had been
adopted and was in progress long before he ever interchanged
a word with the President or Secretary of War or any one else
on the subject. The same may be said in regard to Mr. Stanton,
whom most of the historians of the civil war mention as having
proposed, or been the chief mover and actor in the expedition,
whereas he was not made Secretary of War, nor did he know
anything of it, until it was near its consummation. Then, having
just entered the War Department, he generously seconded the
work, and ordered an increase of the military force from 10,000
men promised by General McClellan to 18,000, with an as
surance we should have more, if more were necessary. But he
never considered himself or the War Department responsible
for the expedition, nor did he have other care or issue orders
except to second and sustain the Navy Department in that
enterprise. The fact that Admiral Farragut left for the Gulf
about the time Mr. Stanton was made Secretary of War, and that
the second instalment of troops for Ship Island sailed soon after,
led the inconsiderate admirers of the Secretary of War and
General Butler to infer, without knowledge or investigation, that
these gentlemen were the originators of an expedition which re-

156 Civil War and Reconstruction

quired months of preparation, and which was on its way before
these gentlemen were aware of its destination. Each entered
earnestly into the plan when informed of it, each in his way
performed well his part in forwarding the troops that were to
cooperate with the navy but the expedition in its inception and
preparation was not in any particular a project of the army or of
the War Department. As soon as advised of the expedition, the
naval programme, and the preparations which had been made,
Mr. Stanton countermanded and corrected all military orders
which interfered with it, and General Shepley, Butler s chief
of staff, left Washington on the following day, the 29th of
January, to join his command, and embarked on the army trans
port steamer Constitution on her second trip, which sailed
immediately for Ship Island with the second instalment of
troops. General Butler sailed from Hampton Roads on the 25th
of February, nearly a month later, more than three months after
the expedition had been ordered, and about four weeks after
he was informed of the destination of himself and the force
which he had raised in New England, to which the Secretary
of War subsequently added other Western regiments, amount
ing to about 15,000 men, not 18,000 as had been promised.
But disaster attended his voyage, and it was not until the 25th
of March, just one month after leaving Hampton Roads, that
he arrived at Ship Island.

Captain Farragut received his preparatory orders on the
23d of December, his full orders from the Navy Department as
Flag Officer on the 20th of January, sailed from Hampton Roads
on the 3d of February, and arrived at Ship Island on the 20th.
The following are his orders, given into his hands before leaving
Washington, and before either the Secretary of War or General
Butler had been advised of the ultimate object of the expedition:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, January 20, 1862.
Flag Officer D. G. FARRAGUT, appointed to command
Western Gulf Blockading Squadron.

SIR:

When the Hartford is in all respects ready for sea, you
will proceed to the Gulf of Mexico with all possible des-

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 157

patch, and communicate with Flag Officer W. W. McKean,
who is directed by the enclosed despatch to transfer to you
the command of the Western Gulf blockading squadron. , .
There will be attached to your squadron a fleet of bomb
vessels and armed steamers enough to manage them, all
under command of Commander D. D. Porter, who will be
directed to report to you. As fast as these vessels are got
ready they will be sent to Key West to await the arrival of
all and the commanding officers, who will be permitted
to organize and practise with them at that port.

When these formidable mortars arrive and you are com
pletely ready, you will collect such vessels as can be spared
from the blockade, and proceed up the Mississippi river
and reduce the defences which guard the approaches to
New Orleans, when you will appear off that city and take
possession of it under the guns of your squadron, and hoist
the American flag therein, keeping possession until troops
can be sent to you. If the Mississippi expedition from Cairo
shall not have descended the river, you will take advantage
of the panic to push a strong force up the river to take all
their defences in the rear. As you have expressed yourself
perfectly satisfied with the force given to you, and as many
more powerful vessels will be added before you can com
mence operations, the Department and the country require
of you success. . . . There are other operations of minor im
portance which will commend themselves to your judgment
and skill, but which must not be allowed to interfere with
the great object in view the certain capture of the city of
New Orleans.

Destroy the armed barriers which these deluded people
have raised up against the power of the United States
Government, and shoot down those who war against the
Union; but cultivate with cordiality the first returning
reason which is sure to follow your success.

Respectfully, etc.,

GIDEON WELLES.

These orders, it will be observed, are framed to meet the
case and its requirements. They state briefly, but with some
particularity, the great object in view and the manner in which

158 Civil War and Reconstruction

it was to be accomplished, but yet give the Flag Officer latitude
and discretion in the employment of the means placed under
his command.

There were, as has been mentioned, differences of opinion as
to the best method of reaching New Orleans. Army officers be
lieved the city could not be captured by a naval force ascending
from the Gulf without first reducing Forts Jackson and St.
Philip. This was also the opinion of Commander Porter, who,
nevertheless, was confident that with such a mortar flotilla as
was furnished him he could so reduce or impair the works as
to render the passage of the steamers practicable. The original
navy programme contemplated neither the reduction of the forts
in advance nor a mortar flotilla, but the passage of the naval
vessels and the capture of the city, when the forts would be
compelled to surrender. Flag Officer Farragut took the bold and
first decided views of the Department. It was his firm conviction
that the naval steamers could run the forts without either re
ducing or bombarding them, and it was his belief that the
passage could be effected, and probably would be, under the
fire of their guns, independent of the bomb flotilla. Some vessels
would doubtless be crippled, not improbably some would be
destroyed; but most, perhaps all, could get above the forts, and
when the fleet was between the forts and the city their fall was
inevitable.

On the 10th of February the following communication was
addressed to Flag Officer Farragut in furtherance of the great
object intrusted to him, General Barnard having prepared a
memorandum and given us sketches relative to the works on the
Mississippi, procured from the Bureau of United States Engineers:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, February 10, 1862.
Flag Officer D. G. FARRAGUT, U. S. N., commanding Western
Gulf Blockading Squadron, Ship Island.

SIR:

I enclose to you herewith sketches from the United
States Engineer Bureau relative to the works on the Missis
sippi river; also a memorandum prepared by General Bar
nard, United States Army, who constructed Fort St. Philip.

Admiral Farragut qnd J^em Orleans 159

The most important operation of the war is confided to
yourself and your brave associates, and every light possible
to obtain should be carefully considered before putting into
operation the plan which your judgment dictates.

It is reported that nineteen feet of water can be carried
over the bar. If this is true, the frigate Mississippi can be got
over without much difficulty. The Colorado draws about
twenty-two feet; she lightens one inch to twenty-four tons;
her keel is about two feet deep. The frigate Wabash when
in New York in 1858 drew, without her spar-deck guns*
stores, water casks, tanks, and coal (excepting thirty tons),
aft twenty feet four inches, forward sixteen feet, or on an
even keel eighteen feet four inches. This would indicate a
very easy passage for this noble vessel, and if it be possible
to get these two steamers over, and perhaps a sailing vessel
also, you will take care to use every exertion to do so. The
powerful tugs in the bomb flotilla will afford the necessary
pulling power. The tops of these large steamers are from
thirty to fifty feet above the fort, and command the parapets
and interior completely with howitzers and musketry. The
Wachusett at Boston; the Oneida, Richmond, Varuna, and
Dakota at New York; and the Iroquois from the West Indies,
are ordered to report to you with all practicable despatch,
and every gunboat which can be got ready in time will have
the same orders. All of the bomb vessels have sailed, and
the steamers to accompany them are being prepared with
great despatch. It is believed the last will be off by the
16th instant.

Eighteen thousand men are being sent to the Gulf to
cooperate in the movements which will give to the arms of
the United States full possession of the ports within the
limits of your command. You will, however, carry out your
instructions with regard to the Mississippi and Mobile with
out any delay beyond that imposed upon you by your own
careful preparation. A division from Ship Island will prob
ably be ready to occupy the forts that will fall into your
hands. The Department relies upon your skill to give
direction to the powerful force placed at your disposal, and
upon your personal character to infuse a hearty cooperation
among your officers, free from unworthy jealousies. If suc
cessful, you open the way to the sea for the great West,

160 Civil War and Reconstruction

never again to be closed. The Rebellion will be riven in
the centre, and the flag to which you have been so faithful
will recover its supremacy in every State.

Very respectfully, etc.,

GIDEON WELLES.

When Farragut was first consulted in December, and when
he received his orders, the understanding was, as has been
stated, that he should be aided by a military force of 10,000 men
promised by General McClellan; but Secretary Stanton directed
that the military force should be increased to 18,000 men. Of this
additional assistance Flag Officer Farragut was first advised in
the above communication of February 10, he having received
his first orders before the Secretary of War was informed of
the expedition, and left Washington and Hampton Roads with
the understanding that the military aid would consist of but
10,000 troops.

In both these orders and in all and every communication and
consultation which took place, the expedition was considered and
treated as a naval expedition, originating in the Navy Depart
ment, and commanded by a navy officer, neither the War De
partment nor the General-in-Chief doing more than furnish
the troops to hold what the navy might take. The programme
and preliminary arrangements were made by the Navy Depart
ment, and the details were carried out by the navy, although
the historians represent it as "Butler s expedition to the Gulf,"
first suggested by the Secretary of War, who on the 28th of
January-or 10th, according to Parton, four days before Stanton
was Secretary "suddenly asked" General Butler, "Why can t
New Orleans be taken?" When that question is represented to
have been put, thousands of men had been for months employed
and millions had been expended in preparations to solve that
problem.

On the 20th of January, before either Secretary Stanton or
General Butler had an intimation on the subject, Flag Officer
Farragut received orders from the Secretary of the Navy to
"reduce the defences which guard the approaches to New Orleans,
when you will appear off that city and take possession of it under

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 16!

the guns of your squadron, and hoist the American flag therein,
keeping possession until troops can be sent to you." These orders
were literally obeyed three months later, when Flag Officer
Farragut on the 25th of April appeared off New Orleans with
no military force whatever to aid him, and took possession of
the place under the guns of his squadron on the 26th; hoisted
the American flag and kept possession until he sent to General
Butler to come up with his troops and occupy and govern the
city, which he did several days after, on the 1st of May.

General McClellan, the General in Chief, in his orders to
General Butler on the 23d of February, more than a month
subsequent to the orders of the Secretary of the Navy to Flag
Officer Farragut, says. "It is expected that the navy can reduce
the works (St. Philip and Jackson). In that case you will after
their capture leave a sufficient garrison in them to render them
perfectly secure." The works were not reduced, but they fell of
necessity after the fleet got above them and the city was captured.
This was the first naval programme, modified on the suggestion
of Commander Porter and the advice of Generals McClellan and
Barnard, who considered a reduction of the forts indispensable.
There was no conflict of orders, understanding, or details, be
tween the naval and military branch of the Government or the
commanding officers or the forces of either; but not one of the
several histories of the war gives a true statement of the case or
awards to the navy or the Navy Department the credit which
belongs to either.

Farragut, the real commander, chieftain, and fighting man of
the expedition, who passed the forts and captured the city, is,
in these histories, made subordinate and second to the General
who had been detailed to assist him, who had no plan or pro
gramme of his own, who was in no battle, whom the Flag Officer
invited up from below and to whom he gave possession of the
place; while the Navy Department, which originated, planned
shaped, and directed the whole, and would have been held re
sponsible for it had it proved a failure, is almost wholly ignored,
and the credit is given to persons who did not devise it, and were
entirely ignorant of it until it was near its consummaton. It is
but justice to General Butler to say that he has in his place on

162 Civil War and Reconstruction

the floor of the Congress declared that the capture of New
Orleans was by Farragut and the navy, and not by him and the
army. Admiral Farragut, whose high qualities and great and
meritorious services all now admire, and which can never be
over-estimated, in his letter of December 31, 1864, addressed to
a committee of New York merchants who as a testimonial of
their esteem and gratitude made him a pecuniary present with
which he purchased a dwelling, says with equal truth and
modesty in accepting it: "As to the duties which you speak of that
were performed by myself in command of the fleet in the South
and Southwest, I have only to say, as I have repeatedly said be
fore, that they were done in obedience to orders from the De
partment at Washington. I have carried out the views of the
Department in accomplishing what I promised to endeavor
to do/*

The Confederate authorities at Richmond, who believed the
lower defenses of the river impregnable, were astonished with
the intelligence that the forts had been passed and New Orleans
had fallen. They had not anticipated a naval attack, nor be
lieved in the possibility of naval success if an attack were made.
The preparations for the expedition, which commenced in
November, had been carried forward for four months without
creating alarm or exciting in that quarter suspicion. Not until
the latter part of March did the rebel Genersd Lovell, in com
mand of the city, entertain apprehensions of the impending blow.
Even then the Confederate Government at Richmond, as well
as Beauregard at Corinth, were wholly incredulous and deaf to
his appeals. Their attention and efforts were in the opposite
direction, where General Halleck and others were organized
for a descent from the north. A few brief extracts from the
official report of General Lovell, written on the 22d of May,
a month after the passing of the forts, opens to us the true con
dition of affairs as they existed prior to and at the time of the
capture of the city. He says: "I applied to Richmond, Pensacola,
and other points for some 10-inch columbiads and sea-coast
mortars, which I considered necessary to the defence of the lower
river, but none could be spared; the general impression being
that New Orleans would not be attacked by the river. . . . The

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 16$

forts had seventy-five or eighty guns that could be brought
successively to bear on the river, were manned by garrisons of
well-trained artillerists, affording a double relief to eadi gun,
and commanded by officers who had no superiors in any serv
ice. . . . The general impression of all those to whom I applied
was, that the largest guns should be placed above New Orleans,
not below, although I had notified the Department on the 22d
of March that in my judgment the fleet only awaited the arrival
of the mortar vessels to attempt to pass up the river from be
low. . . . Every Confederate soldier in New Orleans, with the
exception of one company, had been ordered to Corinth, to
join General Beauregard in March. . . . The fourteen vessels of
Montgomery river defence expedition had been ordered by the
Department, when completed, to be sent up to Memphis and Fort
Pillow; but believing the danger of attack from below, I detained
six of them at New Orleans, of which change the Department
was fully advised. . . . When the Secretary of the Navy ordered
the steamer Louisiana to be sent also up the river, I protested,
through the War Department, being satisfied that we required
more heavy guns below. ... A few moments after the attack
commenced, and the enemy succeeded in passing with fourteen
ships, as described in General Duncan s report, and the battle
of New Orleans as against ships of war was over. . . . The battle
for the defence of New Orleans was fought and lost at Forts
Jackson and St. Philip." The apprehensions of General Lovell
were first excited, as Farragut apprehended they would be, by
the mortar flotilla. He at once commenced preparations for de
fence from a naval attack, and made appeals to his superiors for
assistance to avert the threatened danger so soon as he learned
that the mortar fleet had reached Key West. This was what
Farragut would have avoided by dispensing with the mortar
fleet. The bombardment would, in his opinion, inflect less
injury than we supposed, while such a fleet would impede his
movements, excite suspicion, arouse vigilance, and lead to prep
arations for a more formidable defence.

But, finding the matter had been decided upon before he
was selected or consulted, he acquiesced in that part of the
programme, gave the mortar fleet place and opportunity, and

164 Civil War and Reocmstraotion

generously awarded the flotilla credit for its power, and the
eneigy and skill with which the mortars were served. Their fire
through six days was tremendous, but did less injury to the forts
and inflicted less loss of life than seemed possible after such a
fire as they endured. Fort St. Philip was scarcely damaged, and
Fort Jackson, which sustained the principal assault, was, not
withstanding the barracks were burned, about as formidable at
the dose as at the commencement. General Duncan, who was
in command of the defences, admits his men were demoralized
after Farragut and the naval vessels had passed the forts, but
wrote on the 27th of April, before the forts surrendered: "We
are just as capable of repelling the enemy to-day as we were
before the bombardment/

There can be no doubt that the tactics of Farragut were
correct; that the mortar fleet was, as he apprehended, a warn
ing to the enemy, and that it to some extent embarrassed his
operations. That division of his force, however, if it did not ac
complish all that was promised and expected, was well com
manded, and the mortars were well served. Probably no equal
number of mortars ever expended a greater amount of ammuni
tion and shells in the same space of time, or fired more accurate
ly, but as regards the fire of the enemy and their power of
resistance the bombardment was ineffectual. But Farragut was
resolved that this part of the programme which was not of his
advisement, should have full scope and full opportunity to
display its power, and, if possible, destroy or impair the works.
He therefore suspended his movements for six days; gave Com
mander Porter, with the mortars, not only the forty-eight hours
which were represented to be sufficient to demolish or render
untenable the forts, but twice and thrice that number of hours
to do the work. At length, after a tremendous bombardment for
six days, when the men were overcome with fatigue, and the
ammunition and shells of the mortar flotilla were nearly ex
pended without seriously diminishing the enemy s fire, Flag
Officer Farragut put in execution his own bold plan, which was
also the original programme of the Navy Department, and passed
the forts "under a most terrific fire," says Commander Porter,
who witnessed it from below. "Such a fire I imagine the world

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 165

has rarely seen/* said Farragut. Had the works been seriously
damaged, this could hardly have been the case. Captain Bailey*
second in command, states that "the mortar fleet had been play
ing upon the forts for six days and nights without perceptibly
diminishing their fire"; in fact, the enemy was "daily adding to
his defences" during the entire bombardment. That Commander
Porter did not succeed, as he promised and expected, in re
ducing the forts in forty-eight hours, was not owing to any want
of energy, courage, or perseverance on his part and that of his
gallant associates, but to an error of judgment and misconception
of the effects of shells falling upon a casemate fort.

In the end such a fort must undoubtably yield to a con
tinued bombardment, but not in forty-eight hours, nor in one
hundred and forty-eight hours, as was demonstrated to the satis
faction of every officer in the squadron. During those six days,
the rebel naval defences, the ironclads, the fire rafts, the rams
and obstructions which really constituted the peril to Farragut s
fleet were increased by every hour s delay. The enemy improved
the time from the arrival of the first mortar boat at Key West
in augmenting his defences. That arrival indicated the plan of
attack; he took alarm, commenced preparations, and then and
through the six days of bombardment he was stimulated to his
utmost energies to resist the advance of the squadron. Com
mander Porter says in his official report, after one hundred and
forty-four hours of incessant fire from the mortars, the enemy
was "daily adding to his defence and strengthening his naval
forces with iron-clad batteries." This was what Flag Officer
Farragut, with keen professional sagacity, had predicted; but
the veteran hero, in deference to others, to the policy adopted,
and to the extraordinary efforts of the Department, which had
got up the mortar flotilla on the recommendation of Com
mander Porter and the army officers, submitted to the delay,
although it added to the difficulties he was to encounter. With
a generosity characteristic of the man, he, after the assault was
over, abstained from any censure or reflection on those who
differed with him and had caused a deviation from the original
naval programme, which he pronounced, and which the result
proved, was correct. If he could not commend the mortar scheme

166 Civil War and Reconstruction

for such a work as was given him, he forbore from any public
condemnation of it in his official reports. He spoke of the "tre
mendous fire" on the forts "from the mortars," remarked that
"Commander Porter most gallantly bombarded them"; but
while the mortars failed to seriously impair the defences, Flag
Officer Farragut is studiously careful not to say, as did the
second officer in command, it was "without perceptibly diminish
ing their fire." He knew the fact, but from delicacy would not
proclaim it. The result was sufficient; the problem of running the
forts and the effect of bombarding them was solved. The lesson
in the Mississippi and at Port Royal and Hatteras teaches that
as against naval steamers forts are useless, unless connected with
some system of obstruction, and that their passage will never
be attended with much risk or danger.

The official report of Commander Porter, made to the Secre
tary of the Navy direct, instead of the Flag Officer, represented
the injuries by the bombardment as much more effective than is
admitted by Generals Lovell and Duncan, and as was testified
by the terrific fire of the forts when the fleet passed up. The
reports of the Confederate generals, which correct some apparent
discrepancies that could not at the time be reconciled, did not
come into my hands until after the close of the rebellion. There
was an alleged inconsistency in the representation that the de
fences were seriously impaired with the fact that there was a
"terrific fire," tremendous and unabated, when the passage was
finally made. While Flag Officer Farragut was conscious that
his tactics and professional talents and sagacity were fully vindi
cated by what had been done, and what had failed to be done,
he was not stinted in his award of credit to the brave men who
had been employed in the mortar service, but gave to every man
the honor he earned.

In his official report of April 30th, Commander Porter says:
"On the 23d I urged Flag Officer Farragut to commence the
attack with the ships, as I feared the mortars would not hold
out, the men were almost overcome with fatigue, and our supply
ships lay a good way off." Had this report been made, as is usual
and as regulations require, to the Flag Officer instead of the

Admiral Farmgut and New Orleans 167

Department, this statement would never have appeared. Those
of us who knew the facts^ the feelings and views of Fairagiif^ Ms
dauntless courage and iron will when once engaged, Ms. desire
to dispense with the mortar flotilla which embarrassed Ms
movements and restrained his prompt, impulsive action, any
statement that he delayed, or which conveys the impression that
he hesitated at the critical moment to execute his own plan, had
little effect. He needed no urging from any one to move-
certainly not from one who from the first had advised that the
forts should be reduced before the passage of the fleet was
attempted. It would be reversing the position, plan, and tactics of
the Flag Officer and the commander of the mortar fleet.

In justice to Farragut and to truth, I think it proper here to
present the advice and proposition wMch Commander Porter
submitted preceding the attack and the passage of the forts:
"In my opinion there are two methods of attack: one is for the
vessels to run the gauntlet of the batteries by night, or in a
fog; the other, to attack the forts by laying the big ships dose
alongside of them, avoiding the casemates, firing shells, grape,
and canister into the barbette, clearing the ramparts with boat
guns from the tops, while the smaller and more agile vessels
throw in shrapnel at shrapnel distance, clearing the parapets
and dismounting the guns in barbette. The large ships should
anchor with forty-five fathoms of chain with slip-ropes; the
smaller vessels to keep under way, and be constantly moving
about, some to get above, and open a cross fire; the mortars to
keep up a rapid and continuous fire, and to move up to a
shorter range. The objections to running by the forts are these:
It is not likely that any intelligent enemy would fail to place
chain across above the forts, and raise such batteries as would
protect them against our ships. Did we run the forts we should
leave an enemy in our rear, and the mortar vessels would have
to be left behind. We could not return to bring them up without
going through a heavy and destructive fire. If the forts are run,
part of the mortars should be towed along, wMch would render
the progress of the vessels slow, against the strong current at
that point. If the forts are first captured, the moral effect would

168 Civil War and Reconstruction

be to dose the batteries on the river and open the way to New
Orleans; whereas if we don t succeed in taking them, we will
have to fight our way up the river. Once having possession of
the forts, New Orleans would be hermetically sealed, and we
could repair damages and go on our own terms and in our own
time."

Flag Officer Farragut s order of battle, which is among the
published documents relating to passage of the forts and the bat
tle itself, shows that he adopted none of these suggestions. He
did not yield to the advice that "the large ships should anchor
with forty-five fathoms of chain," "the smaller vessels to be con
tinually moving about/ nor did he deem it expedient that "part
of the mortar vessels should be towed along" when he passed
the forts, nor did he "return to bring them up." His tactics, or
mode, as he expresses it, were of a bolder, more audacious, and
wholly different character. He left the mortar vessels behind
him as an incumbrance, anchored no vessels, but dashed on
amid flame and smoke, danger and death, under a terrific fire
such as the world has seldom witnessed, and performed one of
the most wonderful and daring achievements recorded in history.

Commander Porter beheld from below this terrible but suc
cessful performance of his chief, who cast aside all the schemes
and advice which had been tendered him for reducing the forts
and opening the way for his ships without encountering what
appeared to less resolute minds destruction and death. After
witnessing the great success, which was in total disregard of his
propositions, and after hearing that New Orleans was captured
by his triumphant chief, Commander Porter wrote the Navy
Department that he urged the Flag Officer to make the attack
on the 23d. Ten days later he wrote an unofficial letter to the
Assistant Secretary, reiterating the statement that he had urged
the Flag Officer to make the attack, but requested that the state*
ment might be suppressed in the published documents. The De
partment declined to multilate and change the record, and omit
a statement the truth of which was deliberately and secretly reaf
firmed by the author.

Farragut, who was as generous and forgiving as he was brave

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 169

and resolute, saw with less surprise than regret the extraordinary
statement of Commander Porter. He had no apprehensions, how
ever, that the truth would not ultimately appear. The Depart
ment and all familiar with the expedition, he said, were aware
of his views and tactics from the beginning; that he had never
believed in reducing the forts before passing them, or anchoring
his vessels in the attack, and was entirely opposed to the mortar
flotilla which Commander Porter and the army officers had so
much at heart, and which the Department on their recommenda
tion had adopted as indispensable.

In a letter to me on this and other subjects at a later period
he said: "I was ordered to Washington, when the Department
informed me I should have all the vessels I desired and many
more, inculding a number of mortar boats. To this I replied I
did not want the latter, as they would be more in my way than
otherwise, as I felt satisfied they would be an impediment in
my mode of attack. I presume this was the origin of my supposed
opposition to the mortar boats. But as the Department seemed to
think they were indispensable and had provided gunboats to tow
and protect them in every emergency, I made no further objec
tion."

It is not part of my present purpose to enter upon or narrate
the battles and incidents of the expedition. These have been else
where related in the official reports of the officers themselves.
But the capture of the city was not the conclusion of the expedi
tion nor the completion of Flag Officer Farragut s instructions.

It will be recollected that the orders of the Secretary of the
Navy of the 20th of January directed him after the capture of
New Orleans: "If the Mississippi expedition from Cairo shall
not have descended the river, you will take advantage of the
panic to push a strong force up the river to take all their defen
ces in the rear." This was an important part of the programme
and of his original orders. In pursuance of them, Flag Officer Far
ragut, immediately after taking the city, sent forward a detach
ment of seven vessels up the river under Captain Craven, to obtain
possession of the intermediate places between him and the flo
tilla from Cairo, which, with the army, was by arrangement to

170 Civil War and Reconstruction

descend the Mississippi and meet and form a junction with the
naval force from the Gulf. On the 7th of May, Commander
James S. Palmer, in the steamer Iroquois, appeared off Baton
Rouge, and was followed by Flag Officer Farragut himself and
a military force on the 10th. The place surrendered, as did Natch
ez, Fort Hudson, and Grand Gulf, soon after, and indeed every
Intermediate place on the river except Vicksburg, to which Com
mander S. P. Lee had been sent in advance in the Oneida. This
place, in consequence of its elevated site, made a large cooperating
military force necessary to take possession of and occupy the
works.

To give the details of the harassing river conflicts and the
many perplexities and disappointments which, in consequence of
inadequate military support, attended the naval operations in
the Mississippi, is not here essential. The expected army aid from
the north totally failed to meet the ascending squadron, although
the steamers from Cairo under Flag Officer Davis, the successor
of the heroic Foote, met and formed a junction with the vessels
from the Gulf squadron. In all respects and in every particular,
both the Gulf squadron and the Mississippi flotilla performed
their parts and did all that the Navy Department had promised,
or the Government required or expected, to carry out the
original programme. For two months after the capture of New
Orleans, Flag Officer Farragut remained on protracted and un
pleasant duty on the river at or near Vicksburg, waiting the
promised approach of an army from the north. But he waited
in vain. One or two brief extracts from his patient, uncomplain
ing letters indicate the character of the man and the actual
condition of affairs:

FLAGSHIP HARTFORD, ABOVE VICKSBURG, |
June 28, 1862, }

Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.

Sm:

I passed up the river this morning, but to no purpose;
the enemy leave their guns for the moment, but return to
them as soon as we have passed and rake us. ...

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 171

I am satisfied it Is not possible for us to take Vicksburg
without an army force of 12,000 to 15,000 men. General
Van Dorn s division Is here, and lies safely behind the hills.
The water Is too low for me to go over twelve or fifteen
miles above Vicksburg.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. G. FARRAGUT.

On the 6th of July he wrote me from "above Vicksburg": "I
have to inform you that we are still at this place, bombarding
the peninsula. ... I received a telegram yesterday from General
Halleck (a copy of it is herewith enclosed), by which it appears
that he will not be able to cooperate wiht us for some weeks yet."

The following is the telegram from General Halleck referred
to in the above extract:

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
MEMPHIS, July 3, 1862.

[By telegraph from Corinth.]

Flag Officer FARRAGUT, commanding United States flotilla
in the Mississippi.

The scattered and weakened condition of my forces ren
ders it impossible for me at the present to detach any troops
to cooperate with you on Vicksburg. Probably I shall be able
to do so as soon as I can get my troops more concentrated;
this may delay the clearing of the river, but its accomplish
ment will be certain in a few weeks.

Allow me to congratulate you on your great success.

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.

The troops were never so concentrated under General Halleck
as to cooperate with the navy at Vicksburg. From causes which
it is unnecessary here to relate, there was a total failure on the
part of the army to carry out and complete their part of the origi
nal programme of the New Orleans and Mississippi expedition.
A year s delay, with much national depression and great loss to
the country, was the consequence.

When finally informed of the Inability of the army to carry

172 Civil War and Reconstruction

out their part of the campaign, I, in view of the subsiding of
the waters in the Mississippi, which endangered the safety of the
vessels, the sickly climate, and the necessity of operations else
where, wrote Flag Officer Farragut a communication from which
I make the following extracts:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, July 14, 1862.
Flag Officer D. G. FARRAGUT, commanding,
etc., near VIcksburg, Miss.

SIR:

The evacuation of Corinth has much lessened the impor
tance of your continuing your operations on the Mississippi.
The army has failed to furnish the necessary troops for the
capture of Vicksburg, and has not at present, It is repre
sented, an available force to send there to cooperate with
you in its capture. . . . All proper measures should be
adopted to get the part of your fleet now above Vicksburg
below that place, with as little injury and loss of life as
possible.

Nothing is to be gained by a contest with the batteries
of the enemy. . . .

I am respectfully, your obedient servant,

GIDEON WELLES.

On the 29th of July Flag Officer Farragut wrote me from
New Orleans:

FLAGSHIP HARTFORD, NEW ORLEANS, \
July 29, 1862. }

Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.

SIR:

I am happy to inform the Department that I arrived here
yesterday about noon with the ships Brooklyn, Richmond,
and Hartford, and gunboats Pinola and Kennebec, the other
gunboats, excepting the Katahdin and Kineo, left at Baton
Rouge for the protection of the troops, having preceded me.

On the 20th instant I received the order of the Depart
ment to drop the ships down the river, and not risk them
before the batteries more than possible. The river had fal-

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 173

leu very much, and my anxiety was great that I should not
be able to get the large ships down

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. G. FARRAGUT,

Flag Officer commanding Western Gulf Blockading
squadron.

Further military operations in the direction of Vicksburg were
for the season suspended, not, however, through any defect in the
original programme, or any mismanagement or failure on the
part of the navy or the Navy Department. Flag Officer Farragut
did all that was required of him, that he promised to do, and
more than was believed by many possible for him to accomplish.
If the country did not gain possession of Vicksburg or capture
Mobile in 1862, it was through no fault or failure of the Navy
Department or of the naval commander, who was ready at all
times to meet and cooperate with the army for that purpose.

The War Department, after the reverses before Richmond
in the summer of 1862, became paralyzed and appeared for a time
to lose interest in the Mississippi movement. Its attention was
more earnestly engaged elsewhere. But the Navy Department
was unwilling to relinquish the advantages it had gained, even
after General Halleck s despatch from Corinth, followed by its
own orders for the vessels to drop below Vicksburg. In these
views of the Department Flag Officer Farragut participated, and
after descending the river he lingered some days in the lower
Mississippi.

Before leaving Vicksburg for New Orleans, he made arrange
ments for Commodore William D. Porter to remain with the
iron-clad steamers Essex and Sumter, of the Mississippi flotilla,
below Vicksburg, to keep open the navigation of the river, and
cooperate with any military force, should any be sent. Commodore
William D. Porter was a brother of Commander David D.
Porter, with whom he is often confounded, and brother-in-law
of Admiral Farragut, they having married sisters. He was a man
of undaunted courage, and had distinguished himself under
Flag Officer Foote on the Western waters, particularly at Forts
Henry, Columbus, and other places, at the former of which he

174 Civil War and Reoonstruction

sustained severe injuries. On the 16th of July the rebel iron-clad
ram Arkansas, a formidable vessel, came out of the Yazoo, and,
dashing through the fleet which lay at anchor with low fires,
wholly unprepared, she inflicted some damage on the vessels,
and hastened to take refuge under the guns of Vicksburg. A
gallant attempt was made on the 22d of July by Commodore
W. D. Porter to destroy her under the fire of the rebel batteries,
but not succeeding, he then ran down with his vessels to Flag
Officer Farragut s command. A rebel force, under General Breck-
inridge, made an assault on Baton Rouge a few days after, and
the Arkansas left Vicksburg to assist in the attack, but was met
by Commodore W. D. Porter in the Essex, run ashore, and de
stroyed. The destruction of this formidable monster gave great
satisfaction to the service and the country. Flag Officer Farragut
wrote the Department:

FLAGSHIP HARTFORD, BATON ROUGE, |
August 7, 1862. j"

Hon. GIBEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.

SIR:

It is one of the happiest moments of my life that I am
enabled to inform the Department of the destruction of the
ram Arkansas; not because I held the ironclad in such terror,
but because the community did. ... I arrived here to-day at
12 M., in company with the Brooklyn, Westfield, Clifton,
Jackson, and Scioto. I had sent up the Clifton before. . . .
I will leave a sufficient force of gunboats here to support
the army, and will return to-morrow to New Orleans and
depart immediately for Ship Island with a light heart that
I have left no bugbear to torment the comimmities of the
Mississippi in my absence.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. G. FARRAGUT, Flag Officer.

Foreseeing the disastrous consequences which must result
from an abandonment of the advantages which the navy had
obtained on the Mississippi, and that the rebels would hasten
to fortify and strengthen themselves at Vicksburg and other

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 175

places where they were then weak, thereby interrupting the
navigation of the river, and keeping open their communication
with Texas, from whence they derived immense supplies, I
urged decisive measures, and finally on the 2th of July addressed
the Secretary of War a letter on the subject; from which I make
the following extracts:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, July 29, 1862.
Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

SIR:

. . . The long detention of so large a naval force before
Vicksburg, in consequence of the absence of a sufficient land
force to cooperate with the navy in taking and holding the
place, is, I am aware, a source of regret to you as well as
to myself.

It is a pressing necessity that so important a place should
not be held by the rebels. While it is in their possession it not
only interrupts navigation and keeps our squadron unem
ployed, but impairs its efficiency in cutting off communica
tion and transportation of stores and troops to sustain the

enemy We cannot have a rigid river police and effective

interdiction between the opposite shores while Vicksburg
remains an obstacle to prevent or at least retard operations.
I would invite especial attention to the remarks in relation
to General Williams and his force, and the opinion ex
pressed that he can go anywhere thirty miles into the interior
below Vicksburg, and, supported by the gunboats, destroy
the enemy s stores, capture the cattle they have grazing, and
be instrumental in keeping open the river.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GIDEON WELLES.

Frequent personal interviews took place and were wasted in
vain efforts to procure military cooperation to carry out to full
consummation the programme of the campaign in conformity
with the original understanding. These interviews need not be
more particularly specifed, but the documents on file in the
departments, from which brief extracts are given, verify the
statements which are made.

176 Civil War and Reconstruction

Unquestionably, the passage of Forts Jackson and St. Philip,
with the capture of New Orleans, was not only the most im
portant of the three naval expeditions commenced the first year
of the rebellion, but was the memorable event of the war. It was
a blow at the heart of the Confederacy when in its full vigor and
strength, before the rebels had become enfeebled and exhausted
a blow from which they never recovered. In that great achieve
ment Farragut stands out the grand, imposing figure, and his
high, heroic daring, and the tact and ability he displayed as a
commander, will make him, when the true history of the war
is written, conspicuous beyond others through all time. Attempts
have been made to award honors that are justly his to others, and
by some to appropriate to themselves credit which belongs to
him.

I have here related the essential facts of the origin and com
mand of the three important expeditions instituted by the Navy
Department in the first year of the war, and especially of that
memorable one where the great naval chief earned the honors
which placed him at the head of the Navy. Of subsequent daring
and scarcely less important services at Grand Gulf and Port
Hudson in 1863, and Mobile in 1864 at which last place he was
neither aided nor incumbered by mortar flotillas, but where on
each occasion he exhibited those remarkable qualities which
distinguish and exemplify the great commander I have not
made mention. They must be reserved for another occasion.

It is to be regretted that the last days of this brave, truthful,
amiable, and exemplary man, for whom his countrymen had, and
always will retain, a deep and abiding affection and regard,
should have been subjected to petty annoyances from a few who
were envious of his fame, or incapable of doing him justice.
Although honored and loved by his countrymen and at the head
of the navy, he does not appear to have had the confidence of
those who administered its affairs for the last eighteen months
of his life, or to have been consulted in matters which personally
and officially interested and legitimately belonged to him as
naval chief. Great changes were made in the service without his
knowledge and against his judgment. He was compelled to receive
orders which notoriously emanated from one of inferior rank.

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 177

The office of Admiral, which Congress had created for him in
acknowledgment of his distinguished and unequalled service^
was, he saw, destined by favoritism to pass to another. In various
ways ignoble and ungenerous minds hastened to mortify the
great and unassuming naval chief. In derogation of his real rank
and position as chief and head of the navy, he was made Port
Admiral or usher, to wait upon and receive naval officers at
New York, an employment which self-respect and regard for the
navy compelled him to decline. Among other indignities was
that of ordering the uniform and the flag of Admiral which he
had adopted when the Government created and conferred on him
the office to be changed, and substituting therefor a different
uniform and another flag, wholly unlike the coat he wore, and
unlike the symbol of rank which was identified with Mm, and
from the time the office was created had floated above him. Far
ragut would neither change his coat nor permit the tawdry sub
stitute for the Admiral flag to wave over him. On his special,
personal application, which he felt humiliated to make, the
Secretary of the Navy permitted him to be spared these indigni
ties during his life, but it was with the knowledge that the flag
which he had earned the emblem he had chosen and prescribed
as the symbol of highest naval rank was to be buried with him.
It would be painful to dwell on the many annoyances to which
this brave and noble officer was subjected during the last few
months of his existence.

"There is a tear for all that die,
A mourner o er the humblest grave;

But nations swell the funeral cry,

And triumph weeps above the brave."

The people throughout the Union mourned the death of the
good Admiral, Thousands from the surrounding country crowded
around his bier at Portsmouth, but high official dignitaries were
not there. Neglect of the remains of the great naval chief and of
his family marked the close. The expenses of his funeral, which
was necessarily public at Portsmouth, where he died, were borne
by his widow, who has never been remunerated or noticed by
the Government. She, who fled with him from her home and

178 Civil Wax and Reconstruction

native State, became with him an exile and shared his fortune
and privations in a simple hired cottage on the Hudson, now
lives in a house purchased with the funds contributed by a few
private citizens of New York in grateful acknowledgment for his
heroic and patriotic services. Those services were unsurpassed,
and the personal perils he encountered were unequalled by those
of any military or naval commander. He was exposed to greater
dangers in many battles than any general officer in the field, but
when he died his pay died with him. His widow has received no
recognition or pension. Most naval officers studiously prepared
and presented their prize daims, and some have been enriched
with large amounts of prize money. Farragut, in his unselfish
patriotism, which called out all his energies and all his time, was
neglectful of self and fortune. He never received a dollar of
prize money for the conquest of New Orleans, where more ex
tensive captures were made than in any battle of the war. In the
day and period when these events took place, Congress and his
grateful countrymen cheerfully awarded him their highest honors,
but official slight and neglect attended his last days. Notwith
standing official neglect, the American people revere the mem
ory of one of the most truthful, heroic, exemplary, unselfish and
devoted patriots the country ever had in its service, and grate
fully remember his many signal achievements.

The people of New York adopted Farragut, who came among
them to abide the fortunes of the republic. They respected and
honored him as first among our heroes while living, and for
getting all differences united in a public demonstration of
mournful regard on the reception of his remains, which were
brought from Portsmouth for interment. The municipal govern
ment of the metropolis gave the great naval chief what the
national Government did not, a public funeral. Many of the
high dignitaries whose previous neglect had called out ex
pressions of popular disapproval followed in the train on this
occasion, and did homage to the man and hero.

It is but a simple duty to Farragut, Du Pont, and Stringham,
that their position and their acts in these memorable expeditions,
which they respectively commanded, should be rightly recorded;
and, in the same connection, the truth in regard to the origin

Admiral Farragut and New Orleans 179

of eacti of those enterprises should appear. Had either of them
failed, the Navy Department, which projected them, but has
received little or no credit for either, would have been held re
sponsible and blamed. But slight of the navy and abuse of the
Navy Department were not unusual with partisan writers of the
period. Many of the events of that day are misstated and the
actors in them wronged and misrepresented. They will, perhaps,
never be correctly understood; for besides the Rebellion, which
broke up old associations, and aside from interested personal
motives which influenced many, there were party and personal
animosities and friendships to warp the minds and bias the
judgments of most of the writers, who hasten to publish their
own partialities and prejudices, which they denominate histories
of those occurrences and those times.

6

Lincoln and Johnson

THEIR PLAN OF RECONSTRUCTION AND THE
RESUMPTION OF NATIONAL AUTHORITY

The Johnson Plan of Reconstruction was launched
when the President published his North Carolina Procla
mation, which set forth easy conditions for the re-
admission of the former Confederate States into the
Union. As a supporter of this plan, Welles here at
tempts to demonstrate its similarity to Lincoln s scheme
of reconstruction* Because of Secretary of War Stanton s
collaboration with the radicals, Welles emphasizes Stan-
ton s part in drawing up the original Proclamation.

PART ONE

IKE MEASURES adopted by the Government to promote
peace and reestablish the Union during the last days of President
Lincoln s and the early months of President Johnson s administra
tion, have been much misrepresented, and by many seem to be
still imperfectly understood. No change of policy took place, nor
was there any interruption in the conduct of public affairs, by
the untimely death of Mr. Lincoln and the accession of his suc
cessor. Mr. Johnson accepted the situation, and entered upon
his duties with an earnest and sincere desire to carry forward to
a speedy consummation the plan and intentions of his predecessor
for the restoration of the Federal Government to its full consti
tutional authority, the States each to their rightful position, the

The Galaxy, XIII (April, 1872).
180

Lincoln and Johnson 181

people to their Inherent rights, and the Union to all its strength
and beneficence. No full and authentic record has been, made of
the occurrences of that important period, when the Executive
Department was in a transition state and the country was just
emerging from a civil war. The day has not perhaps arrived for
an impartial history of those times. The resentments which grew
out of the war and the partisan strife of the preceding twenty
years are interwoven with those occurrences, and still remain to
tinge with partiality or prejudice any narrative that may he at
tempted.

The two Presidents, Lincoln and Johnson, were of dissimilar
temperaments, different mental structure, and though associated
in the great Union contest and elected on the same ticket, they
had been trained in opposing political parties. There were, how
ever, many points in which there was a resemblance. Both were
self-made men, neither of them had early educational advantages,
both were sons of poverty, each had early struggles to encounter
in frontier life to obtain position, and each won the confidence
and respect of his associates and the community which knew him
best. One was from the prairies of Illinois the other from the
mountain region of Tennessee. Both were admired for their kind
ness of heart, their honest sincerity, their patriotism and incor
ruptible integrity. Mr. Lincoln had, with much strength of pur
pose, a genial nature, a facile mind and pliant disposition. Mr.
Johnson was reserved but urbane, firm and inflexible in his prin
ciples, stern and unbending in maintaining his convictions. While
each had the characteristics of frontier men, there was a kindly
suavity on the part of Mr. Lincoln which softened and recon
ciled even those with whom he disgreed; but there was a straight
forward and blunt sincerity on the part of Mr. Johnson, of
which his opponents took advantage, often to his injury. The
early political and party associations of Mr. Lincoln had been
with the Whigs. His first vote was for Henry Clay, whose po
litical oratory and magnetic party declamation drew into his
support so many of the young men of the West Led away by
impulse rather than reflection, by personal enthusiasm, and not
by conviction or much thought on the really grave and pro
found political questions involved in the conflict of parties, he

jgo Civil War and Reconstruction

drifted into the Whig organization, and commenced political life
a nominal centralist, with admiration of the "American System"
and of a powerful and magnificent General Government.

Time, reflection, and maturer years tempered his enthusiasm
and modified his feelings. He did not wholly relinquish his party
obligations, but investigation, discussion, and responsibility had
wrought a change in his views. Aside from personal admiration
of the eloquent Whig champion, which lingered in his mind
a pleasant remembrance, and apart from association which begets
attachment, Mr. Lincoln in his later years retained but little
zeal for Whig doctrines. When elected, and during his administra
tion, he was sincerely and conscientiously, in feeling and princi
ple, a constitutionalist, a Federal republican, a friend of State
rights, and in his general views an opponent of consolidation.
Observation and experience made him less a centralist and more
a State rights republican than he had been in his earlier days.
If the exigencies of the war impelled him to exercise extra
ordinary and sometimes doubtful powers, he lamented the neces
sity, and became more and more an admirer of our federative
system, and in his convictions an earnest constitutionalist.

During the winter of 1864 and 1865, after Sherman s success
ful march to the sea and after the fall of Fort Fisher, the ex
piring days of the Confederacy were manifest and the end not
distant. President Lincoln foresaw the result, and anticipated
with undisguised satisfaction the time, then rapidly approaching,
when the General Government would be able to dispense with
the exercise of arbitrary and questionable authority, the States
could each and all resume their true position and their rights
in the administration and direction of public affairs, and the
people again become reconciled, contented, and at peace. In the
early months of 1865 he frequently expressed his opinion that
the condition of affairs in the rebel States was deplorable, and
did not conceal his apprehension that, unless immediately at
tended to, they would, in consequence of their disturbed civil,
social, and industrial relations, be worse after the rebellion was
suppressed.

That event was obviously near at hand, and he enjoined upon
those who were associated with him in administering the govern-

Lincoln nd Johnson 185

ment, and occupying stations of responsibility, to be prepared
to discharge their novel and important duties intelligently,
benignantly, and for the best interests of the country. The im
poverishment of the people of those States by a long and ex
hausting war; the negroes emancipated, but ignorant and in
capable of providing for themselves; alienations and difficulties
between them and their former masters; new and grave questions
between labor and capital, the employer and the employed, the
landholder and the landless, the master and the servant; the
danger of conflicts between the different classes not only of
whites and blacks, but between the rich whites and the poor
whites, the free blacks and the late slaves, domestic servants and
field hands these were matters that pressed upon alL The
President alluded to them in Cabinet meetings and in private
conversations, together with the consequences which in all wars
have resulted from the sudden disbandment of great armies, even
where there were not domestic and social disturbances and de
rangements such as existed at the South. In consequence of the
insurrection the legal civil governments of the States of the
South had been suspended or overthrown, and there must neces-
sarily be a revival and restoration of the old governments, or a
reconstruction, by which their interrupted and broken relations
with the Union might be reestablished. One of the first move
ments, therefore, would necessarily be the establishment of civil
government in each of the States, so that there should be a
legitimate legislature to enact laws, and a legal executive and
judiciary to restrain crime, enforce obedience, and preserve civil
and social order. Grime, as far as possible, must be prevented and
punished; and if on the suppression of the rebellion the armies
broke up and portions were enlisted into robber bands and
guerilla parties, which he greatly feared, instant measures must
be adopted to arrest and punish the offenders. It was essential
that these matters should be brought within the scope of the
local civil tribunals, and that the people should not depend
upon the military to secure and maintain peace and domestic
tranquility. Let the people who have been under Confederate
despotism learn to take care of themselves under this dispensa
tion, as in former years, and the great principles which underlie

184 Civil War and Reconstruction

our civil fabric will vindicate themselves wthout a resort to
force and arbitrary power.

He dreaded and deprecated violent and revengeful feelings,
or any malevolent demonstrations toward those of our country
men who were involved, voluntarily or involuntarily, in the
rebellion. The leaders, he believed, would flee the country when
they became satisfied their cause was hopless. He often expressed
a wish that they might be facilitated in their escape, and no
strenuous efforts made to prevent their egress. This was more
strongly enjoined upon me, perhaps, than upon any other mem
ber of the Cabinet, by reason of the blockade, which was rigidly
enforced. In consequence of the fall of Wilmington, ocean com
munication with the rebels had almost entirely ceased, and
escape by water was extremely difficult.

In the latter part of March, about the 22d or 23d of that
month, the President left Washington and went to the front,
One of the alleged objects in his going was to relieve himself
of the immense throng of Congressmen and others which was
besetting him for office, at a period when his mind and thoughts
were engaged on more important and responsible duties than
the mere bestowal of party patronage. The rebellion was drawing
to a close, and he anticipated that his visit to army headquarters
might be productive of benefits in that regard.

His stay at City Point and with the army was protracted, and
attended with some inconveniences to the departments. The
Secretary of State went to see him, but promptly returnedthe
President did not desire the presence of any of his Cabinet. His
great object was clemency to the rebels and peace to the country.
Shortly after Mr. Seward s return he was thrown from his car
riage, and so severely injured as to be unable personally to dis
charge all of the necessary duties of the Department of State at
that interesting crisis.

This accident to the Secretary of State hastened somewhat the
President s return. I have reason to suppose, however, that in
interviews with Generals Grant and Sherman he had enjoined
upon them the concession of liberal terms to the rebels on the
first indication of a disposition to yield and abandon the contest.
To these merciful and considerate views of the President may be

Lincoln and Johnson 185

attributed the liberal tarns extended by the conquering generals
to Lee and Johnston. Each of our generals was impressed with
the humane, generous, and patriotic designs of the President,
whose earnest, deepest wish was peace to the people, an early
restoration of the national union, and the reestablishment of
the States and people in all their original, reserved, and un
doubted rights, on terms of equality and justice.

On the 2d of April, while the President was still at the front,
he telegraphed that a furious fight was going on, and on the
3d we received intelligence of the fall of Richmond. The infor
mation on that and the two succeeding dap was, however,
meagre and stinted. Mr. Seward, who had been uneasy since his
return, read to the Secretary of the Treasury and myself the
draft of a proclamation he had prepared for the President to
sign, closing the ports of the Southern States. This was a step
which I had earnestly pressed at the beginning of the rebellion,
as a domestic measure, and more legitimate than a blockade,
which was international, and an admission that we were two
nations. Within a few months, in fact, from the fall of Fort
Fisher, Mr. Seward, who originally opposed this view, had been
more favorably inclined, and the result was the proclamation he
had prepared and now read to us. After some little discussion
and approval, with an admission of the importance of an early
promulgation of the document, Mr. Seward proposed that as
it was uncertain when the President would return, he should go
to Richmond and procure his signature to the paper. Within
half an hour after we separated the horses attached to the
carriage of the Secretary of State ran away with him, and he
received injuries from which he did not recover for many weeks.
When restored, great changes had taken place, affecting himself
and the country.

The President reached Washington on the evening of Sun
day, the 9th of April. When I called on him the next morning
he was in excellent spirits, the news of Lee s surrender, which
however was not unanticipated, having been received. While I
was with him he signed the proclamation for closing the ports,
and expressed his gratification that Mr. Seward and myself con
curred in the measure, alluding to our former differences.

186 Civil War and Reconstruction

The President at that time, and while I was with him at the
White House, was informed that his fellow-citizens would that
evening call to congratulate him on the fall of Richmond and
surrender of Lee; but he requested their visit should be delayed
that he might have time to put his thoughts on paper, for he
desired that his utterances on such an occasion should be de
liberate and not liable to misapprehension, misrepresentation,
misinterpretation, or misconstruction. He, therefore, addressed
the people on the following evening, Tuesday the llth, in a
carefully-prepared speech, intended to promote harmony and
union.

In this remarkable speech, delivered three days before his
assassination, he stated he had prepared a plan for the re-
inauguration of the national authority and reconstruction in
1863, which would be acceptable to the Executive Government,
and that every member of the Cabinet fully approved the plan;
but he was now censured for his agency setting up and seeking
to sustain the State governments, though the Executive claimed
no right to say when or whether members should be admitted
to seats in Congress, That subject rested exclusively with the
respective Houses, and not to any extent with the Executive.
Neither he nor his successor seemed disposed at any time to
trespass the legislative department of the Government; each de
partment should limit its action within its prescribed constitu
tional sphere.

There was between the President and most of his Cabinet
a cordial concurrence of opinion in regard to the importance of
an early restoration of the Union, the reestablishment of the
States in their rights, the exercise of clemency, the inculcation
of harmony among the people, and a dismissal of all feelings of
revenge or resentment toward the beaten rebels. The proclama
tion or order of General Weitzel for convening or reassembling
the Virginia rebel Legislature was discussed very fully, and it
had also been commented upon at the Cabinet meeting on
Tuesday. The subject had caused general surprise, and, on the
part of some, dissatisfaction and irritation. Mr. Stanton and Mr.
Speed were particularly disturbed by it, and I believe Mr. Denni-
son also. Some, and perhaps all these gentlemen saw and remon-

Lincoln and Johnson 187

strated with the President, and individually made known their
repugnance to the proceeding. Their decisive opposition, he
admitted, was annoying him greatly, and he wished, in an
interview with myself, that I would state frankly how the meas
ure struck me. I did not hesitate to tell him I thought the
movement questionable; that it did not strike me favorably;
that in our desire to bring about an early peace, and to reestab
lish the political relations which had been suspended for four
years, we might make too much haste to accomplish our object
satisfactorily. The method and way proposed might retard the
measure, and lead the Virginia Legislature, when assembled, to
profitless discussion and the adoption of inadmissible terms* He
said his object and intentions were to effect a reconciliation as
soon as possible, and he should not stickle about forms, provided
he could attain the desired result; that he thought it best to meet
the rebels as men, fellow-countrymen, who were reasonable and
intelligent, and had rights which we were willing and disposed
to respect. They had been in error, had appealed to arms, and
after having fought well were beaten and humbled. I suggested
that as we had never recognized any of their organizations as
possessing validity during the war, it would be impolitic, to say
the least, to now recognize them and their government as legal
and possessed of authority to act. It was a concession which it
appeared to me ought not to be made. Besides, when assembled,
they might be contumacious and not counsel submission, but
conspire to resist still further. There was, moreover, a feeble
organization in Virginia, under Pierpont, which we had striven
to vitalize and maintain; how could we, with justice to Pierpont
and his supporters, recognize another opposing and antagonistic
organization? He said he had no fears of any further attempts
at resistance by the rebels; they had been too thoroughly whipped
and weakened; but there might be something in the other sug
gestion that we were giving sanction to the rebel organization.
He did not himself, however, think much of it, The government
under Pierpont, and no other, could be considered legal, but
public sentiment or public prejudice must not be overlooked.
He had, he said, no thought of treating the rebel Virginia
representatives as a legal assemblage a real Legislature; but

188 Civil War and Reconstruction

the persons composing tliat body were leading men in their re
spective counties, each of whom had a local influence, which he
thought should be made available, in this critical rtransition
state, in the interest of peace and the Union. He was surprised
that his object and the movement had been so generally mis
construed, and under the circumstances, perhaps, it was best the
proceeding should be abandoned. State action in the interest of
peace was, however, in itself disintegration and destruction to
the Confederacy. He thought it should "be encouraged, and was,
I pefceived, disappointed that his Meads opposed the measure,
and that I, always recognized by him as a State rights Union man,
had not favored it. The very fact of the rebel representatives
coming together and dissolving their organization by their own
act, after the troops were disbanded, would, in his belief, have
a beneficial influence; but he could not, he said, go forward
with everybody opposed to him. Civil government must, how
ever, be established as soon as possible in those States when
hostilities had ceased; there must be courts, and law, and order,
or society would be broken up; the disbanded armies would
turn into robber bands and guerilla parties. We had a responsible
and he feared a difficult duty to prevent such a state of things.

When I went to the Cabinet meeting on Friday, the 14th
of April, General Grant, who had just arrived from Appomattox,
was with the President, and one or two members were already
there. Congratulations were interchanged, and earnest inquiry
was made whether any information tad been received from
General Sherman. The Secretary of War came late to the meet
ing, and the telegraph office from, which we obtained earliest
news was in the War Department. General Grant, who was in
vited to remain, said he was expecting hourly to hear from
Sherman, and had a good deal of anxiety on the subject.

The President remarked that the news would come soon and
come favorably, he had no doubt, for be had last night his usual
dream which had preceded nearly every important event of the
war. I inquired the particulars of this remarkable dream. He said
it was in my department -it related to the water; that he seemed
to be in a singular and indescribable vessel, but always the
same, and that he was moving with, great rapidity toward a dark

Lincoln and Johnson 189

and indefinite shore; that he had had this singular dream pre
ceding the firing on Sumter, the battles of Bull Run, Antietam,
Gettysburg, Stone River, Vicksburg, Wilmington, etc. General
Grant remarked with some emphasis and asperity that Stone
River was no victory that a few such victories would have
ruined the country, and he knew of no important results from
it. The President said that perhaps he should not altogether
agree with him but whatever might be the facts, his singular
dream preceded that fight. Victory did not always follow Ms
dream, but the event and results were important. He had no
doubt that a battle had taken place or was about being fought,
"and Johnston will be beaten, for I had this strange dream
again last night. It must relate to Sherman; my thoughts are in
that direction, and I know of no other very important event
which is likely just now to occur."

Great events did indeed follow. Within a few hours the
good and gentle as well as truly great man who narrated his
dream was assassinated, and the murder which closed forever his
earthly career affected for years, and perhaps forever, the welfare
of this country.

The session of the Cabinet on that eventful day, the last of
President Lincoln s life, was chiefly occupied on the subject of
our relations with the rebelsthe communications, the trade,
etc. The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. McCulloch, who had but
recently entered upon his duties, was embarrassed in regard to
captured cotton, permits, and traffic. It was generally agreed
that commercial intercourse with the rebel States should be
speedily established. Mr. Stanton proposed that communication
should be reopened by his issuing a military order, authorizing
and limiting traffic; that the Secretary of the Treasury would
give permits to all who wished to trade, and he (Stanton) would
order the vessels to be received into any port.

I suggested that instead of a military order from the Secretary
of War, the President should issue an Executive order or
proclamation for opening the ports to trade, and prescribe there
in the duties of the several Departments. Mr. McCulloch ex
pressed his willingness to be relieved from Treasury agents, and
General Grant declared himself unequivocally opposed to them

190 Civil War and Reconstruction

and the whole Treasury system of trading within the rebel lines
as demoralizing.

In regard to opening the ports to trade, Mr. Stanton thought
it should be attended with restrictions, and that traffic should
not extend beyond the military lines. I proposed opening the
whole coast to every one who wished to trade, was entitled to
coast license, and should obtain a regular clearance. I wished
the reestablishment of unrestricted commercial and social inter
course with the Southern people with as little delay as possible,
from a conviction that it would conduce to a more speedy
establishment of friendly relations. General Grant concurred
with me, and recommended that there should be no restrictions
east of the Mississippi. The President referred the whole subject
to the Secretaries of the Treasury, War, and Navy, and said he
should be satisfied with any conclusions to which they might
arrive, or on which they could agree.

At the close of the session Mr. Stanton made some remarks
on the general condition of affairs and the new phase and duties
upon which we were about to enter. He alluded to the great
solicitude which the President felt on this subject, his frequent
recurrence to the necessity of establishing civil governments and
preserving order in the rebel States. Like the rest of the Cabinet,
doubtless, he had given this subject much consideration, and with
a view of having something practical on which to base action,
he had drawn up a rough plan or ordinance which he had
handed to the President.

The President said he proposed to bring forward that sub
ject, although he had not had time as yet to give much attention
to the details of the paper which the Secretary of War had
given him only the day before; but that it was substantially, in
its general scope, the plan which we had sometimes talked over
in Cabinet meetings. We should probably make some modifica
tions, prescribe further details; there were some suggestions which
he should wish to make, and he desired all to bring their minds
to the question, for no greater or more important one could
come before us, or any future Cabinet. He thought it providential
that this great rebellion was crushed just as Congress had ad
journed, and there were none of the disturbing elements of that

Lincoln and Johnson 11

body to hinder and embarrass us. If we were wise and discreet^
we should reanimate the States and get their governments in
successful operation, with order prevailing and the Union re
established, before Congress came together in December. Tills
he thought important. We could do better; accomplish more
without than with them. There were men in Congress who, if
their motives were good, were nevertheless impracticable, and
who possessed feelings of hate and vindktiveness in which he did
not sympathize and could not participate. He hoped there would
be no persecution, no bloody work, after the war was over. None
need expect he would take any part in hanging or killing those
men, even the worst of them. Frighten them out of the country,
open the gates, let down the bars, scare them off, said he, throw
ing up his hands as if scaring sheep. Enough lives have been
sacrificed. We must extinguish our resentments if we expect
harmony and union. There was too much of a desire on the part
of some of our very good friends to be masters, to interfere with
and dictate to those States, to treat the people not as fellow-
citizens; there was too little respect for their rights. He did not
sympathize in these feelings, Louisiana, he said, had framed
and presented one of the best constitutions that had ever been
formed. He wished they had permitted negroes who had
property, or could read, to vote; but this was a question which
they must decide for themselves. Yet some, a very few of our
friends, were not willing to let the people of the States determine
these questions, but, in violation of first and fundamental prin
ciples, would exercise arbitrary power over them. These humani
tarians break down all State rights and constitutional rights. Had
the Louisianians inserted the negro in their Constitution, and had
that instrument been in all other respects the same, Mr. Sumner,
he said, would never have excepted to that Constitution. The
delegation would have been admitted, and the State all right.
Each House of Congress, he said, had the undoubted right to
receive or reject members; the Executive had no control in this
matter. But Congress had nothing to do with the State govern
ments, which the President could recognize, and under existing
laws treat as other States, give them the same mail facilities,
collect taxes, appoint judges, marshals, collectors, etc., subject

192 Civil War and Reconstruction

of course, to confirmation. There were men who objected to
these views, but they were not here, and we must make haste
to do our duty before they came here.

Mr. Stanton read his project for reorganizing, reestablishing,
or reconstructing governments. It was a military or executive
order, and by it the War Department was designated to reorganize
those States whose individuality it assumed was sacrificed. Divest
ed of its military features, it was in form and outline essentially
the same as the plan ultimately adopted. This document proposed
establishing a military department to be composed of Virginia
and North Carolina, with a military governor. After reading
this paper, Mr. Stanton made some additional remarks in further
ance of the views of the President and the importance of prompt
measures.

A few moments elapsed, and no one else speaking, I expressed
my concurrence in the necessity of immediate action, and my
gratification that the Secretary of War had given the outlines
of a plan embodying his views. I objected, however, to military
supervision or control, and to the proposition of combining two
States in the plan of a temporary government. My idea, more
perhaps than that of any other of the Cabinet, was for a careful
observance, not only of the distinctive rights, but of the indi
viduality of the States. Besides, Virginia occupied a different
position from that of any other of those States. There had been
throughout the war a skeleton organization in that common
wealth which we had recognized. We had said through the whole
war that Virginia was a State in the Unionthat her relations
with the Government were not suspended. We had acknowledged
and claimed that Pierpont was the legitimate and rightful Gov
ernor, that the organization was lawful and right under him;
that the division of the State, which required the assent of the
legal State government, had been effected, and was claimed to
be constitutional and correct. Were we now to ignore our own
actsto say the Pierpont Government was a farce that the act
creating die State of West Virginia was a nullity? My position
on that question was different from others, for though not un
friendly to the new State, I had opposed the division of the
State when it took place. The proposition to reestablish a State

Lincoln and Johnson 195

government In Virginia whore there was already a State govern
ment with which we were acting; with Pierpant as governor* or
to put it under military control, appeared to me a grave error.
The President said my exceptions* some of them at least, were
well taken. Some of them had occurred to him. It was in that
view he had been willing that General Weitzel should call the
leading rebels together, because they were not the legal Legis
lature of Virginia, while the Pierpont Legislature was. Turning
to Mr. Stanton, he asked what he would do with Pierpont and the
Virginia Constitution? Stanton replied that he had no appre
hension from Pierpont, but the paper which he had submitted
was merely a rough sketch subject to any alteration,

Governor Dennison thought that Pierpont would be no serious
obstacle in the way, were that the only difficulty; but there were
other objections, and he thought separate propositions for the
government of the two States advisable.

I suggested that the Federal Government could assist the loyal
government of Virginia in asserting, extending, and maintain
ing its authority over the whole State, but that we could not
supersede or annul it.

The President directed Mr. Stanton to take the document and
have separate plans presented for the two States. They required
different treatment. "We must not," said he, "stultify ourselves
as regards Virginia, but we must help her." North Carolina was
in a different condition. He requested the Secretary of War to
have two copies of the two plans for the two States made and
furnished each member of the Cabinet by the following Tuesday
the next regular meeting. He impressed upon each and all the
importance of deliberating upon and carefully considering the
subject before us, remarking that this was the great question
pending, and that we must now begin to act in the interest
of peace. He again declared his thankfulness that Congress was
not in session to embarrass us.

The President was assassinated that evening, and I am not
aware that he exchanged a word with any one after the Cabinet
meeting of that day on the subject of a resumption of the
national authority in the States where it had been suspended,
or of reestablishing the Union. I was told by Speaker Colfax that,

194 Civil War and Reconstruction

in anticipation of a journey to the Pacific, he had come to
Washington to learn the intentions of the President in regard
to the meeting of Congress, whether he intended to convene that
body in extra session; that he was assured by the President he
did not contemplate such a step; that he informed Mr. Colfax
he might proceed on his journey without hindrance, and part
ing with him at the portico of the Executive mansion, as he was
entering his carriage to go to the theatre, he gave him a message
to the miners in Colorado.

On Sunday the 16th of April, after the assassination of Presi
dent Lincoln, there was a meeting of President Johnson and
the Cabinet at ten in the morning at the rooms of the Secretary
of the Treasury. The meeting was a protracted one. Mr. Stanton
came late and brought with him a mass of papers. Many and
important matters were adverted to, and among them the sub
ject of reconstruction. The original draft, he said, had been
divided, and the reestablishment of a State government as di
rected by Mr. Lincoln was made applicable to North Carolina,
while Virginia, with her loyal Governor and government, was
to take necessary measures for an election of State officers by
the people of the whole State. Mr. Stanton had not, however,
copies for the members of the Cabinet at this meeting.

I was invited to the War Department that evening, Sunday
the 16th, on some matter of business, by Secretary Stanton, and
after that was disposed of I sat by the fire conversing with him,
when Senator Sunmer, Representatives Dawes and Gooch, and
several other gentlemen in pretty rapid succession, entered the
the room. Messrs. Colfax and Covode wire of the number. After a
brief general conversation, the Secretary of War took from his
desk the Cabinet papers in relation to the government of the
rebel States, which, without introductory comment or remark, he
proceeded to read. As these were Cabinet papers not yet matured,
and had been scarcely discussed copies of which had not yet
been furnished the members my surprise was great, and it be
came a question in my own mind whether I was not an intruder.
Yet I had been invited there by Mr. Stanton, ostensibly on busi
ness. I could not doubt, however, that the other gentlemen came

Johms&n

with an understanding of the object which had called
together, but such was not my case.

After reading the Virginia plan, for a division of the docu
ment had been made, and before concluding that which related
to North Carolina, Mr. Simmer interrupted the reading and re
quested Mr. Stanton to stop until he could understand whether
any provision was made for enfranchising the colored man.
Unless, said he, the black man is given the right to vote, his
freedom is mockery,

Mr. Stanton said there were differences among our friends
on that subject, and it would be unwise in his judgment to pros
it in this stage of the proceedings.

Mr. Sumner declared he would not proceed a step unless the
black man had his rights. He considered the black man s right
to vote the essence the great essential. He had letters in his
pocket from some distinguished foreigners, whom he named,
setting forth the subject dearly and emphatically.

Mr. Stanton depreciated the agitation of the subject just at
this time as unfortunate.

I availed myself of the interruption caused by the discussion
to bid the gentlemen good evening and withdraw. This evidence,
on that Sunday evening, that Cabinet measures while yet in
embryo and under discussion were subjected to outside criticism
and consultation, confirmed an opinion I had long entertained
that Cabinet measures were communicated to outside parties,
and gave me pain and regret.

Although the subject of the restoration of the States and the
Union to their proper constitutional position and rights was a
paramount question before the country, it was not alluded to
at the regular Cabinet meeting on Tuesday the I8th, nor on
any other occasion until after tie funeral of President Lincoln.
This was perhaps excusable, although measures of less impor
tance received attention. I endeavored to have the subject taken
up at the meeting of the Cabinet on Friday the 21st, but the
Secretary of War succeeded in getting it passed over then and for
several successive meetings. It was not until Friday the 5th of
May that it was brought forward. On that day President Johnson,

196 Civil War and Reconstoiotion

after a brief discussion, requested the Secretary of War to send
copies of the plans to each member of the Cabinet for criticism
and amendments, and he ordered a special Cabinet meeting on
Monday the 8th of May for their consideration. I received from
Mr, Stanton a printed copy of each of the proposed plans, that
of Virginia on the 8th, that of North Carolina on the 9th; and
still have in my possession the original printed copies of the
"Executive order to reestablish the authority of the United
States and execute the laws within the geographical * limits of
Virginia and North Carolina, as submitted by him, with the al
terations proposed by myself. Most of the emendations or correc
tions were adopted, and with two exceptions were readily as
sented to by Mr. Stanton. I preferred a proclamation to an
Executive order, as more in character for the Chief Magistrate,
more respectful, and less martial.

The first paragraph of Mr. Stanton s draft, which was intro
ductory, was by common consent omitted.

The sixth section, or order, as originally proposed by Mr,
Stanton, was the longest and fullest. It gave into the hands of the
Secretary of War the whole machinery for organizing civil gov
ernment for the States, through provost marshals to be by him
appointed.

To this delegation of Executive duties and authority to the
Secretary of War decisive objection was taken. The subject of
reorganizing the State governments and reestablishing Federal
authority in the insurrectionary region, was a matter of the
highest responsibility and gravest importance, and could not
with propriety be turned over to any one department, but should
be reserved for general Administration and Executive action.
On this point there was such general concurrence of opinion by
all others, that Mr. Stanton, though disappointed, was not per
sistent in its defence.

The eighth section as proposed by Mr. Stanton read as
follows:

Eighth. That to carry into effect the guarantee by the
Federal Constitution of a republican form of State govern
ment, and afford to them the advantage and security of
domestic laws, as well as to complete the reestablishment of

Lincoln and Johnson 197

the authority and laws of the United States* and the full
and complete restoration of peace within the limits afore-
said* Francis H. Pierpont, Governor of the State of Virginia,
be requested to take measures for the recstablishment of

the State government, and for the election of State officers,
with the assurance that the aid of the United States, so far
as may be necessary, will be exerted to that end.

I proposed to amend and so modify the section as to assure
the existing State authorities of Federal aid in maintaining and
extending the admlnistraton of the State government throughout
the geographical limits of the State, but without ordering a new
election or Interfering with the State government.

As changed and corrected by me, the section was as follows:

Eighth. That to carry Into effect the guarantee by the
Federal Constitution of a republican form of State govern
ment, and afford the advantage and security of domestic
laws, as well as to complete the reestablishment of the au
thority and laws of the United States, and the full and com
plete restoration of peace within the limits aforesaid, Francis
H. Pierpont, Governor of the State of Virginia, will be
aided by the power of the Federal Government so far as
may be necessary, in the lawful measures which he may take
for the extension and administration of the State govern
ment throughout the geographical limits of said State.

The first rough draft presented to the Cabinet on the 14th
of April embodied, as has been stated, a plan for the government
of both Virginia and North Carolina under a military governor,
and was doubtless the germ of the military reconstruction laws
enacted two years later in 1867, which placed the Southern States
under military rule. North Carolina and South Carolina formed
under those laws the second military district, instead of Virginia
and North Carolina, as proposed by Mr. Stanton s first draft.
In the differences growing out of the construction of this eighth
section may be seen the early dawn, the incipient movement,
which was subsequently more fully developed in the controversy
between the Executive and Congress in regard to Federal and
State rights, the exercise of unlimited central power on the one

198 Civil War and ReconstmctlMi

hand, and restriction to constitutional limitation and freedom
of the people and States on the other. The original eighth section
had in view the first step toward the subordination of the States
exercising over them arbitrary and absolute control, treating
them as provinces, dependent territories, subjugated, and without
any of their original inherent and reserved rights as distinct
and independent members of the Union. The design was to
establish a new State government in Virginia by Federal mandate,
when a State government was already there established and
in force, ordering a new election of State officers, although the
term of the incumbents with whom for years we had been
acting had not expired. President Johnson and most of the
Cabinet took the ground of non-interference, non-dictation by
the Federal Government to a State which was organized, the
government of which was republican and had been so treated
by us; but as the Federal and State authority had been excluded
from a large portion of the State by the insurrection, it was
necessary to resume national authority, to reassert the Federal
jurisdiction, and to give aid to the State authorities so far as
aid might be necessary to enforce State jurisdiction in those
localities. Mr. Stanton had, however, after the suggestions on
the 14th of April, and under the instructions given him by
President Lincoln, so far modified his original plan as to give
a qualified recognition to Virgnia as a State; but yet by inference
she was without a republican form of government, and in such
a condition of territorial pupilage as to be considered a mere
corporation, subject to the mandatory orders of the Federal
Government. The Governor was requested, or in plain language
required, ordered, to "take measures for the establishment of
the State government and the election of State officers," etc
The subject was not divested of embarrassment, for the govern
ment of Pierpont was frail, and those administering it, though
loyal, were not the legitimate offspring or choice of a majority
of the whole people; but most of the Cabinet approved of the
amendment and the President adopted it with a slight verbal
alteration. Mr. Stanton assented with unexpected willingness to
most of the minor amendments or alterations which I proposed,
but yielded on the sixth and eighth sections with some reluctance.

Lincoln mnd Johnson 199

At the of the discussion he requested that the copies which
he had furnished to each member of the Cabinet be re

turned to him; and most, perhaps all except myself, compiled
with his request. As I had proposed the principal if not all the
amendments, I desired to retain my copy with the Interlineations.
Mr. Stanton after a little hesitation acquiesced* but Insisted
on destroying that part of the sixth section which placed the
machinery for reorganizing and reestablishing the governments
of the Southern States in the hands of the Secretary of War,
This part of his scheme having been rejected, he claimed It
formed no longer any portion of the plan, and with his scissors
he cut out the whole section except the first two lines. This copy,
thus mutilated, with the amendments interlined, is In my posses
sion, as Is also Ms plan for a temporary government of North
Carolina submitted and discussed on the 9th of May. This state
ment differs In some respects from the testimony of Mr. Stanton,
and also that of General Grant, before the Impeachment Com
mittee, when the proceedings of the Cabinet on these points
were disclosed. Their statements wore from memory, MINE is
FROM RECORD. Not only the original plans are now before me,
but memoranda of the occurrences which took place, and are
the basis of what Is related in this paper.

The draft for a provisional or temporary government of North
Carolina was considered on Tuesday, the 9th of May. As this
was to be the plan or form for the temporary government of
the other States which had been in rebellion, preparatory to
and In aid of their full and complete restoration, the subject
was canvassed with much deliberation. The details prescribed in
the Virginia plan, so far as they could be made applicable to
North Carolina, were to be followed, and the Secretary of War
was directed to furnish copies to each member of the Cabinet
embodying the general ideas advanced and approved In the
discussions on the 5th and 8th. This plan, as arranged by Mr.
Stanton and submitted, was not however in form and manner
conformable in all respects to the President s Ideas and wishes.
The most important point that which related to the qualified
voters, or who should be permitted to take part in the elec
tionswas involved in some obscurity.

2Q Civil War and Reconstruction

Mr. Stanton, in Ms evidence before the Impeachment Com-
mittee, says:

There was one point which I had left open; that was
as to who should constitute the electors in the respective
States. That I supposed to be the only important point
upon which a difference of opinion could arise whether
the blacks should have suffrage in the States, or whether
it should be confined, for the purposes of reorganization,
to those who had exercised it under the former State laws.
I left a blank upon that subject to be considered.

Mr, Stanton committed a mistake when he made this state
ment. No blank in regard to electors or suffrage was left in his
draft for the reestablishment of State governments for the South.

His plan of government for North Carolina submitted on the
9th of May expressly ordered: "That the loyal citizens of the
United States, residing within the State of North Carolina on
the second Tuesday of July next, may on that day, in the sev
eral precincts and customary places of holding elections, and
between the usual hours, elect members of a State Convention
to adopt a State constitution and republican form of State gov
ernment in said State/ I claimed that this was equivocal, that
it would lead to controversy, and asked what was meant by
"loyal citizens." He admitted the intention was to include negroes
as well as white men. To this, serious objection was made by
another member, which led to an expression of opinion by each
one of the Cabinet present. Mr. Stanton himself objected to any
preliminary discussion. There was a kindly feeling on every hand
toward the colored race, whose freedom and social condition
had been involved in, and in many respects improved by, the
results of the War; but a large portion of the people, even in
the States loyal to the Constitution, were not prepared to en
franchise or admit negroes to the privilege of being voters. This
question as presented in Mr. Stanton s plan being equivocal, or
left vague and uncertain, was objected to, as it would lead to
controversy and collision. The President wished there might be
no room for dispute or equivocation. Mr. Stanton said there
were differences on that subject which could not be easily rec-

Lincoln and Johnson 201

onciled; perhaps It would be well therefore to meet it and set
tle it here. He suggested, however, that there should be no
cussion, but that each member should ay f briefly, whether the
negro should be authorized to Yote in North Carolina. There
is no secrecy in regard to the opinion of the individual mem
bers of the Cabinet as declared on that occasion, The result of
the meeting and the position of each member were immediately
known outside the Administration. Indeed, most of the Cabinet
proceedings on that subject and some others of importance were
divulged at that period. The Secretary of State was not present,
nor am I aware that he was consulted. The Secretary of War,
the Postmaster-General, and the Attorney-General declared them
selves in favor of giving the negro the privilege of voting by
Federal authority in this Executive order. The Secretaries of
the Treasury, Navy, and Interior denied that the Federal Gov
ernment had any authority in the premises, or power to confer
this privilege.

But few words were interchanged in regard to public sen
timent, etc. I remarked, after each had expressed his opinion,
that the subject had been well considered and passed upon by
President Lincoln and the Cabinet before issuing the proclama
tion of December 8, 1863. At that time it was concluded unan
imously I had supposed, Mr. Stanton being one of our number
that the question of suffrage belonged to the States; that the
qualification in different States was not uniform; that the Fed
eral Government could not rightfully interfere to make it so;
but that all entitled to and accepting of amnesty, who possessed
the qualifications prescribed in the constitutions of their re
spective States prior to the passage of the secession ordinances,
could legally vote, and none others. The rule then adopted I
thought a correct one, and should be adhered to. Discussion,
however, was declined, and the President took the papers with
out himself expressing at that time an opinion.

It was also stated by Mr. Stanton in his testimony before
the Impeachment Committee, that

Subsequently, at an early day, the subject (suffrage) came
under consideration, after the surrender of Johnston s army,
in the Cabinet of Mr. Johnson. The projet I had prepared

202 Civil War and Reconstruction

was printed, and a copy In the hands of each member of
the Cabinet, and the President. It was somewhat altered in
some particulars, and came under discussion in the Cabinet,
the principal point of discussion being as to who should
exercise the elective franchise. I think there was a dif
ference of opinion in the Cabinet upon the subject. The
President expressed his views very dearly and distinctly.
I expressed my views, and other members of the Cabinet
expressed their views. The objection of the Persident to
throwing the franchise open to the colored people ap
peared to be fixed, and I think every member of the Cabinet
assented to the arrangement as it was specified in the procla
mation relative to North Carolina.

There was an impression almost an accusationthat Presi
dent Johnson, by an arbitrary dictum, disposed of this question
without deliberation; that he had predetermined it before the
subject was taken up in Cabinet meeting. So far is this from the
truth, that he forbore to express an opinion, gave the question
much careful thought and consideration, and reserved his decision
for some days.

General Grant was present, by invitation of President Lincoln,
at the Cabinet meeting on the 14th of April, when the first
rough draft for reconstruction was read, as stated in his evidence,
but not at any other Cabinet meeting when this subject was
considered. That draft of the 14th of April was an "Executive
order" for the government of Virginia and North Carolina, and
a different document from the "North Carolina proclamation"
of President Johnson of the 29th of May, although General Grant
appears to think it the same. In the draft or plan which General
Grant heard read on the 14th of April, no allusion was made
to the subject of franchise, for Secretary Stanton was aware that
Mr. Lincoln, who was then present, had settled and fixed opin
ions on that subject, which he had clearly stated in his proclama
tion of December, 1863. The question of franchise was, how
ever, the prominent topic in the North Carolina proclamation.
The draft of the 14th of April also contained a proposition for
a military government to reorganize the Southern States, under
the direction of the Secretary of War, which is not the fact in

Lincoln Johnsmi

the plan finally adopted by President Johnson. The first was
an Executive order, the last was a Proclamation. General Grant
was present when the "Executive order * was read in Cabinet
council, but never when the North Carolina Proclamation was
under consideration. He confounded the two documents, which
were in some respects quite dissimilar, though both had in view
the reorganization and recstablishment of civil government in
the rebel States.

There was a slight diversity in respect to the title which
should be given the officer who, undo: the direction of the
President, should initiate proceedings to reestablish civil govern
ment, and have charge of affairs in North Carolina until her
Constitution was modified and the State in full accord with the
General Government The subject had been previously adverted
to. A military man could, it was said, be assigned to the duty,
and have a command given him to enforce his orders and make
himself respected, and who would be paid from the army ap
propriation. The precedent which had been set in Tennessee,
when Mr. Johnson, the President, had been made a brigadier-
general and military governor, was cited. But, on the other hand,
it was urged that the war being over, it was desirable to do away
with military rule so far as it could be safely dispensed with;
that the office and duties were essentially civil, and that it would
be desirable, and conducive to harmony, if the person selected
should be a citizen of the State not connected with the army,
but familiar with the laws and institutons of the people he was
to govern, and whose broken relations were to be reestablished.
The title of Provisional Governor or Commissioner, was there
fore preferred, and that of Provisional Governor, proposed, I
think, by Governor Denison, was adopted.

The people had for four years submitted to the exercise of
extraordinary, almost unlimited military power, and on the
cessation of hostilities good and wise men not connected with
the army were anxious to relieve the country of military rule.
This was the prevailing feeling of the Administration, and many
of the army officers concurred in that feeling. The title of Pro
visional Governor for the person to be employed to adjust those
affairs was, therefore, generally approved. On the question of

204 Civil War and Recoostrncftioii

Negro suffrage, however, there were Irreconcilable differences in
the Republican party, which had then already disclosed them
selves in the Senate on the Louisiana question and other measures,
and these differences were increasing in Congress and through
out the country. Many who felt indifferent on the subject so
far as the negro was concerned, denied nevertheless the power
of the Federal Government to give the black race the privilege
or right to vote or to prevent them from voting; claimed that
it violated the foundation principles on which our governmental
superstructure was built; that the subject belonged to the States
exclusively. But there was a fanaticism with others, who in
their zeal appeared to consider the cause of liberty and free
government involved in the enfranchisement of the blacks, and
were ready in pursuit of this one idea to sacrifice constitutional
limitations and safeguards, and constitutional government, to
secure to that race the privilege of suffrage. Instead of a privilege
conferred and regulated by law and constitutional rules, the
Radicals, as they began to call themselves, insisted that suffrage
was and is an inherent and inalienable right. The condition of
the country, just recovering from a civil war which had its origin
in the aggressive demands of slavery, and claims in its behalf
not warranted by the Constitution, conduced to the growth of
public sentiment in the opposite extreme, scarcely less reprehensi
ble, in favor of the blacks and against their rebel masters. While
the fanatics I do not apply the word offensively were earnest
and sincere, there was another class of shrewd and managing
partisans who allied themselves to the movement, but were
governed by less honest motives and had less honest convictions.
The people, North and South, were weary of war and wished
for peace; but there were extreme men in each section who had
an object in perpetuating differences. This question of negro
suffrage, together with proscription of the Southern whites, soon
became a party test, and with it came in the old distinctions in
regard to State rights and central power.

7

Lincoln and Johnson

THEIR PLAN OF RECONSTRUCTION AND THE
RESUMPTION OF NATIONAL AUTHORITY

The break between President Johnson and Congress on
the question of reconstruction overshadowed Ms entire
administration. Welles here continues his account of the
origins of the President s policy and seeks to put all
the blame for the breach upon the radicals. The Secre
tary s account of their efforts to induce the President
to call Congress into special session as late as July,
1865, is especially interesting.

PART TWO

1 HE MEASURE of reconstruction involved principles which,
from the origin of the Government, have divided public sen
timent and led to the organization of opposing parties. The
question presented was whether the people of the States which
had been in rebellion had sufficient intelligence and virtue to
resume their rights and exercise the duties and authority of
local self-government, or whether they should by central power be
denied these privileges and rights, and subjected to military
domination. Distrust of popular government had always existed
to a considerable extent, and those who were of that faith were
unwilling, now that the power was in their hands, to permit the
people of North Carolina and other Southern States to frame
their own governments, make their own organic laws, and govern
themselves. Neither President Lincoln nor President Johnson

The Galaxy, XIII (May, 1872).

205

206 Civil War and Recoiastraction

had any such distrust, nor would they consent to exercise arbi
trary power on the rights of the States or our established federal
system of State equality. The subject had been considered with
out prejudice or party bias, long before the rebellion was sup
pressed. The plan of reconstruction which President Lincoln
initiated is clearly set forth in the annual message of December
8, 1863, and the accompanying Proclamation of that date. In
those documents the people of the States in insurrection are
invited to resume their lawful position in the Union, and are
assured that when they the people of any Statemay do so, and
"shall reestablish a State government which shall be republican,"
such shall be recognized as the true government of the State, and
the State shall receive thereunder the benefits of the constitu
tional provision which declares that, "the United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union, a republican form of
government, and shall protect each of them." This policy, which
is constitutional, and was announced by President Lincoln with
the approval of his cabinet in 1863, received the sanction of the
tountry, and was adopted and carried forward by President
Johnson in 1865. The Secretary of War manifested a desire to
continue military ascendency after the overthrow of the Con
federacy. In consultation with his confidants in Congress he
proposed by an executive order to abandon the principles laid
down by Mr. Lincoln in regard to suffrage, and without warrant
from the Constitution, and in derogation of the rights of the
States, to authorize the negroes to vote in the elections.

President Johnson modified essentially Mr. Stanton s draft
for the temporary government of North Carolina, put the docu
ment in the form of a Proclamation instead of an Executive
order, and made it more distinctly a civil than military paper.
In that respect it was a great improvement on the original and
on the Virginia draft. He did not issue the proclamation ap
pointing the Provisional Governor and establishing a temporary
government in North Carolina until the 29th of May. The dis
puted question of suffrage he carefully weighed and investigated,
reviewed the whole subject, and while, like Mr. Lincoln, he felt
as a man kindly disposed toward the colored race, and would have
been gratified even to give them qualified suffrage if were they

Lincoln Johnson 207

of capacity, lite President Lincoln lie came to the
conclusion that the subject belonged exclusively to the States
and the people of the States respectively, and that the Federal
Government had no legal power or legitimate control over it.
The rebels by their own acts had individually forfeited their
rights as citizens, and might each be excluded from participating
in the Government unless pardon or amnesty was granted.
Amnesty might be qualified and conditional. It was admitted to-
be in the power of the Executive, by a limited pardon, to oc
clude from suffrage certain criminal whites, but neither the
President nor the Federal Government had authority to admit
to suffrage any blacks. By excluding those who had been in
rebellion he had the power, if disposed to exercise it, to gratify
to that extent the intolerant feeling which sought to proscribe
the Southern whites; but while he might so far restrict suffrage,
and thereby had measurable control, he yet had no authority
to establish new qualifications for voting, or to confer on minors,
or females, or blacks, the privilege of electors, in opposition to
the fundamental laws of the States respectively. By withholding
a full pardon he might exdude traitors from voting, but he was
invested with no authority to confer suffrage on any person or
dass, in derogation or violation of the local fundamental law
of any State. Nor had the President nor the whole Federal
Government any authority, constitutional or equitable, to break
down sovereign communities, or deprive the loyal, law-abiding,
patriotic citizens of those States of their reserved civil, municipal,
and political rights. And, as punishment should not precede but
follow conviction, rebels themselves were entitled to a fair and
impartial trial before being condemned, outlawed, and punished
for crime. His investigations and reflections led him, in his North
Carolina proclamation, to adopt the principle, and almost the
very words, of President Lincoln in 1863. He said:

In any election that may be hereafter held for choosing
delegates to any State Convention, as aforesaid, no person
shall be qualified as an elector, or shall be eligible as a mem
ber of such convention, unless he shall have previously
taken the oath of amnesty as set forth in the President s
proclamation of May 29, A.D. 1865, and is a voter qualified

208 Civil War and Reconstnidtimi

as prescribed by the laws and Constitution of the State of
North Carolina in force immediately before the 20th day
of May, 1861, the date of the so-called ordinance of seces
sion; and the said Convention when convened, or the Legis
lature that may be thereafter assembled, will prescribe the
qualifications of electors and the eligibility of persons to hold
office under the Constitution and laws of the State, a power
the people of the several States composing the Federal
Union have rightfully exercised from the origin of the
Government to the present time.

The words of President Lincoln in his proclamation of the
8th of December, 1863, proposing the reestablishment of legal
governments in the rebel States, are, "being a qualified voter
by the election laws of the State existing immediately before the
so-called act of secession"; and in the same proclamation he
suggests that "the Constitution and the general code of laws as
before the rebellion he maintained, subject only to the modifica
tions made necessary by the conditions hereinbefore stated."
These conditions related to confiscation, emancipation, and other
acts originating in and growing out of the rebellion.

The rule and principles set forth had been carefully and
elaborately examined and discussed by the members composing
the Executive Administration in 1863, and upon their unanimous
approval had been adopted and proclaimed by President Lincoln.
Three of the members of President Lincoln s Administration in
1863 were in the Cabinet of President Johnson in May, 1865,
two of whom are understood to have advised an adherence to
the rule laid down in 1863. President Johnson agreed with them
as to the correctness and legality of the principle, and made it his
rule of action in reestablishing loyal governments. There was
therefore no change of policy in 1865, on the part of the
Administration, from the policy of 1863 in that regard. The
views of President Lincoln and President Johnson were identi
cal; yet an organized opposition was immediately commenced
against President Johnson for the honest and conscientious
discharge of his constitutional duty, which pursued him with
vindictive and unrelenting ferocity during his whole Administra
tion, and malignantly and without cause or justification at-

Lincoln $nd Johnson

tempted Ms impeachment. Other pretexts, and

were assigned, but the real and true cause of and

persecution was the fearless and unswerving fidelity of the
President to the Constitution, his refusal to proscribe the
white people In the rebel States and the States themselves by
ex post facto laws, his opposition to central Congressional usurpa
tion, and his maintenance of the rights of the States and of
the Executive Department of the Government against legislative
aggjression. Of the manner in which he met his assailants, and
the wisdom of all that was said and done on either side during
that extraordinary conflict which was carried on by a fragment
of Congress that arrogated to itself authority to exclude States
and people from their constitutional right of representation,
against an Executive striving under infinite embarrassments to
preserve State, Federal, and Popular rights, to restore peace and
promote national union it is unnecessary to speak at this time,
further than to say that his motives were as pure as the principles
which governed both him and Abraham Lincoln were constitu
tional and correct

In this matter of extending suffrage to the colored race and
of proscription of the whites, the President and most of his
Cabinet were opposed to any and all oppressive measures, and
to any general subversion of the laws, usages, institutions, tradi
tions, and customs of the States respectively, excepting so far
as to rid them of slavery, the radical error which had caused our
national trouble and led to the arbitrament of arms. That had
been by common consent on both sides in issue, and was de
termined by the war. Emancipation was in issue; negro suffrage
was not. That was an afterthought a new contest, introduced
after hostilities had ceased, and terms had been granted and ac
cepted. The doctrine, recognized throughout the civilized world,
that all laws not inconsistent with those of the conquerors re
main in force till changed to the conquered, the centralists would
not concede to the Southern States, composed of people who
were their countrymen, living under the some Constitution, and,
like themselves, amenable to existing Federal laws. They were
sheltered by no treaty, and were denied the legal rights guaranteed
by the Constitution to all citizens. Had the war been carried on

210 Civil War and Reconstruction

with a foreign power, there would have been peace when hos
tilities ceased and the conquered party had submitted and ac
cepted terms; but such was not the case in this instance. The
defeated States were protected by no treaty, and the conquerors
refused to recognize or be governed by existing laws towards
the conquered. American citizens who resided at the South dur
ing the rebellion were not allowed the rights conceded to aliens
if they continued to reside in that section. Leading minds in
Congress and the country exerted their influence to prevent har
mony and reconciliation. Hatred and revenge were cherished
and inculcated towards all indiscriminately who lived in the
rebel States, whether they had been actors or not, willing or
involuntary, Union men or otherwise. While the Radicals did
not propose to hang or imprison all, or perhaps any considerable
portion, of the Southern people, all who continued to reside
within the limits of any of the rebel States were to be unrepre
sented, to be classed as rebels, and robbed of their rights. Their
fidelity to the Union during the war, and their surrender and
submission, were not sufficient; the white people, loyal and dis
loyal, who continued to reside South, were denied rights reserv
ed and secured to them by the fundamental law rights inherent
in the people of each State as distinct communities, and which
were never ceded away, granted to or conferred upon the Fed
eral Government, or in any manner parted with. All were sub
jected to arbitrary military rule, no further restrained under the
laws which Congress proceeded to enact than the military com
mander placed over them might, in his own voluntary pleas
ure, tolerate and permit. It was a war against States as much
as against persons, for not one of the thousands who fled into
the Northern States was disfranchished or molested. There seem
ed an unreasoning fanaticism on the subject of the rights and
privileges of the colored race with some, who in their zeal per
suaded themselves that the cause of liberty was with the negro,
not with the white man, Negro suffrage and negro supremacy
over the whole South became with these men the one great ab
sorbing idea. Others less sincere than the fanatics, but who had
party, personal, and merecenary ends in view, and central prin
ciples to promote, allied themselves with the fanatics against

Lincoln and Johnson 211

the President, in the confident expectation that, by the aid of
negro votes, the party of centralists would secure and Baaintain
ascendancy in the General Government. This party, which sooa
assumed the name of Radical, scouted at all legal restraints
upon their schemes against the States and against white men*
and did not hesitate to disregard and break down all constitu
tional barriers which were in their way, although but few had
the frankness of their chief leader, Thaddeus Stevens, to de
clare they were independent of and outside the Constitution.

Senator Sumner called on me on the 10th of May, the day
after the Cabinet had taken action declining to interfere with
suffrage. No direct mention of that action was made, but the
question in its general aspect was discussed, and I was satisfied
he had been informed of the opinions given. He was very ear
nest and sincere in urging the absolute necessity of permitting
or not denying to the colored race the franchise. Voting, he
claimed, was indispensable to freedom; without it the blacks
had gained nothing servitude, slavery in another form would
be imposed upon them by the privileged or master race. Their
admission to civil rights, the establishment of the marriage re
lation, the unity of the family which could no longer be for
cibly separated by any master against their willpoints which
I mentioned as secured to them by the war he treated as of little
consequence without suffrage. In the course of the conversation
he said that Chief Justice Chase had left on a visit to the rebel
States for the purpose of promoting the cause of negro suffrage,
and that President Johnson was aware of his object and favored it.

As the President had forborne to express his opinion on the
9th, when he took the papers and dismissed the Cabinet council,
not unlikely there was at the time an impression, perhaps an
expectation with some, that he would favor negro suffrage. He
would not, I was confident and so stated, have opposed it, had
any State adopted or proposed to adopt it On the contrary, he
was kindly disposed, and I think personally favorable to quali
fied negro suffrage, when there were evidences of capacity suf
ficient on the part of the colored man to discharge the duty
intelligently. But that the Federal Government had any power
or authority to dictate or control the States on this subject, was

212 Civil War and Recoostractiwi

an idea he never entertained. He was too faithful to the Con
stitution, too strict a constructionism too firm an advocate of
State rights, had too profound a regard for our system of State
and Federal governments based on popular rights, to interfere
with the States in this matter.

Mr. Sumner did not controvert, but rather assented to my
exposition of what I believed were President Johnson s views,
but he put in a remark indicating that the popular voice and
popular rights included the negro race. This, I claimed, would
be a new dispensation from the central Government, which had
no authority to give or order it. Although no direct mention
was made of the opinions expressed in the Cabinet, I was im
pressed with the belief that Senator Sumner had been advised
in regard to what had taken place, and that his statements of the
expedition of the Chief Justice, its object, and that the President
approved of it, were intended, as well as his own remarks, to have
an influence on that subject.

In a conversation with Senator Sumner the following Decem
ber, referring to the secret meeting which took place at the War
Department on the Sunday evening succeeding the assassination
of President Lincoln, he said that he and Colfax interpolated a
paragraph on the subject of suffrage into the Executive Order
that Mr. Stanton had prepared, which Stanton accepted. This
paragraph, which has been already quoted in a preceding paper,
was, he said, satisfactory to him and those who agreed with him,
but that Seward, McCulloch, and myself had upset the arrange
ment and were responsible for all the consequences. This para
graph, which Messrs. Sumner and Colfax interpolated on the
16th of April, was not in the first rough draft submitted to the
Lincoln Cabinet on the 14th of April, the only occasion when
General Grant was present while the subject of a provisional
or military government for North Carolina was under considera
tion. He was never present with President Johnson s Cabinet
when the subject was considered. Mr. Stanton was mistaken when
he represented that he left a blank on the subject of suffrage in
his North Carolina draft. I have that draft as he presented it,
and there is no such blank. I have quoted the paragraph re-

Lincoln and Johnson 218

speetmg loyal citizens and elections which Messrs, Sunnier
Colfax prepared, and which was submitted for approval.

General Grant was in error in supposing he was present when
the North Carolina Proclamation was read in Cabinet, He was
not present on that occasion, but was in attendance when the
first Executive Order was submitted.

It is also worthy of observation that Messrs. Simmer and
Colfax and others took no exception to the plan or policy of
reconstruction instituted by President Lincoln and adopted by
President Johnson; but they, with Mr. Stanton, undertook to
assist the President, and shape and perfect the Executive Older
to meet their peculiar views. When, however, President Johnson
declined, as President Lincoln had declined, to intermeddle with
the subject of suffrage, he was accused of "high crimes and
misdemeanors" for the steps which he had taken to reconstruct
the States and resume the national authority.

On the 24th of May I saw for the first time the proclamation
for establishing government in North Carolina, with the pro
gramme as revised by the President and finally published on
the 29th. It was in some essentials different from Mr. Stanton s
draft, and was a more finished and complete document in every
respect than when it passed into the President s hands. The
promulgation in the form of a Proclamation was preferable to
that of an Executive or military order, which had been proposed
in the first draft, and was in fact applied to Virginia.

Almost immediately after the proclamation for amnesty, which
was issued on the 29th of May, simultaneously with the procla
mation for establishing a provisional government in North
Carolina, preliminary to the complete restoration of the State
to the Union, opposition to these measures began to be developed.
The people North and South, with great unanimity, acquiesced
in and approved these steps of the Executive and the policy thus
indicated, but discontent began to be manifested, angry ex
pressions were uttered, and combinations entered into by a
class of active and leading party men of extreme views, who
were not willing that the desolation of war should be so soon

214 Civil War and Reconstruction

forgotten and its spirit allayed. The same men had denounced
the mild and lenient policy of President Lincoln and opposed
his reelection.

Foremost among them as a master spirit and avengernot
a restorer and moving with subtle skill and effect, was Henry
Winter Davis of Maryland. Although of abilities superior in
many respects to any man in Congress for the work in hand, and
possessed of a keen, suggestive, and intriguing mind, with variable
and salient powers, which could devise schemes and excite his
associates to their execution, he failed to win and hold the con
fidence of the people. But few even of his most intimate friends,
while listening to his eloquent suggestions, gave him implicit
trust. Conspicuously and energetically beyond any other man,
he came forward at this period as the leader and oracle of the
Radical party, the champion of negro suffrage and of the
equality of the races the opponent of State rights, and the
open advocate of the omnipotent imperialism of Congress and
the central Government. He had not been a favorite of Mr.
Lincoln and most of his Cabinet, and he knew full well they did
not desire his return to Congress. Aware of these facts, and that
a considerable portion of the Republicans of Baltimore as well
as all the Democrats of his district were opposed to him, he feared
to stand as a candidate for reelection, and had reluctantly de
clined and retired from the contest the preceding fall. But his
ambition, his extreme radicalism, and his hostility to the mild
and benignant policy of Mr. Lincoln and his Administration, had
not abated. The death of the President wrought no change of
feeling in Davis, for the same Cabinet remained, the same
clemency was being exercised, and the same policy was pursued
as under Mr. Lincoln, with even a more studied observance of
the rights of the States. He was therefore among the very first to
manifest opposition to President Johnson and his policy, aggra
vated in his mind because it was a continuation of the policy
of Mr. Lincoln.

Before the close of the month of June, Senator Wade and
Thaddeus Stevens, acting in concert with Davis, and who, like
him, had been opposed to the renomination arid election of
Mr. Lincoln, repaired to Washington. Wade was much under

Lincoln and Johnson * 215

the Influence of the Baltimore Radical, whose genius he admired,
and between whom and himself there was coincidence of opinion
on most of the political questions of the period. Although acting
in concert, the mental structure of the two men was widely dif
ferent. Wade, rugged and less cultivated than Davis, had vastly
greater influence, for his rough and honest sincerity* thought
sometimes astray, begat confidence and respect* while proposi
tions originating in the scheming and intriguing mind of Davis
generally required indorsement. In allying himself to the Ohio
Senator Davis exhibited shrewdness, but the alliance was at the
expense of Wade, whose Presidential aspirations had, however,
begun to warp his judgment, which, with his violence against
President Lincoln and his measures, contributed to undermine
his standing and influence with the public.

Acting under an honest and friendly impulse, Wade was un
willing to surrender Johnson, whom he respected, and indulged
hopes that the President might be brought into the views of the
Radicals. But Davis, more shrewd and sagacious, and looking
much deeper into subjects and their results, as well as into the
character of individuals, had no such expectation. He therefore
paid no court to Johnson, whose principles and adamantine in
tegrity he knew were firmly fixed. For several days in June Wade
danced attendance on the President while holding converse with
Davis, Thaddeus Stevens, and others, and earnestly besought
him to convene Congress a step which was ardently pressed by
the Radicals from all quarters. It was made plain by their own
arguments that they wished Congress in session, not to promote
union, but to prevent it; not to conform to the great requirements
of the Constitution, but to disregard them; not to harmonize
public opinion, but to prolong hostile feelings.

Mr. Lincoln had fathomed and well understood these men
and their purposes, and hence under no circumstances would he
have convened Congress, where malevolent intrigues and factious
designs could be fostered and have effect. The centralizing,
usurping, unconstitutional purposes of the Radical leaders he
deprecated; and they, knowing his opposition to their ultra
schemes, had endeavored to prevent his nomination and re
election in 1864.

216 Civil War and Reconstruction

It began to be intimated by the leading Radicals, and was
soon given out by them that Henry Winter Davis would, In an
oration which he was to deliver on the 4th of July at Chicago,
enunciate the policy which the Federal Government must adopt,
and it was understood to be fundamentally different from that
which President Lincoln had initiated and President Johnson was
pursuing. Suffrage was to be given to the negroes by the Federal
Government; proscription was to be the doom of the rebel whites;
death was to be the fate of the State governments. Until there
was a radical reconstruction of the government, the people in
the States that had participated in the rebellion were to be
allowed no representation or any voice in the public councils,
whatever might be their claims under constitutional guarantees.
Emancipation of the blacks was not sufficient; the rebel whites
were to be subjugated and politically enslaved. Congress was to
take these subjects in hand, regardless of the Constitution; and if
President Johnson would not at once convene that body in
order to consummate these great ends, they were to receive im
mediate attention, at the regular session in December, from Wade,
Stevens, and their associates.

Senator Wade did not until the last moment relinquish the
hope that he could persuade President Johnson it was his duty
to assemble Congress forthwith, and consult that branch of the
Government on the subject of reconstruction and the resumption
of the national authority. In two or three interviews which he had
with me in the latter part of June, he admitted he was beginning
to be discouraged, and I could perceive he was quite desponding.
On one of these occasions I expressed my views freely, and stated
that I could not see what Congress had to do with the State
governments, unless they were anti-republican. The rebels had
laid down their arms and submitted to law and the results of
the war which had extinguished slavery; peace prevailed through
out the region which had been in insurrection; the pardoning
power was with the President; the States and the people of the
South had their rights under the Constitution; it was for the
best interest of the country that those rights should be recog
nized, and the broken relations of the communities speedily
mended, and the Union restored. No legislation on the part of

Lincoln and Johnson 217

the Federal Government was needed to secure this end; the
Executive and the people could accomplish it Each House of
Congress had the undoubted constitutional right and authority
to judge of the qualifications of its own members^to admit,
to refuse to admit, or to expel any one; but they possessed no
power to deprive any of the States of their rights, or to forbid
the people to frame, revise, and modify their Constitutions.

Senator Wade declared his unqualified dissent from these
views; complained that the Executive had the control of the
Government; that the other departments were subordinate and
powerless; said, on the whole, our form of government was a
failure; that there are not three distinct and independent depart
ments, but one great, absorbing, and controlling one, which had
two others as assistants.

Thaddeus Stevens, who with other Radicals had been in
consultation with Henry Winter Davis, called to see me on the
30th of June, and made some sarcastic hits at the President and
most of his Cabinet. He expressed his contempt for State rights;
and for any steps which would place the rebels on terms of
equality with loyal men, his indignation was unutterable. Only
boys, he said, ignorant of their duty, or men as incompetent as
boys, destitute of all statesmanship, could think of reestablishing
the rebel States, and admitting them and the rebels to participate
in the Government with the same rights as ourselves.

When I spoke of constitutional obligations, he said constitu
tional obstructions; they were impediments to progress. We had,
he averred, outgrown the garments made and put on in 1789.
They did not fit us. The men who manufactured the Constitu
tion had given us but a piece of patchwork at best. They did
not like it themselves in some respects, but it was the best they
could do under the then existing circumstances. They were very
good men, and wise for the times in which they lived. We, how
ever, belonged to a later age, a more advanced civilization, and
were blockheads if we could not improve on their work. One
of their mistakes had been almost fatal to us as a nation; had
brought upon us civil war. It was an absurdity for us to attempt
to go along, broken up into fifty different States or corporations;
we must be more compact, have a nationality, and get rid of the

218 Civil War and Recoestractkm

ridiculous theories and fanciful notions that we were thirty or
fifty different sovereignties.

John Slidell, the subtle and managing secessionist, had views
not dissimilar to Stevens of the Constitution, and as little
reverence for it and for popular government. Each considered the
Constitution an imperfect instrument, not adapted to the ex
panded limits, great resources, and power of the country, or to
the changes and advances which modem improvements had
made. Slidell maintained the right of any State to secede or with
draw from the Union. Stevens denied the right of secession, but
insisted that the central Government could expel or exclude any
State from the benefits of the Union or participation in the
government. If these extremes did not meet in their conclusions,
either scheme carried into effect would be subversive of the
Constitution; each was revolutionary.

The oration of Davis at Chicago proved to be what his party
associates had predicted it would be the radical programme of
the Republican party. It was a skilful, eloquent, and able exposi
tion of Radical intentions, and of the policy which the Govern
ment should in the view of his sect pursue. There must be no
attempt to conciliate differences, no reconciliation, no clemency;
the white people of the South were not to be treated as our
equals; the negro was to be elevated. The constitutions, govern
ments, and traditions of the States of the South were not to be
respected. The State governments were dead, and the people
there had no rights but such as the dominant party chose to
give them. He said:

The way to preserve the bond of peace is not by com
promise or concession, or by friendly proposals. Who does
not know that the negro is a man? State rights are re
sponsible to the bayonet. Those great organizations that
insolently lifted their arms in the front of battle against the
nation, where are they now? that Virginia, the Old Dominion,
etc. Pierpont was created her master at the bidding of na
tional necessity, and because the nation required that the
old government of Virginia should cease to exist. States are
. immortal, but State governments that are organized by men,
and may be used for selfish purposes, perverted to the pur-

Lincoln and Johnson 219

poses of treason to defy the Union, are, by the laws of the
United States, not immortal, but amenable to the laws as
men, and die by treason.

They have suffered, and suffered much, by the confisca
tion of their slaves; the next best punishment is to deprive
them of the rights of citizenship.

I am no enthusiast. I am very little of a philanthropist
I have no supreme love of the intellectual superiority of the
negro over the white, but I know his vote is important, and
if I have not much respect for justice and humanity, I have
for the five-twenties. I have great respect for the integrity
of the Government and the possibility of carrying on its
machinery, and if their Constitution does not give the mass
of negroes the right of voting on equal terms with the loyal
white man, the safety of the nation requires, republican prin
ciples require, that no such government shall be recognized
as republican in form, that no Representative or Senator
from such a State shall be admitted to either House, or even
complimented with the privilege of the floor. We need the
votes of all the colored people; it is numbers, not intelligence,
that counts at the ballot-box; it is right intention, not phi
losophic judgment, that casts the vote.

Let them (Congress) pass by their two-thirds majority,
in both Houses of Congress, an amendment of the Constitu
tion, securing forever the mass of the people as the basis of
the republican government of the United States, and submit
it, this very coming winter, before the Legislatures adjourn,
for their confirmation.

Such were some of the utterances of the ablest Radical leader
their oracle, and boldest and most skilful manager who placed
himself in antagonism to the peaceful, constitutional, and mag
nanimous policy of Presidents Lincoln and Johnson. Enfranchise
ment of the negroes, disfranchisement of the whites, death to
State governments and States rights, exclusion of the rebel States
from representation in the Senate, or of the people in the House,
amendment of the Constitution by snap judgment, etc., were
the Radical doctrines.

Most of that small combination of Radicals who concocted
the plan which Davis proclaimed at Chicago had been opposed

220 Civil War and Reconstruction

to the reelection of Mr. Lincoln, and were avowedly hostile to
his ideas of clemency, general amnesty, and a restoration of the
Union on the Federal basis of a political equality of the States.
Henry Winter Davis was the prime mover and actual leader of
this Radical combination, which in the summer of 1865 laid
down the chart that, by caucus machinery, guided and governed
that party in after years. He possessed intellectual vigor, culture,
grasp, and comprehension, which inspired and subordinated
Wade, and was endowed with physical as well as mental ability
and activity, that gave him advantages over Stevens, who had,
perhaps, as suggestive, fertile, and adroit a mind. Stevens, how
ever, was infirm from age, was deformed, and a cripple. Davis
moved on for a time, the pioneer of the Radicals in their war
upon the Administration. But this rising genius was stricken
down at the commencement of what he and his friends antici
pated was to be a brilliant and successful career. He died of
fever at Baltimore in December. His early death was severely
felt by his Radical associates, who resorted to extraordinary means
to embalm his memory and give strength to the political views he
had promulgated, and which became the text-book and guide
of his party.

Congress, when it assembled, passed resolutions of respect
for Abraham Lincoln, and measures were taken for an official
observance of the national bereavement. Mr. Stanton, Secretary
of War, was selected to pronounce a eulogy on the murdered
President But the Radical leaders, who were opposed to Presi
dent Lincoln and his policy, were determined the occasion should
not pass without a similar official Congressional demonstration
to their selected and brilliant leader, Henry Winter Davis, not
withstanding he died of fever In Baltimore, a private citizen.
He had been the master spirit, the leading Radical opponent
of the policy of the late and present Presidents; his followers,
having the control of Congress, resolved on an apotheosis to
Davis, and that the same official tokens of respect, the same
Congressional honors and observances which were rendered the
murdered Lincoln, should be awarded to the Radical, Davis.
Mr. Stanton, who respected Lincoln, but was nevertheless in
strong sympathy with the Radicals, became embarrassed by these

Lincoln and Johnson 221

intrigues, hesitated, and finally declined to deliver the euloghun
on the deceased President. George Bancroft, unconnected with
the Lincoln Administration, was selected as his substitute.

The eulogy on Mr. Lincoln was delivered in the hall of the
House of Representatives on the 12th of February, the anni
versary of his birth. Congress adjourned for that purpose.

J. A. J. Creswell, at that time a Senator from Maryland, now
Postmaster-General, was chosen to deliver an oration before the
Government and two Houses of Congress, in commemoration of
Davis, the Radical leader. The day selected for this singular and
unprecedented proceeding as regards a private citizen, who was
no public benefactor and had no public reputation save that
of a mere political partisan, was the 22d of February, the anni
versary of the birth of Washington. The solemnities and observ
ances were the same in form as for President Lincoln, to whose
policy he was opposed. The Representatives Hall, in the Capitol
of the nation, was the place of these obsequies. The hall was
draped with crape, flags, and all the insignia and emblems of
mourning that had been bestowed on the deceased President,
and no effort was spared by Congress to give this Radical leader
who was a private citizen of Baltimore the same official honor
and respect that were shown to the Chief Magistrate of the
nation, who had been assassinated while in the public service.

But few, comparatively, sympathized with the violent Radicals
at the beginning of their opposition to peaceable reconstruction.
Tired of "war and all its horrid cost/ its calamities and abuses,
devoted to the Union, and earnestly desiring reconciliation and
peace, the masses were, like Mr. Lincoln and his successor, for
conciliation and the restoration of friendly feelings. But the
expression of these sentiments subjected those Republicans who
uttered them to sneers and assaults from Radical partisans. The
men who advocated clemency, union, and peace, were denounced
as in alliance with Copperheads, as rebel sympathizers, not truly
loyal, men of unsound principles. In the party organizations and
elections they were stigmatized as traitors, disloyal or suspected
persons, who could not be trusted, and the Radicals of the party
declared they would not vote for such candidates. The conse
quence was that good and calm patriotic Republicans were pro-

222 Civil War and Reconstruction

scribed, and aspiring politicians of the Republican party feared
to exercise moderation or express Union opinions. Hate and
revenge toward the South became tests of political orthodoxy,
and in nearly every district in the North only such persons as
would vilify the President and denounce the South were selected
as candidates by the Republican party organizations.

The extreme men of the South were in some localities as
rash, unreasonable, and impracticable as the Radicals of the
North, and for a time gave the Administration scarcely less
embarrassment. War and defeat had not extinguished that super
cilious arrogance which they whimsically called "chivalry," and
had cherished for a generation. These pupils of nullification
hastened to press forward into prominent positions, State and
national, some of the most conspicuous and offensive rebels. It
was a feeble exhibition of the sense, or want of sense, of nullify
ing chivalry. The mild and generous policy of the Administra
tion they misconstrued and abused, and the old party feeling and
sectional animosity which had prevailed before the war were
revived, and received encouragement by lenity. Intimations and
suggestions that slavery would be established under another form,
that the blacks should be allowed no civil rights, that the rate
of wages should be regulated by law, that negroes should own
no real estate, and other as unjust and wrongful propositions,
were thrown out, and in some communities were sanctioned.
It was declared, moreover, that the South by a united representa
tion of secessionists in Congress, in alliance with the Democrats
of the North, would have a controlling majority, and that thus,
by party political action, they would achieve what they had been
unable to accomplish by arms, and in diis way the "Lost Cause"
would be eventually triumphant.

These indirect schemes and inconsiderate threats and pro
ceedings were just such materials to provoke the popular mind
as the Radicals desired, and they availed themselves of them with
effect Nor were the more violent Democrats those who were
stigmatized as Copperheads for a time wise and judicious in
many respects, but gave force to Radical schemes by boasting
that the Democratic party, by Southern aid, would soon be in
the ascendant. They openly admitted that they had more regard

Lincoln nnd Johnson 225

for the secessionists than for the Radicals, and would readily*
when they had opportunity, coalesce with them. IE some instance
repudiation of the war debt was threatened, so soon as they could
obtain power; and it was claimed by some that the rebel war
debt had equal merit with that of the Government. The spirit
of party, which, carried to excess, often undermines and destroys
the judgment, and incapacitates bodies of men from acting
wisely and well, stimulated the violent and rash Radicals, Seces
sionists, and Copperheads alike against the Administration. In
their zeal for party, the extremists were forgetful of country.
Faction fortified and strengthened itself at the expense of the
Constitution and good government.

There was but little difficulty on the part of the Radicals in
creating alarm and exciting the apprehensions of the Union men*
who had not yet recovered from the war feeling, nor had they
entirely overcome the resentment which the causeless rebellion
had provoked. Every hamlet, and almost every household,
mourned the loss of brave and devoted men, who had given their
lives to put down the rebellion and maintain the integrity of the
Union. The memory of the departed, and the recollection of
their own sacrifices and sufferings, were aroused by the appeals
and representations which the Radicals made of the danger of
a coalition between the Copperheads, who had been indifferent
to their calamities, and the Secessionists who had caused them.
Instead of denying or counteracting these representations, or
taking any measures to defeat their effects, many of the Demo
cratic presses and leaders, by their bold defiance, their boastful
claim of anticipated party ascendancy, and their threat that
there was to be a change and reversal of measures and policy,
contributed to strengthen the Radical movements.

Both extremes, North and South, by these ultra views, thwart
ed and embarrassed the Administration in its efforts to re-
establish the State governments and restore the Union; but they
were actuated by opposite motives. The South, discouraged, im
poverished, and subdued, was recovering from the delusions of
Quixotic chivalry, and beginning to revive and become hopeful,
and gradually gave its confidence to the President and his Ad
ministration. The North, under the vindictive and persecuting

224 Civil War and Reconstruction

teachings and influences of the Radicals, began to grow sus
picious of and ultimately hostile to the President whom they had
elected, and such of the Cabinet as had counselled and sustained
him and Mr. Lincoln. Through the summer and autumn the
conflicting elements were at work. The President, conscious of
right intentions, and with unabated confidence in the people,
labored incessantly, night and day, in the great work of pro
moting peace and reestablishing the government and the Union.
Admonitions of secret operations against him, made by such
of his friends as were aware of the intrigues at work, and
who foresaw and deprecated the gathering storm, were not
regarded. He who alone of all the Senators from the South
had denounced secession in the national Capitol as treason,
and its leaders as traitors; who had made such sacrifices to
resist secession; who had perilled and lost so much in the Union
cause; whose home had been made desolate; whose family had
been broken up; whose social and political associations and
friendships had been destroyed; whose children had fallen vic
tims of the war; who himself had been a refugee from his State
and an exile from his home for many years for his devotion to
the Union he would not permit himself to believe that any
considerable portion of his intelligent countrymen would allow
themselves to be persuaded that he was not faithful to the cause
with which he was identified, and in which he had suffered so
much. But with partisans these sacrifices, this sincerity, this
earnest devotion to the public good and the general welfare
were nothing. He reverenced the Constitution, respected indi
vidual and State rights, and would not knowingly trespass upon
either; while his Radical opponents, under real or affected
philanthropy, were disregardful of each. Claiming to be the
friends of the Union, they resisted every movement made and
every step taken to restore it, except upon terms unknown to the
Constitution, and on conditions which they should dictate. The
President was at first calumniated in whispered slanders, assailed
as a Southern man whose sympathies were with the secessionists,
or a Democrat who never had abandoned his original State-
rights principles; a false Republican; a traitor to the party
which elected him, and not to be politically trusted. Members

Lincoln and Johnson 225

of Congress, of the Radical type, were in active correspondence
during the entire vacation in secret defamation, sowing the seeds
of enmity among his friends and supporters.

Warned though he was, the President continued incredulous.
He hesitated, was disinclined to appoint Democrats to office,
and would not for months consent to the removal of Radicals,
however violent, unscrupulous, and malignant their opposition
to him. Yet the report was everywhere circulated among the
Republicans that he favored the Democrats, was appointing them
to office, or was going to; that he was exerting himself to under
mine and destroy the Republican party, and was using the patron
age of the Government for that purpose. This unjust, untruth
ful, ungenerous warfare was persistently carried on for months,
while he pursued the even tenor of his way, and steadily re
fused to adopt any retaliatory or even opposing measures. His
position was anomalous. He had no sympathy with the extremes
of either party, for he was neither a secessionist nor an exclu*
sionist. With him the Union of the States and the rights of the
States were living principles. He had, in 1861, resisted a dis
solution of the Union by secession, and became alienated from
his old political associates in consequence. In 1865 he denied
the right of the central Government to exercise imperial power
and exclude the erring States from rights which they had re
served and never surrendered rights recognized and guaranteed
by the Constitution and essential to our Federal system, and
thereby incurred the lasting resentment of the Radicals.

President Johnson, it must be remembered, entered upon his
duties as Chief Magistrate at a most critical and trying period,
and under the most extraordinary and calamitous circumstances
that ever befell a nation, or placed an individual at the head of
a government. The chief under whose benignant guidance the
war had been brought to a successful termination had been assas
sinated in the hour of triumph; the Union was divided in feel
ing, if not sundered in fact, by sectional animosity; the civil
service was deranged and embarrassed by Congressional innova
tions and assumptions; the concentrated hate of party bitterness,
fostered for years by ambitious leaders, was rife; the national
relations of one-third of the States and people to the Union were

226 Civil War and Reconstruction

broken or suspended; the civil, industrial, and social structure
of society in those States was overthrown; the contending armies
were about to be disbanded; and under his ministration, these
conflicting elements, which for four years had been arrayed in
hostility against each other, were to be reconciled, reunited, and
the people, if possible, be again made friends. With a conviction
that the responsibility of good government and the welfare of a
whole people were in a great measure upon him, he was not
long in coming to the conclusion that persecution would not
beget fraternal feeling, nor would oppression or arbitrary rule
conduce to union, harmony, and peace. It would not have been
surprising had there been lingering remains of resentment on his
part for causeless calamities which the country had experienced,
and which had fallen with peculiar severity upon himself and
family. But all personal resentments were by him soon dismissed,
if not forgotten, and kindness, forbearance, and tolerance were
substituted, and became the policy of his Administration, as it
had been the policy of his immediate predecessor. Elected with
Mr. Lincoln, he inherited and adopted his measures, and also the
Cabinet which had counselled and advised those measures. He
inherited also as a legacy the general demoralization that war
had introduced into the civil administration, by which members
of Congress usurped the constitutional prerogatives of the Execu
tive and dictated appointments. The tolerant and benevolent
policy which Mr. Lincoln initiated and Mr. Johnson adopted
toward the South, was opposed by the party which elected them.
The extreme men of that party assumed for the Government
imperial and arbitrary authority over the States and people of the
South, denied them equality of rights, and shut them out from
representation and many of their constitutional guarantees. Par
ties when in power often, and sometimes speedily, become
oblivious of the principles which gave them existence and success.
The Republican party had its origin in resistance to aggressions
by the Federal Government, which under Pierce and Buchanan
attempted to impose a constitution and obnoxious government
on the people of Kansas in opposition to their wishes and will.
But the same party in 1865, and subsequently, forgetful of its
professions and principles in the case of Kansas ten years before,

Lincoln and Johnson 227

did not scruple to disregard the popular will In each of the
Southern States, and insist on dictating to the people of each
in regard to their constitutions, and, in violation of the principles
of freedom and self-government, broke down their State govern
ments and placed them under central military control. It was
not sufficient that the people of those States modified their
constitutions and laws so as to conform to the results of the war;
their governments thus modified were overthrown, and the
President was denounced because he would not unite in these
anti-republican movements. With him the Union of the States
and the rights of the States based on popular sovereignty were
cardinal points. With his opponents, an imperial central gov
ernment, which should hold the States in subjection and allow
them no rights but such as Congress might grant, was the aim
and rule. The President recognized the States South and North
as equal in political rights, and the whole people as fellow-
citizens. His opponents denied these positions, refused to admit
the political equality of the States, and excluded both States and
people from the national legislature, where laws were enacted for
the whole country. It was the misfortune of President Johnson
and his Administration that those who elected him were so
diametrically opposed to him on those fundamental principles
which are the basis of our system, and it was probably an error
that he and his old political friends did not come to prompt
understanding, and unite to sustain and carry into effect those
principles wherein they agreed. Had that course been pursued
the Lincoln and Johnson plan of peaceful reconstruction and
resumption of national authority might have been successful,
and military domination avoided.

The time has not arrived perhaps for a full and impartial
history of all the events of that period, when the principle of
voluntary secession had just been suppressed by war, and the
principle of central imperial exclusion from the National Council
was being inaugurated by the victors.

s

The History of Emancipation

The problem of slavery was one of the most difficult
issues facing the Lincoln administration. How the Presi
dent, in spite of his conservatism, came to the conclusion
that emancipation in the insurgent states was essential
constitutes the main theme of Welles s account. The
article s most interesting portions reveal the Cabinet s
reactions to Lincoln s announced decision to issue an
emancipation proclamation.

I HE

treatment and disposition of slaves who were captured,
or who came within the lines of the Union armies, were in the
early days of the war perplexing questions, and contributed to
embarrass the Government and confuse individuals. By the Con
stitution, from which the Administration derived its authority,
the institution of slavery was recognized, and the right of property
in slaves, secured by the local law, was protected. Neither the
President nor any member of the Cabinet was disposed to inter
fere with the institution of slavery, or believed the Government
could legally interfere. Mr. Lincoln had declared previous to his
election, and reiterated at his inauguration "I have no purpose,
directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery
in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do
so, and I have no inclination to do so." Notwithstanding all this,
he was denounced as an abolitionist, and it was persistently
maintained that it was his purpose and the purpose of his Ad
ministration to set free the slaves. The members of the Adminis
tration, though selected from the old opposing traditional parties,

The Galaxy, XIV (December, 1872).
228

The History of Emancipation 229

were, like the President, for preserving inviolable the constitu
tional compact in regard to slavery. In the controversy which
followed the acquisition of territory from Mexico and the settle
ment and organization of Kansas, they had been united in
affirming the nationality of freedom and opposing the extension
of slavery into the territories. Slavery being the creature of local,
not of national law, the President and the members of the
Cabinet, though of different party antecedents, had each, in the
Presidential elections of 1856 and 1860, advocated the policy of
strict construction and of limiting human servitude to the States
which authorized its existence. They denied that the Federal
Government was empowered to transplant or establish slavery in
the territories where it had no existence, but insisted that it was,
and must remain, the creature of local municipal laws. This
policy of non-actionrefusal to assume ungranted power, or to
exercise jurisdiction in behalf of slavery beyond the boundaries of
the States, except that of returning slaves to their owners under
the constitutional provision was the extent of the abolitionism
of the President and Cabinet; yet this policy of non-action and of
strict construction was made the basis of disaffection and civil
war. Soon after hostilities commenced fugitives from servitude
began to come to Washington, and appeared on the decks of
our vessels and within the lines of the Union armies. For a time
the owners secessionists as well as Union men reclaimed their
slaves under the laws and Constitution; and in many instances
the fugitives were surrendered by the military commanders to
their rebel masters, who invoked for this species of property the
assistance and protection of the laws and the very government
which they and their associates repudiated and defied. What, it
began to be asked, is the status what are the rights of these men
who spurn the Constitution and are making war upon the Gov
ernment? If they have thrown off their allegiance and refuse to
acknowledge any obligation to the Government if they are not
citizens of the United States, as they affirm they are not, but are
alien enemies what right have they to appeal to the laws of the
United States, and demand that the bondsmen who have left them
and sought freedom under the flag shall be returned to their
rebel masters and the rebel governments and to bondage? Could

230 Civil War and Reconstruction

the Administration allow itself to consider and treat these slave
owners as alien enemies? Could the Government admit that
secession was so far an accomplished fact as to place those who
resided within the limits of a rebel State beyond the pale of the
laws which ordered slaves to be restored to their owners? If they
owed allegiance to the Government, as they undoubtedly did,
was it not the duty of the Government to protect them in person
and property?

Application from commanders on duty soon began to reach
the War and Navy Departments, asking for instructions how to
proceed, and what to do with the fugitive slaves who fled to us
and asked protection. This, in the early days of the insurrection,
was a difficult problem, and in the new and singular state of
affairs, for which no legal provision had been made, did not
receive final formal decision from the Government. The Secre
taries of War and the Navy, in the absence of distinct action by
the Administration, were compelled to take the responsibility
of giving such instructions to the officers as in their judgment
was best for the public welfare. Every movement of the Executive
was watched and scanned by opposing factions in the free States
as earnestly as in the slave States. One party insisted that the
President was tender toward the slave-owners; the other de
clared it to be his purpose to oppress and rob them; while his
wish and intention were to obey the laws, administer them justly,
protect individuals, observe State and federal as well as personal
rights, and maintain the Union at all hazards and at any sacri
fice. Neither the Secretary of War nor the Secretary of the Navy
shrank from the responsibility of meeting and disposing of this
difficult subject, so far as it devolved on them. In the conflict
of authorities between the States and the General Government,
the consequent quasi suspension of the laws, and the unsettled
condition of affairs, no more was put upon paper than was
necessary. Verbal instructions were given to the commanders not
to entice slaves to come to them, but to receive, feed, and employ
such as fled from any States which had passed a secession ordi
nance and was by force resisting the Government. Slaves from the
non-seceding slave States who came to our vessels or navy-yards
were restored to the owners who reclaimed them pursuant to

The History of Emancipation 231

law. In some instances, where fugitives had deserted loyal
owners in Virginia and were retained by us, and in others where
they had fled from violent and outspoken rebels in Maryland,
but were surrendered, this rule operated harshly. There seemed,
however, for the time, no alternative. The action of the States
respectively controlled the action of the departments in these
cases. Those States which, by their legislatures and conventions,
had assumed the right and undertaken to dissolve their con
nection with the Government, to secede from the Union, and
were resisting by armed force the national authority, were not
entitled, while in arms against the Government, to claim its
assistance to subjugate and deprive persons, black or white, of
their freedom. But slaveholders residing in non-seceding States,
although themselves in sympathy and opinion with the seces-
sionists, yet had committed no overt act, were under the aegis
of the Federal Constitution, protected by the laws, and secure
in their rights. There were some hard and afflictive cases un
der this ruling, when slaves were sent back to servitude tinder
cruel and really disloyal masters on one side of the Potomac in
Maryland, while the owners on the opposite side of the river in
Virginia, though loyal to the Union, lost their slave property.
There was sympathy for the sufferers in each case, and anathemas
and wrathful indignation against the Government in both for
its alleged severity, inhumanity, and injustice. Not only the
opponents of the Administration, but many of its friends and
supporters, who took only a superficial view of the subject,
joined in these denunciations.

Every step taken by the Navy Department on this question,
its instructions, and its policy, were reported to the President,
who approved of them without reserve, modification, or qualifi
cation. The course of the Secretary of War was very similar,
though then and when making up his annual report a few
months later he was more demonstrative, and took advanced
positions on the slavery question, which, if such were the fixed
and determined policy of the Administration, might have been
more appropriately enunciated by the President than by one
of the departments. The officers of the navy conformed to the
instructions and views of the Navy Department, and with, I

232 Civil War and Reconstruction

believe, a single exception, returned no slaves to their previous
owners in the rebel States. None were repelled who came on board
our ships or sought protection under the flag. In the armies
there were widely differing views and practice. Some of the
generals, looking to the laws and not to the Executive or depart
ment for authority, were for excluding slaves from the Union
lines, and if they came, for delivering them up to their rebel
masters, using in some instances Union soldiers for that purpose.
Others, taking a different view and going to greater length than
their instructions would warrant, invited the slaves to their
standard and proclaimed freedom to all who came or were
within their departments. The orders and assumptions of some of
the military commanders caused uneasiness, and in several in
stances rendered necessary counter and annulling orders by the
President. It was evident to most of the dispassionate and clear
minds of the country that the secessionists had by their own acts
struck a fatal blow to the institution of slavery, yet the country
was not fully prepared to pronounce freedom to all slaves. The
orders of such officers as Generals McClellan, Halleck, Dix,
and others, prohibiting the fugitives from coming within the
army lines, caused great dissatisfaction in the North without
appeasing any at the South.

As late as the 19th of May, 1862, the President by proclama
tion annulled a document of General Hunter, proclaiming free
dom to the slaves of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. In
that proclamation the President said: "I further make known
that whether it be competent for me as Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and Navy to declare the slaves of any State or States
free, and whether at any time, in any case, it shall have become a
necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the government
to exercise such supposed power, are questions which under my
responsibility I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feel justi
fied in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field."

For more than a year this annoying and preplexing question
had on the frontier or border States, on the Gulf of Mexico, on
the Atlantic coast, and on the Potomac, embarrassed the Ad
ministration. The shield which, by the compromises of the Con
stitution and the laws of the country, was thrown over the in-

The History of Emancipation 233

stitution of slavery, and the property rights of the slave owners*
were respected by the Administration long after it was known
that the rebels were directly and indirectly employing their
slaves in the war against the Government, But as the war pro
gressed the anti-slavery feeling increased. There was a reluctance,
however, on the part of the Government to adopt measures^
even under the reverses of war, which conflicted with the com*
promises of the Constitution. The President seemed more averse
than Congress, where party feeling prevailed notwithstanding
the war, to touch this delicate question. Much has been justly
said and written on his philanthropic and humanitarian feelings,
and it is asserted that his benevolence prompted the proclamation
of emancipation. He had the kind and generous nature imputed
to him, but in his official relations and in issuing the proclama
tion of freedom he was governed, not by sympathy for the slave,
but by a sense of duty, and the obligations which as Chief
Magistrate he owed to his country.

To conciliate and retain the border States, torn by intestine
factions, in their rightful position, required for a period all the
skill, tact, and ability of the President, aided by the best minds
and talents of the country. No means had been left unem
ployed by the rebel leaders to detach these States from the
Union, and the slavery element, in which they had a com
mon interest with the rebels, was the instrumentality on
which they chiefly relied to effect a separation. Hatred of
the abolitionists and the radical portion of the Republican party
was as intense in the border States as further South; but a
majority of the people in that belt of States were patriotic and
loved the Union, to which they dung with a devotion unsur
passed in any section. They had, moreover, a growing confidence
in the President, and in their great trouble they looked to him,
who was overwhelmed with the calamities of the nation and
people he had been elected to govern and was striving to recon
cile, for support and protection. Step by step, yet with hesitation,
Congress ventured, as hostilities were prolonged and increased,
to take measures restrictive of the disturbing element which
originated and aggravated the war. Each and every movement was
resisted by the opponents of the Administration, and on each its

234 Civil War and Reconstruction

friends were divided; but by degrees, though gradual, the posi
tive element made advances. Congress delayed, however, to go
to the root of the difficulty, and strike for general emancipation.

Convinced that the disturbing cause of our national diffi
culties must be removed in order to restore and perpetuate unity,
the President conceived the idea of compensated, prospective
emancipation, and for a time fostered the scheme of a voluntary
movement by the border States. A part of this scheme was a
plan for the deportation of the colored race; for Mr. Lincoln had
a belief, amounting almost to conviction, that the two races
could not long dwell together in unity and as equals in their
social relations. There was, he thought, a natural antagonism
between the whites and blacks which could not and ought not
to be overcome. He therefore, at an early period of his adminis
tration, some time before his emancipation proclamation was
projected, devised plans for the deportation and colonizing of
the colored population, and especially of slaves who might thence
forward receive their freedom. In these various projects of de
portation and colonization he was earnestly sustained by the
Attorney-General, Mr. Bates, the Postmaster-General, Mr. Blair,
and the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Caleb Smith; but each and
every device, and especially the Thompson proposition for a
colony at Chiriqui, and the Senator Pomeroy scheme to trans
plant our negroes to Central America or the West Indies, proved
signal failures.

Although there was little doubt after war commenced that
chattel slavery was doomed, there was much doubt and un
certainty when and in what manner its total extinction was to
be brought about. Men and parties paused when they approached
the subject of setting free the laboring millions of the South, a
movement fraught with consequences, immediate and remote,
such as human foresight could not penetrate. The executive and
legislative authorities hesitated to strike the first effective blow,
yet each seconded and sustained the propositions, and advances
of the other. The President, practical, sagacious, and shrewd,
suggested that the border States, in view of the impending and
certain fate of slavery, should avail themselves of an opportunity
to set free their bondsmen, and that they should receive pecuniary

The History of Emancipation 235

compensation for the act Were they to take the initiative m
emancipation, which they as distinct commonwealths, having
each within itself entire and absolute control of the subject,
could do, it would relieve the Government, which was engaged In
a life struggle with the rebels in the cotton and rice growing
region, of serious embarrassment in dealing with a question that
was not national, but had been expressly reserved to the States.
It would be the beginning of a movement that would sweep the
whole South, and end in general emancipation. He therefore on
the 6th of March, 1862, addressed a message to Congress, recom
mending that "the United States ought to cooperate with any
State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving
to such State pecuniary aid," etc.

In a conference which he invited with the border State dele
gations a few days later the 10th of March-he explained more
in detail his views; but his policy of voluntary emancipation did
not meet a favorable response. Congress, however, expressed its
concurrence in the project, but did not make the necessary con
tingent appropriation, which would have encouraged and justi
fied the authorities of any State that might entertain the proposi
tion.

The policy of voluntary emancipation by the States was per-
severingly pressed for some months; but not succeeding, that
of general emancipation began to be entertained, though not
until after fifteen months of active hostilities, during which the
Government exercised extraordinary forbearance, and every
effort to induce State action was a failure. In July, after the
reverses before Richmond, the President visited the army at
Harrison s Landing. From his observances in that visit he be
came convinced that the war must be prosecuted with more
vigor, and that some decisive measures were necessary on the
slavery question, not only to reconcile public sentiment and to
consolidate and make uniform military action, but to bring the
slave element to our aid instead of having it turned against us.
Some of the generals assumed that they should be governed by
the laws and not by military necessity and executive orders; and
there was a belief, hardly a design perhaps, among a few of their
indiscreet partisans, that these generals, better than the Ad-

236 Civil War and Reconstruction

ministration, could prescribe the course of governmental action.

General McClellan, popular with the army, which was com
posed of citizens who were voters and a political power in this
respect, flattered himself and was persuaded by others that he,
though not always consistent, could mark out a course of civil
administration that would be acceptable to the whole country.
In a letter of the 7th of July, 1862, written at Harrison s Landing,
he proffered to President Lincoln much unasked-for political
advice, some of which, if sound in principle, was extraordinary
in its language and almost mandatory in its terms. Among other
things he informed the President that "military government
should be confined to the preservation of public order and the
protection of political rights. Military power should not be al
lowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by sup
porting or impairing the authority of the master, except for
repressing disorder as in other cases. Slaves, contraband under
the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive
it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to
its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the
right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recog
nized."

That singular letter from the General at the head of the
armies to the Chief Magistrate under whom he served struck the
President painfully, but he was not insensible to any valuable
salutary suggestions that were made by the military commander
whom he had most trusted. The reverses before Richmond un
doubtedly hastened the movement of emancipation. Until those
disasters, the President had hoped the rebellion would be sup
pressed without disturbing the compromises of the Constitution,
or requiring Federal action on a subject which was expressly
reserved to the States. Returning from the headquarters of the
army, which he visited on the 8th of July, and grieved with what
he had witnessed, he resolved to make one more earnest effort
with the delegations from the border States to initiate a policy of
voluntary emancipation by those States. He prepared a carefully
written speech on board the steamer before he reached Washing
ton, which he read to the border State representatives in a con
ference which he invited at the executive mansion on Saturday,

The History of Emancipation 237

the 12th o July. As had been the case with all the movements
which he made in that direction, he received little encouragement
at this interview, though the plan was for their benefit and the
substantial interest of the whole country. The discussion, though
harmonious and frank, gave him little or no hope of success, and
its unpromising aspect greatly depressed him. The delegations
were to give him their answer soon, but the debate left Mm in
no doubt of its character, and he felt the necessity of adopting
a different policy.

On Sunday, the 13th of July, the day following this last hope
less interview, the President invited Mr. Seward and myself to
accompany him in his carriage to the funeral of an infant child
of Secretary Stanton. At that time Mr. Stanton occupied for a
summer residence the house of a naval officer, some two or three
miles west or northwest of Georgetown. It was on this occasion
and this ride that he first mentioned to Mr. Seward and myself
that he had about come to the conclusion that, if the rebels per
sisted in their war upon the Government, it would be a necessity
and a duty on our part to liberate their slaves. He was convinced,
he said, that we could not carry on a successful war by longer
pursuing a temporizing and forbearing policy toward those who
disregarded law and Constitution, and were striving by every
means to break up the Union. Decisive and extreme measures
must be adopted. His reluctance to meddle with this question,
around which there were thrown constitutional safeguards, and
on which the whole Southern mind was sensitive, was great He
had tried various expedients to escape issuing an executive order
emancipating the slaves, the last and only alternative, but it was
forced upon him by the rebels themselves. He saw no escape.
Turn which way he would, this disturbing element which
caused the war rose up against us, and it was an insuperable
obstacle to peace. He had entertained hopes that the border
States, in view of what appeared to him inevitable if the war
continued, would consent to some plan of prospective and com
pensated emancipation; but all his suggestions, some made as
early as March, met with disfavor, although actual hostilities had
then existed for a year. Congress was now about adjourning, and
had done nothing final and conclusive perhaps could do nothing

238 Civil War and Reconstruction

on this question. He had since his return from the army the
last week called the members of Congress from the border States
together, and presented to them the difficulties which he en
countered, in hopes they would be persuaded, in the gloomy
condition of affairs, to take the initiative step toward eman
cipation; but they hesitated, and he apprehended would do
nothing. Attached as most of them and a large majority of their
constituents were to what they called their labor system, they
felt it would be unjust for the Government which they supported
to compel them to abandon that system, while the States in
flagrant rebellion retained their slaves and were spared the
sacrifice. A movement toward emancipation in the border States
while slavery was recognized and permitted in the rebel States
would, they believed, detach many from the Union cause and
strengthen the insurrection. There was, he presumed, some
foundation for their apprehension. What had been done and
what he had heard satisfied him that a change of policy in the
conduct of the war was necessary, and that emancipation of the
slaves in the rebel States must precede that in the border States.
The blow must fall first and foremost on them. Slavery was
doomed. This war, brought upon the country by the slave-owners,
would extinguish slavery, but the border States could not be
induced to lead in that measure. They would not consent to be
convinced or persuaded to take the first step. Forced emancipation
in the States which continued to resist the Government would of
course be followed by voluntary emancipation in the loyal States,
with the aid we might give them. Further efforts with the border
States would, he thought, be useless. That was not the road to
lead us out of this difficulty. We must take a different path. We
wanted the army to strike more vigorous blows. The Administra
tion must set the army an example, and strike at the heart of
the rebellion. The country, he thought, was prepared for it. The
army would be with us. War had removed constitutional obliga
tions and restrictions with the declared rebel communities. The
law required us to return the fugitives who escaped to us. This
we could and must do with friends, but not with enemies. We
invited all, bond and free, to desert those who were in flagrant

The History of Emancipation 259

war upon the Union and come to us; and uniting with us they
must be made free from rebel authorities and rebel masters.

If there was no constitutional authority in the Government to
emancipate the slaves, neither was there any authority, specified
or reserved, for the slaveholders to resist the Government or
secede from it. They could not at the same time throw off the
Constitution and invoke its aid. Having made war upon the
Government, they were subject to the incidents and calamities
of war, and it was our duty to avail ourselves of every necessary
measure to maintain the Union. If the rebels did not cease their
war, they must take the consequences of war. He dwelt earnestly
on the gravity, importance, and delicacy of the movement, which
he had approached with reluctance, but he saw no evidence of a
cessation of hostilities; said he had given the subject much
thought, and had about come to the conclusion that it was a
military necessity, absolutely essential to the preservation of the
Union. We must free the slaves or be ourselves subdued. The
slaves were undeniably an element of strength to those who had
their service, and we must decide whether that element should be
with us or against us. For a long time the subject had lain
heavy on his mind. His interview with the representatives of the
border States had forced him slowly but he believed correctly to
this conclusion, and this present opportunity was the first oc
casion he had had of mentioning to any one his convictions of
what in his opinion must be our course. He wished us to state
frankly, not immediately, how the proposition of emancipation
struck us, in case of the continued persistent resistance to Federal
authority.

Mr. Seward remarked that the subject involved consequences
so vast and momentous, legal and political, he should wish to
bestow on it mature reflection before advising or giving a decisive
answer; but his present opinion inclined to the measure as justi
fiable, and perhaps he might say expedient and necessary. These
were essentially my views, more matured perhaps, for I had
practically been dealing with slavery from the beginning as a
wrecked institution. During that ride the subject was the absorb
ing theme, and before separating the President requested us to

240 Civil War and Reconstruction

give it early, especial, and deliberate consideration, for he was
earnest in the conviction that the time had arrived when decisive
action must be taken; that the Government could not be justitfied
in any longer postponing it; that it was forced upon him as a
necessity it was thrust at him from various quarters; it occupied
his mind and thoughts day and night. He repeated he had about
come to a conclusion, driven home to him by the conference of
the preceding day, but wished to know our views and hear any
suggestions either of us might make.

This was a new departure for the President. Until that Sun
day, in all our previous intercourse, whenever the subject of
emancipation or interference with slavery in the States, in any
way or form, had been alluded to, he had been prompt and
emphatic in disclaiming and disavowing any authority or right
on the part of the General Government to move in it; he had been
reluctant to treat the rising at the South otherwise than as an
insurrection. In one or two conversations that followed within
a few days, it was said that if the Southern States and people were
within the pale of the Constitution, and had not absolved their
connection with and obligations to it, and disavowed and resisted
the laws and constituted authorities, they were entitled to all
its guarantees. But it was known to the whole world that there
was a war of more than a year s duration, which was being prose
cuted with constantly increasing bitterness against the Govern
ment; that there was a denial and defiance of national authority
by the States in rebellion, which had placed them in the attitude
of belligerentspublic enemies; that they must be treated as such,
and abide the consequences of their own acts. If they possessed
full, absolute, inherent original sovereignty, or could resume it,
as they asserted they had done by their acts of secession, and be
come aliens, foreigners to the United States, it was not for them
to claim protection and aid from the Government which they
repudiated, for the continued enslavement of an unfortunate
race. They and their sympathizing friends and abettors could not
insist that what was a chief element of strength to them and of
injury to the Union should be shielded and secured to them by
the Constitution and the government which they, as enemies,
sought to destroy. So long as the slave States, or any of them,

The History of Emancipation 241

acknowledged the supremacy of die Constitution and adherence
to the Government and the Union, to them was the Inviolability
of slavery secured and observed. The President and every member
of the Cabinet considered it and treated it as a local domestic
subject, the creation of municipal, not national law, appertaining
to the States exclusively and respectively, and that they had never
parted with, but reserved their authority over It.

The reverses before Richmond, and the formidable power and
dimensions of the insurrection, which extended through all the
slave States, and had combined most of them in a confederacy or
league to disolve the Union, impelled the Administration to
adopt extraordinary measures, and to exercise all Its power to
preserve the national existence. The slaves, if not to any con
siderable extent armed and disciplined as soldiers, were In the
service of those who were soldiers, engaged as field laborers,
producers, and domestic servants, and thousands of them were In
camp attending upon the armies in the field, employed as
waiters, and In the construction of fortifications and intrench-
ments for those whose avowed object was the overthrow of the
government and the dissolution of the Union.

Early in August it has been said on Saturday, and if so it
was, I think, the 2d of that month the President called a special
meeting of the Cabinet. The meeting was In the library of the
executive mansion, and not in the council chamber, where the
regular sessions were usually convened. All were present except
Mr. Blair, who had gone to his country residence In Montgomery
county. If I am not mistaken, Mr. Chase was also from some
cause absent from this first meeting. The President stated that the
object for which he had called us together was to submit the
rough draft of a proclamation to emancipate, altar a certain day,
all slaves in the States which should then be in rebellion. There
were, he remarked, differences in the Cabinet on -the slavery
question, and on emancipation, but he Invited free discussion on
the Important step he was about to take; and to relieve each one
from embarrassment, he wished it understood that the question
was settled in his own mind; that he had decreed emancipation
in a certain contingency, and the responsibility of the measure
was his; but he desired to hear the views of his associates and

242 Civil War and ReconstaioticMi

receive any suggestions, pro or con, which they might make. He
had, he said, dwelt much and long on the subject, and formed
his own conclusions, and had mentioned the matter in confi
dence to one or two of the members. Little was said by any one
but the President. Mr. Bates expressed his very decided approval,
but wished deportation to be coupled with emancipation. He
was, it was well known, opposed to slavery. Though born in a
slave State, and always residing in a slave State and among
slaves, he nevertheless wished them free, and that the colored
race should leave the country. It was impossible, he said, for the
two races to assimilate but by amalgamation, and they could not
amalgamate without degradation and demoralization to the
white race. The whites might be brought down, but the negroes
could not be lifted to a much higher plane than they now oc
cupied. He had been a close observer of the influence of slavery
on the enterprise and welfare of the country through a long
life, had deplored its effects, and himself had given freedom to
his own slaves, and wished them and their fellows in Africa, or
elsewhere than in the United States. He was fully convinced that
the two races could not live and thrive in social proximity. The
result of any attempt to place them on terms of equality would
be strife, contention, and a vicious population, as in Mexico.
The whites might be debased, but the blacks could not be ele
vated, even by the disgusting process of mixed breeds, which
was repugnant to nature and to our moral and better instincts.
He therefore wished a system of deportation to accompany any
scheme of emancipation. These were also the President s views.
Mr. Seward, without expressing an opinion on the merits of
the question, thought it would be well to postpone the whole
subject to a more auspicious period. If the proclamation were
issued now, it would be received and considered as a despairing
cry a shriek from and for the Administration, rather than for
freedom. The President instantly felt and appreciated the force
and propriety of the suggestion. We had experienced serious dis
asters. Important results were in the immediate future; high
hopes were entertained from army operations under Halleck and
Pope, who had just taken the direction of military affairs. The
President at once closed his portfolio and suspended his proda-

The History of Emancipation 243

mation and all further proceedings on the subject of emancipa
tion, I do not recollect that it was again alluded to in Cabinet
until after the battle of Antietam, which took place on the 17th
of September six weeks later.

The disasters of the army under McClellan were not re
trieved by Pope and Halleck. Dark and heavy clouds hung over
the country, and the civil service was depressed in consequence
of military reverses. But the spirit of the people against what they
deemed the inciting cause of hostilities became more aggravated
and intense by the military failures, and the demand for freedom
to the slaves, which had been increasing for months, came thick
and fast and from various quarters upon the Administration.
Among others who were impatient under what they considered
the inexcusable neglect and inaction of the President was Horace
Greeley, the editor of one of the widest circulated and most in
fluential journals in the country. Uninformed, like others, of
the purposes and contemplated movements of the Government,
but filled with patriotic fervor, such as a year previous had led
him and men like him, possessed of more zeal than military
knowledge, to insist that the army should, while not duly pre
pared, move on to Richmond, he now, on the 19th of August,
addressed a letter, earnest but dictatorial in tone, to the Presi
dent, admonishing him of public sentiment and of his duty.
This letter was not sent through the mail as a friendly epistle,
with the friendly suggestions and advice of a friend, but for some
reason, good or bad, was published in the "New York Tribune/
The effect of this publication on the ardent and unreasoning
fanatical mind was to increase discontent towards the Adminis
tration. This, however, was cooled and counteracted almost im
mediately by the calm, deliberate, and statesmanlike answer of
the President. This reply, on the 22d of August, discloses the
real views and principles by which the President was governed
better than any other. He said: __

The sooner the national authority can be restored, the
nearer the Union will be the Union as it was.

If there be those who would not save the Union unless
they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with
them.

244 Civil War and Reconstruction

If there be those who would not save the Union unless
they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree
with them.

My paramount object is to save the Union, and not
either to save or to destroy slavery.

If I could save the Union without freeing any slave,
I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves,
I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and
leaving others alone, I would also do that.

What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do
because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I
forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help
to save the Union.

I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing
hurts the cause, and shall do more whenever I believe doing
more will help the cause.

In these brief paragraphs will be found the controlling mo
tives, principles, and purpose of the President the true key to
his official actions on this subject. He was Chief Magistrate, to
maintain, preserve, and so far as in him lay to perpetuate the
Union. Slavery or emancipation was a secondary consideration,
a mere incident to that great object. He did not and could not
inform the distinguished journalist who took upon himself to be
his mentor that there was in his portfolio a proclamation of
emancipation, prepared in obedience to the national necessities,
but which, for public considerations was temporarily suspended.
Yet such was the fact. His sympathies were as great and his phi
lanthropy as broad and deep as those of any one who appealed
to him; but his legal and constitutional obligations were para
mount. He proved himself a statesman. Many blamed him for
inaction in the cause of freedom then, as subserviency to the
slave oligarchy. Many have extolled his decree of emancipation
since, as the kindly prompting of a generous nature. It was
neither, but a sense of duty his honest conviction, acting un
der the highest responsibility that was ever devolved on a Chief
Magistrate which controlled him when the impulsive were rest
less and the benevolent impatient. The proclamations of eman
cipation were not the offspring of mere humanitarianism, as

The History of Emancipation 245

many of the superficial and thoughtless suppose, but of the
highest and noblest statesmanship. Fidelity to the Union and
to the Constitution, both of which were imperilled In that dark
and gloomy period of the great struggle, influenced and con
trolled him. He was President to preserve the Union, not to
destroy it, or to permit it to be destroyed; to observe the com
promises and ordinances of the fundamental law, not to over
throw or discard them. It was no part of his duty or trust, what
ever might be his individual sympathy, to interfere with or
molest the institutions and laws of the States, or to trespass on
their reserved rights, so long as they observed and respected
Federal rights; but he could omit no legitimate duty to remove
any obstacle which endangered the national existence. Certain
States made war upon the Government in behalf of slavery, and
were availing themselves of the slave element to dissolve the
Union. He had Federal rights to maintain while observing the
rights of the States.

Individuals and public meetings appealed to him in behalf
of emancipation more earnestly as our military disasters increased.
The Rev. Dr. Patton of Chicago, at the head of a deputation
from the clergymen of northern Illinois, called on me on the
13th of September and requested an introduction of himself
and his associates to the President, in order to urge upon him
more active and decided measures in the cause of freedom. The
President expressed his willingness to receive them, and after
listening to their memorial he stated some of the difficulties which
embarrassed him, but assured them he had not decided against
proclaiming liberty to the slaves. He held the subject under
advisement; it was on his mind by day and by night, more than
any other. Whatever should appear to be God s will he would do.

A special Cabinet meeting was convened on Saturday, the
20th of September, when the preliminary proclamation for eman
cipation was again submitted. In bringing it forward on this
occasion the President remarked that, though suspended for
several weeks, the subject had never been lost sight of. He had
in the mean time made a few verbal alterations, without chang
ing the character of the paper, which he thought and which
undoubtedly were improvements. All listened with profound

246 Civil War and Reconstruction

attention to the reading, and it was, I believe, assented to by
every member. Mr. Bates repeated the opinions he had pre
viously expressed in regard to the deportation of the colored
race. Mr. Seward proposed two slight verbal alterations, which
were adopted. A general discussion then took place, covering
the whole groundthe constitutional question the war power
the expediency and the effect of the movement. After the matter
had been very fully debated, Mr. Stanton made a very emphatic
speech sustaining the measure, and in closing said the act was
so important, and involved consequences so vast, that he hoped
each member would give distinctly and unequivocally his own
individual opinion, whatever that opinion might be. Two gentle
men he thought had not been sufficiently explicit, although they
had discussed the question freely, and it was understood that
they concurred in the measure. He referred, he said to the Secre
tary of the Treasury and (hesitating a moment) the Secretary
of the Navy. It was understood, I believe, by all present, that he
had allusion to another member, with whom he was not in full
accord.

Mr. Chase admitted that the subject had come upon him un
expectedly and with some surprise. It was a step further than
he had ever proposed, but he was prepared to accept and support
it. He was glad the President had made this advance, which he
should sustain from his heart, and he proceeded to make an
able impromptu argument in its favor.

I stated that the President did not misunderstand my position,
nor any other member; that I assented most unequivocally to the
measure as a war necessity, and had acted upon it.

Mr. Blair took occasion to say that he was an emancipationist
from principle; that he had for years, here and in Missouri,
where he formerly resided, openly advocated it, but he had
doubts of the expediency of this executive action at this par
ticular juncture. We ought not, he thought, to put in jeopardy
the patriotic element in the border States, already severely tried.
This proclamation would, as soon as it reached them, be likely
to carry over those States to the secessionists. There were also
party men in the free States who were striving to revive old
party lines and distinctions, into whose hand we were putting a

The History of Emancipation 247

club to be used against us. The measure he approved, but the
time was inopportune. He should wish, therefore, to file his
objections.

This, the President said, Mr. Blair could do. He had, however,
considered the danger to be apprehended from the first objection
mentioned, which was undoubtedly serious, but the difficulty
was as great not to act as to act. There were two sides to that
question. For months he had labored to get those States to move
in this matter, convinced in his own mind that it was their true
interest to do so, but his labors were vain. We must make the
forward movement. They would acquiesce, if not immediately,
soon; for they must be satisfied that slavery had received its
death-blow from slave-ownersit could not survive the rebellion.
As regarded the other objection, it had not much weight with
him; their clubs would be used against us, take what course we
might.

The question of power in the Government to act authority
to set free the slaves in the rebel States was not, in this war
for the Union, controverted or doubted by any member of the
Administration. It was suggested by some that preliminary legis
lation would be advisable before a decisive step was taken by
the Executive; but it was answered, Congress was clothed with no
authority on the subject, nor was the Executive, save under the
war power military necessity martial law where there could be
no legislation. Congress had, however, taken some action, indi
cating the sentiments of that body and the country.

Before reading the proclamation the President again said he
felt the great responsibility of the step he was taking, both to
himself and the country. It had oppressed him, and not until
all other measures and expedients failed had he come to the
conclusion that this element, which was arbitrarily used against
us, must be brought into the Union cause. Having reached that
conclusion, his decision was fixed and unalterable. The act
and all its responsibilities were his alone. He had prepared the
paper which he was again about to read without advice or as
sistancehad pondered over it for weeks, and been more con
firmed in the rectitude of the measure as time passed on. There
had been moments when he felt awed and overwhelmed by the

248 Civil War and Reconstruction

gravity and magnitude of the subject and of what might fol
low, but his way was now clear he knew he was right. Among
other things, he said in a somewhat subdued tone, he had looked
to a Higher Power for aid and direction. He had made a vow
that if God gave us the victory in the impending battle he would
receive it as an indication of the Divine Will that it was his duty
to go forward in the work of emancipation. In a manner half
apologetic, he said this might seem strange, but there were
occasions when, uncertain how to proceedwhen it was not
clear to his mind what he should do he had in this way sub
mitted the disposal of the subject to a Higher Power, and abided
by what seemed the Supreme Will. Events at Sharpsburg had
confirmed and strengthened his original purpose in regard to
emancipation and he had no hesitation in issuing this preliminary
order; the States interested would decide for themselves as to
its consummation.

This was not the only occasion when he manifested the
peculiar faith or trait here exhibited. It was doubtless to be at
tributed in a great measure to the absence of early religious
culture a want of educational advantages in his youthful, fron
tier life. In the wilderness of Indiana fifty years ago there were
few churches, and only an occasional wandering preacher fur
nished the sparse population with rude religious instruction. Al
though his early opportunities for religious improvement had
been few, there was deep-seated within him a feeling of de
pendence and trust in that Supreme Intelligence which rules
and governs all.

Some general conversation followed the reading of the docu
ment, when the President handed it to the Secretary of State,
with directions to publish it forthwith.

There were, I think, apprehensions and anxiety on the minds
of every member of the Administration as to the effect which
the proclamation would have on the public mind. I make an
extract from a memorandum of my own on the 22d of September,
which expresses my views and feelings at the time: "The subject,
aside from the ethical view of the question, has, from its magni
tude and its uncertain results, a solemnity and weight that op
presses me. It is a step in the progress of this war a beginning, the

The History of Emancipation 249

results of which will extend into the distant future, A favorable
termination of the war seems more remote with every movement.
Unless the rebels hasten to avail themselves of the alternative now
presented and I see little probability of it, the end on scarcely
be other than emancipation of the slaves, and subjugation of their
masters, carrying with it a revolution of the social, civil, and
industrial habits and condition of society in all the slave States,
There is in the free States a prevailing opinion that this measure
will secure a speedy peace. I cannot say that I so view it There
will be the energy of desperation on the part of the slave-owners,
aided by those who sympathize with them, which with the im
pending pecuniary sacrifices will intensify the struggle. While,
however, dark clouds are before us and around us, I do not see
in the twilight of the future how the measure taken could be
avoided, and I know that it is desirable it should be. It is a
despotic act in the cause of the Union, and I may add of
freedom."

The immediate effect of this extraordinary and radical meas
urealmost revolutionary in its character was less turbulent
and exciting, North and South, than had been generally appre
hended. It called out no excessive jubilation on one part, nor
angry violence on the other. For a time it failed to strengthen
the Administration in any section. It imparted no vigor but
rather depression and weakness to the North nor strength, to
the secession cause in the South, where there began to be a con
scious feeling of the fatal step they had taken. Mr. Blair s fore
bodings as to the effect on the approaching autumn elections
were realized. Many who had resisted secession were not pre
pared to sustain the Executive in a measure which was without
direct warrant from the Constitution, though adopted as a ne
cessity to defend and preserve it and the Union from rebellious
assailants, whose avowed purpose was to destroy both. The eman
cipationists, who had urged decisive action upon the President,
relaxed for a time their energies after action was taken, and
the fall elections were adverse to the Administration.

In the rebel or Confederate Government there was much
empty gasconade, and many loud threats and denunciations for
this executive act; but they ended in mere declamation. It had

250 Civil War and Reconstruction

become a conviction with the intelligent minds o the South
that the rebellion had put slavery in jeopardy, and that if the
rebellion was suppressed slavery would be extinguished. The
proclamation brought conviction of this fact to their minds,
and alarmed and weakened them.

Following the preliminary proclamation, and as a part of
the plan, was the question of deporting and colonizing the col
ored race. This was a part of the President s scheme, and had
occupied his mind some time before the project for emancipa
tion was adopted, although the historians, biographers, and com
mentators have made slight, if any, allusion to it. The Presi
dent, however, and a portion of his Cabinet considered them
inseparable, and that deportation should accompany and be a
part of the emancipation movement.

A speculating operation for colonizing and taking possession
of a tract of country in Central America, known as the Chiriqui
grant or purchase in Costa Rica, had been in progress under
the Buchanan Administration, and greatly interested President
Lincoln, who thought it might be used for colonization pur
poses. He had in the spring of 1861 expressed a favorable opin
ion of the scheme, and referred it to me for investigation, and
if I approved it, to bring forward the necessary measures to car
ry it into effect. Without here going into details of that investiga
tion, I became satisfied that it was a speculating, if not a swin
dling scheme, and so reported, and declined to further consider
the subject. It was then referred to the Secretary of the Inte
rior, a friend of the scheme and the parties. He made a very
skilful and adroit report in its favor, stating that there was an
abundance of the best quality of coal in the Chiriqui purchase,
which a colony of emancipated negroes could mine, and recom
mending that such a colony should be established, and that the
Navy Department should procure its supplies of fuel from that
source. The President gave the project favorable consideration,
and in compliance with it proposed to issue an order directing
the Navy Department to procure its coal from Chiriqui, and to
make an advance to the company of $50,000 to aid in its col
onizing and mining purposes. To this I wholly and entirely ob
jected, and when the President became aware that the law re-

The History of Emancipation 251

quired coal to be purchased by annual contract awarded to the
lowest bidder, and that we had such a contract only partly exe
cuted, the scheme was abandoned. But the plan of deportation
and colonization by the Government was not given up. It was
pressed as an incidental and necessary part of the emancipation
proceeding. The President brought the subject of deporting the
freed slaves before the Cabinet on Tuesday, the 23d of Septem
ber, the day succeeding his preliminary emancipation proclama
tion, when it was discussed at some length, and again on Friday*
the 26th. There was a diversity of opinion in the Cabinet on
this measure, but ultimately a majority opposed it. The Presi
dent, in reluctantly giving up the Chiriqui project, declared
himself opposed to the proposition of the Attorney-General, Mr.
Bates, who was also opposed the Chiriqui scheme, but who read
an elaborate paper in favor of compulsory emigration or de
portation.

Deportation and colonization eventually died out, after a
feeble and abortive effort to plant a cargo of negroes at Cow
Island; but emancipation became a success.

On Tuesday, the 30th of December, the President read to the
Cabinet the draft of his proclamation emancipating the slaves
in the rebellious States, pursuant to his preliminary proclama
tion of the 22d of September, and, as usual with his public
papers, invited criticism. A general debate took place that day,
but without much definite point, or any new suggestion in the
discussion. The President directed that copies of the paper should
be made and sent to each member of the Cabinet, and ordered
a special meeting on the next day, Wednesday, the 3 1st of De
cember, to hear remarks and receive suggestions. At that meet
ing two or three verbal alterations were suggested. All but one
of them were, I think, proposed by Mr. Seward. Four members,
viz., Messrs. Seward, Chase, Blair, and myself, without inter
changing opinions, advised that any and all exceptions of
fractional parts of any State should be omitted. It was stated
that, slavery being the creature of local law, no State where it
existed could discriminate in its enactments so as to authorize
its continuance in some counties, yet prohibit it in others. There
could be no such unequal, sectional legislation in any State. But

252 Civil War and Reconstractkrn

the President, while he felt the force of the suggestion, declined
to make the omission, conceiving himself committed in his pre
liminary proclamation. Mr. Chase proposed the felicitous closing
paragraph, declaring the sincerity of the Executive in this act,
believed to be an act of justice warranted by the Constitution,
upon military necessity, and invoking for it the considerate
judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God.

All the suggestions, written and oral, which had been made,
were received by the President, who said he would consider
them and complete the document. This was done, and the paper
signed and published on the following day, the 1st of January,
1863.

The speculations as to the origin of the proclamation and
the influence and causes which prompted the emancipation move
ment have been many, and some of them merely imaginary or
conjectural. It has been said it was done to prevent a recog
nition of the Confederacy by European governments; that it
was extorted by the ultra abolitionists, who threatened the Ad
ministration; that the President was overborne and subdued by
appeals which the clergy and others addressed to him. Some
or all of these may have tended to confirm him, but the origin was
with neither. The war and war necessities had modified his
views and overcome his primary, undisguised reluctance to
adopt a measure for which he had no express constitutional or
legal authority nothing but absolute military necessity. The
calamities of the war, which were prolonged, and the condi
tion of national affairs, convinced him that to confer freedom
on the four millions who were in bondage would be the most
fatal blow he could strike against the rebellion, and the most
effectual if not the only measure that would give peace and
prosperity to the Union.

The period when he came to this conclusion, and decided to
give by an executive act freedom to the slaves, has been a con
troverted question on the part of his biographers, historians, and
commentators, but no specific day or influence can be named.
Impressed with the importance, solemnity, and responsibility
of the measure, he was slow and deliberate in adopting it. For
more than a year after his inauguration, he resisted the appeals

The History of Emancipation

and the threats of his ultra supporters, who urged him to use the
war necessity and strike the fetters from the slave, in the con
fident belief that peace would be restored and the compromise
of the Constitution maintained unimpaired, without resorting
to this necessity. But gradually the conviction dawned upon him
that the cause which led to the rebellion must be removed before
harmony could prevail. For a time he indulged the hope that
the border States would view the subject as he viewed it, and
come to the same conclusion. If so, they in the wreck and down
fall of the institution would, he thought, gladly avail themselves
of the proposition of gradual and compensated emancipation,
Disappointed after repeated earnest appeals addressed to the
patriotism and the pecuniary interest of the States, and failing
to persuade them to take the initiative by voluntarily relinquish
ing slavery, he was compelled to take the other and extreme
alternative of addressing himself to the rebels themselves, and
warning them that if they persisted in rebellion after a given
date, he should adopt the policy of emancipation.

His interview with the representatives on the 12th of July,
and his ineffectual appeal to them to favor a scheme for volun
tary, prospective, and compensated emancipation, forced upon
him the conviction that all arguments and appeals in that
quarter were vain and useless, and that a different, stronger,
and more ultra policy was necessary. They, and the constituency
on whom they relied, were most of them Union men, but they
clung to the system of productive slave labor to which they had
been accustomed. Their secession opponents at the South had
from the beginning taunted them with the assertion that if
they adhered to the Union cause the abolitionists would set free
their slaves and subvert their industrial and social system. This
they had repelled, and when appealed to by the President felt
that they could not sustain themselves at home if they gave in
to the measure. They therefore declined the propositions he made.

It was after that last fruitless and hopeless interview with the
border State representatives, on Saturday the 12th of July, that
he became convinced the Government would be compelled to
adopt the principle of emancipating the slaves in the rebel
States in order to close the conflict. In all probability the al-

254 Civil War and Reconstruction

ternative of this harsher and more responsible measure toward
the extreme South, in case the border States could not be per
suaded to come into his project of voluntary emancipation, had
been evolved in his mind before that last meeting. He had urged
the project from the 6th of the preceding March, without re
ceiving much encouragement, and the opposition and repug
nance manifested at the meeting on the 12th of July satisfied
him that a different and more decided policy, and in another
direction, must be pursued. In this mood, and with this con
viction, after his unsatisfactory interview on Saturday, he felt
that he must abandon that project, and on the following day,
Sunday, the 13th, introduced to Mr. Seward and myself the topic
that engrossed his mind, with a request that we should give the
subject of emancipating the slaves in the Southern States, after a
given date, early and earnest consideration. He had not at that
time fully determined on issuing a proclamationhad not en
tirely given up the hope that the border States might yet come
into his scheme, which was obviously so much to their advantage;
but it had become a remote and glimmering hope, which their
written reply on the 14th of July extinguished. Not until after
that date did he write his preliminary proclamation, which was,
I believe, first read to the Cabinet on Saturday, the 2d of August.
The statement made and reiterated with great confidence,
that this proclamation was written on a steamboat when return
ing from a visit to General McClellan, on the 8th of July, is a
mistake. He did, there is little doubt, at that time, when re
turning on the steamer, write out the speech which he read to
the representatives of the border States when he reached Wash
ington. It would be unjust to him as a man, and as Chief
Magistrate, to impute to him a disingenuous and a double part
in his proposition to the representatives of the border States;
to suppose that while he was inviting them to adopt the policy
of voluntary emancipation by their respective States, he con
cealed from them the fact that he was pursuing a different policy,
and had indeed, as represented, written a proclamation fox
general emancipation by the Federal Government. Nor were the
two policies compatible. The truth is, he had doubted Federal
authority, and therefore labored earnestly and with fidelity to

The History of Emancipation 255

induce the border States to initiate the milder and practical
policy of voluntary emancipation by State action, which they
clearly had the right to do. To encourage them in this move
ment, he promised the influence of the Executive to give them
pecuniary aid. Could they have been persuaded to act, the Presi
dent would have been relieved of embarrassment, for it would
have been the first step in a movement which would have eventu
ated in general emancipation by the undoubted, rightful legiti
mate State authorities. Not until the last hope of voluntary
emancipation was extinguished in the interview on the 12th of
July, did he relinquish his early and favorite policy, and take up
the controverted and contested one of Federal action, warranted
alone by military necessity.

His generous and benevolent nature was gladdened at the
close by the result of his proclamation, which gave freedom to
four millions in bondage, and contributed in no small degree to
the suppression of the rebellion and to the preservation and
perpetuation of the Union. The fruition of this measure, adopted
under imperious necessity, and with responsibilities and a solem
nity that few can appreciate, cheered the last days of the extra
ordinary man, to whom belongs the credit, as he assumed
the consequences of the: act, and whose untimely death the
nation will ever have cause to deplore. Love for his country, its
Constitution, and the Union which he had been chosen to guard,
was the controlling influence that governed him in one of the
most important and responsible measures ever decreed by chief
magistrate or ruler.

9

The Capture and Release of Mason and Slide!!

When Captain Charles Wilkes of the U.S.S. San Jacinto
stopped the British mail steamer Trent to seize James
M. Mason and John Slidell, Confederate Commissioners
to Great Britain and France, an international incident
resulted* The embarrassments and consequences to the
Navy Department are here developed in detail by the
Secretary of the Navy.

WAR of the rebellion dragged heavily along through
the summer and autumn of 1861, its reverses but slightly relieved
by some successes of McClellan in West Virginia and Stringham
at Hatteras. Late in October a formidable squadron which the
Navy Department had collected at Hampton Roads, with ac
companying army transports, left the capes of Virginia for a
destination unknown to more than half a dozen persons aside
from the expedition. About the middle of November the country
was made glad by the announcement that the squadron under
Dupont had captured Port Royal, and that our troops were in
possession of the most favored locality of the South Carolina
insurgents. Almost simultaneously with this intelligence the
country was electrified with rumors, which were speedily con
firmed, that James M. Mason and John Slidell, two rebel emis
saries, with their secretaries, were captured by Captain Wilkes,
in command of the San Jacinto, and taken from on board the
English packet steamer Trent, a neutral vessel, which was con
veying these messengers on a hostile mission abroad. The action

The Galaxy, XV (May, 1873).
256

The Capture and Release of Mason and Slidell 257

at Port Royal took place on the 7th of November; the rebel
emissaries were arrested on the following day, the 8th.

Great as were the rejoicings over the achievement of Dupont,
the most important victory which had then been obtained, they
were for a time eclipsed by the startling news that the two rebel
leaders, who had recently abandoned their seats in the Senate,
and been selected by the Confederate organization to represent
it abroad, and enlist foreign governments in its behalf, had been
intercepted and were prisoners.

Several of the European powers, and especially England,
under the mischievous intrigues of Palmerston and Russell, and
France under the malign influence of Louis Napoleon, had
hastened to recognize the rebels as belligerents, thereby placing
them, though destitute of any acknowledged nationality, on
terms of equality with the government of the United States-
a government with which they had treaties and were professedly
on terms of amity and friendship. The effect of this recognition
was-and unquestionably was so intended-to deprive the gov
ernment and people of the United States, with their navy, com
merce, and large shipping interests, wWle the rebels had none,
of the hospitalities and privileges which exist among nations at
peace, and which had been extended to us by all governments
prior to the rebellion. The assumed neutrality of those countries
was therefore an unfriendly act, adverse to the United States,
whose ships were thereby restricted in their supplies, and almost
excluded from foreign ports. It was favorable to the rebels, who
had neither navy, ships, nor commerce to be excluded or injured
by any inhibition that might be imposed. It elevated and gave
political power and importance to the conspirators, who, by the
standard of those governments, were made in all respects the
equals of the United States, although they had no existence or
standing in the family of nations, and were neither by law nor
fact entitled to nationality or belligerent rights. Hostility to free
government, and unfriendliness, not to say enmity, to the Ameri
can Union, actuated the men in authority in both England and
France. Their sympathies, particularly those of the aristocracy
of Great Britain, were with the rebels, not from any especial

258 Civil War and Reconstruction

regard, love, or respect for them or their cause, but from dislike
of free institutions and the rising power of the great republic.

Mason and Slidell had managed to elude the blockade in
October in the Theodora, a blockade-runner, and were landed
at Cardenas in Cuba. Thence as ambassadors or commissioners
they proceeded with their retinue to Havana, where they were
officially and ostentatiously received and introduced by the
English Consul to the Cuban authorities. The cautious and
dignified Spanish grandee who was then Captain General de
clined to recognize the official pretensions of the emissaries but
received them as strangers of distinction. Americans were not
unmindful of the extraordinary and marked courtesy and at
tention of the British officials to these messengers, known to be
on a mission hostile to our government. When, therefore, intel
ligence of the capture of these conspirators, who were so recently
Senators, was received, intense excitement and general joy were t
manifested. Men of all parties and grades united in a general
hallelujah over the achievement. Without pausing to inquire
under what circumstances the arrest had been made, and whether
the Government was in any degree compromitted, the people
everywhere approved it, and recognized and acknowledged Cap
tain Wilkes as a bold, daring, and energetic officer, more ef
ficient and vastly more deserving of applause than the more slow
and deliberate men who were administering the government.
The fact that these traitorous and avowed enemies of the re
public, on a hostile errand to procure foreign aid for the
destruction of our national unity, were taken on an English
steamer, under an English flag, and from the embrace of English
officials, gave additional gratification and zest to the daring act
of the naval captain. From the Atlantic to the Pacific meetings
were called to express the feelings of the people and their thanks
to the gallant officer who had rendered this great service. Captain
Wilkes, on his arrival at Boston, and as he passed through the
country to Washington, was greeted with welcome and hailed
as a chieftain worthy of command. A banquet was given him
in the commercial metropolis of New England, which was at
tended by many distinguished personages, among them the Chief
Magistrate of Massachusetts, the patriotic Governor Andrew, and

The Capture and Release of Mason and Slidell 25

Chief Justice Bigelow, each of whom made speeches in
of the hero. Publicists lite Mr. Everett endorsed and Justified
the act. The House of Representatives at Washington* on the
first day of its session, the 2d of December, by unanimous con
sent received, and without dissenting voice passed a resolution
declaring "that the thanks of Congress are due, and are hereby
tendered, to Captain Wilkes of the United States Navy, for his
brave, adroit, and patriotic conduct in the arrest and detention
of the traitors, James M. Mason and John Slidell" On the same
day Schuyler Colfax, then a prominent member, and subse
quently Speaker of the House and Vice-President of the United
States, introduced a resolution which, after a recitation in the
preamble that Colonel Michael Corcoran, taken prisoner on
the battle field, had, after suffering other indignities, been con
fined by the rebel authorities in the cell of a convicted felon,
made known as the wish of the House that "the President of the
United States be requested to similarly confine James M. Mason,
late of Virginia, now in custody in Fort Warren, until Colonel
Corcoran shall be treated as all the prisoners taken by the
United States on the battle field have been treated/* A similar
resolution in regard to Mr. Slidell was introduced by Mr. Odell,
a Democratic representative from the State of New York. These
resolutions of the representative body of the nation exhibit the
feeling and temper of the people, and were supposed to be in
contrast with, if not a rebuke to, the qualified congratulatory
letter which I had written on the 30th of November, three days
before. To these resolutions, and all the honors awarded to
Captain Wilkes, the people responded, and were prompt to com
pare his energetic and effective action with the tardy and un
satisfactory movements of others at the beginning of the war.

Captain Charles Wilkes, who acquired this sudden and high
renown, was an intelligent and daring officer, advanced in life,
many of whose active years had been passed on shore duty, and
in the preparation and publication, under the authority of Con
gress and at the expense of the government, of an elaborate work
of several volumes, narrating the discoveries, geographical and
scientific, made by an exploring expedition under his command,
which was projected and sent out during the administration of

260 Civil War and Reconstruction

President Van Buren In 1838. He was detached from these literary
and scientific labors in the spring of 1861 and ordered to pro
ceed to the coast of Africa to relieve a Southern naval officer
on that station of the command of the San Jacinto, and return
with her to the United States. Our naval force was at that time
small, on a very limited peace establishment, and the vessels,
in some instances commanded by officers from the insurrectionary
region, were most of them widely dispersed. Congress had ad
journed without taking measures to increase or to authorize an
increase of the navy, notwithstanding impending difficulties. In
the strife of factions the welfare of the country and the strength
and stability of the government were greatly neglected. Only three
small steamers were in commission, and but two hundred and
eighty seamen in all the Atlantic ports. Almost all the authorized
force of vessels and men were absent in the West Indies or
Gulf of Mexico, or on foreign stations. What was called the
home squadron consisted of eight vessels in commission, most
of them in the West Indies or the Gulf of Mexico, and were
all of them, with the intervening insurrectionary States, nearly
as unavailable and remote as the ships on the coast of Europe.
Among both naval and military officers of the South there was
great demoralization, affecting the discipline of the service and
impairing public confidence. Many of them, under the specious
but delusive and mistaken idea that obedience to the local State
governments, even in their illegal enactments against national
unity and authority, was paramount to all obligations to the
Federal Government, had thrown up their commissions and
abandoned the service. The new Administration, unaware of the
extent of the conspiracy, and wholly unprepared by needful
legislation, or previous executive action for the emergency, was
compelled to meet the crisis, and on its own responsibility take
instant measures for the preservation of the national existence.
Called, as most of them were, from private life to their new
positions, and under confident assurances from leading minds on
both sides that an adjustment of difficulties would take place
without a conflict, the men administering the government de
layed measures of a belligerent character until the last moment.
When it became evident that the extreme secessionists had ob-

The Capture and Release of Mason and 261

tained control of the rebel State organizations,
determined on national dismemberment, and that
could scarcely be avoided, precautionary measures were
involving among other things an entire change of aava!
ment. Before a blockade had been declared or Sumter
orders were sent, on the 8th of April, to Commodore CL H* Bell,
who was in command in the Mediterranean, to break up the
European squadron and return with his command to the United
States. A difficulty existed in regard to the withdrawal of the
African squadron, in consequence of treaty stipulations with
Great Britain, by which we were obliged to maintain a specified
force on the coast of Africa for the suppression of the slave trade.
But higher duties in the great impending crisis overrode in this
instance treaty stipulations, and the demand for ships and men
on our own coast was so imperative that the Navy Department
took the responsibility after the blockade was declared of with
drawing the African squadron, with the exception of a single
sloop of war. Orders to this effect were sent to Commodore
Inman, in command, on the 9th of May, with directions to return
as soon as practicable with all his force except the Saratoga. One
of the vessels of this squadron was the San Jacinto, commanded
by Captain T. A. Dornin. This officer was a citizen of Maryland,
and it was his misfortune that a portion of his family were early
and active secessionists. What were his own opinions and feel
ings on the absorbing questions that were disturbing and dividing
the country, and what would be his course, it was impossible to
ascertain, nor could inquiry well be made. The subject was one
of extreme delicacy. To question the fidelity of a faithful officer,
and thus cast suspicion on his integrity, would be harsh and
severe; to continue him in command without certain assurance
of his fidelity, when so many from his section were deserting,
would not be good government, and in case of disaster would
have been considered censurable and doubtless condemned as
bad administration. There had been infidelity and the worst
of treachery on the part of officers of the Treasury in the
revenue marine, who not only deserted, but betrayed their trust,
and perfidiously turned over their vessels and commands to the
rebels. Great power is necessarily vested in a naval commander

262 Civil War and Reconstruction

over Ms subordinates. His orders are absolute. To resist or
oppose them is mutiny. Such, an officer might, if disposed, ran
his vessel into a rebel port and deliver her into the possession
of the secessionists. Apprehensions of such a proceeding were
entertained. Naval discipline requires from the crew implicit
obedience. When sectionalism was rampant, and whole com
munities were in arms against the government, and men most
honored and of the highest standing in the civil service were
unmindful of their allegiance, and when the governments of
States were arraying themselves in opposition to the Federal
authority, great caution and circumspection in regard to all
officers of the South in responsible positions were necessary,
and especially those whose families and kindred were embarked
in the rebellion. It should be said, however, to the honor and
credit of the navy, that though many officers, under a mistaken
sense of duty to their local government on questions of national
concern, threw up their commissions and left the service, none
of them were guilty of the perfidy of Twiggs, and of those
officers of the revenue marine who broke faith, betrayed their
trust, and transferred to the insurgents the vessels which were
confided to them. Harsh as was the proceeding, there was no
alternative but that of relieving the sectional officers whose
opinions and views were unknown, as was done in the case of
the commander of the San Jacinto. It is due to Captain Dornin
to say that he remained loyal to the government.

Captain Wilkes, who was ordered to relieve Captain Dornin,
arrived at Fernando Po and took command of the San Jacinto
in August. Touching at St. Vincent on his return in September,
he crossed over and cruised in the West Indies and Caribbean
sea in search of the Sumter and other rebel privateers if any
were abroad. At Cienfuegos, on the south coast of Cuba, he was
informed that Messrs. Mason and Slidell had on the night of
the 12th of October secretly and successfully run the blockade,
and were on a hostile errand against the government. Learning
that they were to take passage on the Trent, an English packet
steamer a merchant vesselCaptain Wilkes proceeded with the
San Jacinto to the old Bahama channel, and took position at a
point where it is contracted, in order to intercept and search

The Capture and Release of Mason and Slidell 263

the professedly neutral vessel which in disregard of neutral
obligations was carrying these avowed enemies of his country on
a hostile errand. The English government had, by recognizing
the rebels as belligerents and placing them on terms of equality
with the United States, left no doubt that he possessed the un-
question belligerent right of search, and, if contraband were
found, to capture. He exercised and enforced the right by board
ing on the 8th of November off the light-house of Paredom del
Grande, and searching the British packet, and found, after some
equivocation by the captain of the Trent, these rebel com
missioners who were "bent on mischievous and traitorous errands
against our country." Written despatches, he became satisfied
from an examination of international and British authorities,
were contraband, and liable with the vessel which conveyed them
to seizure. Without searching for and seizing papers, he says, he
considered these emissaries of the rebels as the "embodiment"
of despatches, was convinced that their mission was adverse to
the Union and criminally hostile to his government; he had
consequently no hesitation in seizing them. But while seizing
the emissaries he, for reasons which to him seemed sufficient,
omitted to make prize of the Trent, and send her and the emish
saries with the despatches into the courts for adjudication. His
motive in this omission was disinterested and generous, but it was
an error which, under the subsequent imperious demands of the
English government, was made to vitiate his proceedings. The
right of a naval commander to arrest an ambassador or emissary
on a hostile mission against his government from on board a
neutral vessel may be a controverted question, but there is no
doubt that a different tribunal than that of the quarter-deck
should decide on that as on the legality of all captures, and as
to what is contraband. Captain Wilkes was satisfied he had the
right to capture vessels with written despatches,- he considered
these messengers on a hostile errand were the embodiment of
despatches, and consequently amenable to capture, and the
neutral vessel in which they were embarked a good prize; but
arresting the commissioners, he forbore to seize the Trent, and
send her, with the commissioners whose transportation violated
her neutrality, into the courts for adjudication.

264 Civil War and Reconstruction

Mason and Slidell, the two rebel emissaries thus arrested,
were men of ability, but of different habits, temperaments, and
mental calibre. Mason was ardent, impetuous, and arrogant;
Slidell was crafty, cool, and designing. Each had been active, con
spicuous, and mischievous in fomenting political disturbance and
forwarding the secession movement. Mason, inflated with the
supercilious assumption of the superior capacity and higher
order of statemanship which prevailed in the Old Dominion,
had not at first proposed or intended a division of the Union,
but that Virginia, "the Mother of States," should on great oc
casions be the mediator or mentor, and direct the course of her
co-States and the Union. State rights meant with him Virginia
rights; republican government was found in the ancient com
monwealth, whose statesmen in his view framed the Constitution
and were the chief architects of the Federal Government. Vir
ginia had moreover furnished most of the earlier Presidents. His
dislike and contempt of the Yankees he did not conceal, but
took pride in proclaiming. In legislation he was on all party
questions and with him questions generally assumed a party
character like most modern Virginians in office, a sectionalist
of narrow views, which, except on the subject of slavery, scarcely
extended beyond the boundaries of Virginia. Professing a deep
regard for State rights, and when he entered the Senate pro
found veneration for the Federal Constitution, which he in
sisted must be strictly and literally construed, he nevertheless
introduced a bill for the capture and rendition of fugitive slaves
a measure that was more arbitrary and centralizing than any
ever previously proposed by the ultra consolidationists of Massa
chusetts. It was a gratification to him to impose the offensive
provisions of that questionable constitutional enactment upon
the law-abiding people of the non-slaveholding States. Although
a manifest stretch of Federal authority, this measure, obnoxious
to freemen, was under the exaction of party discipline, and what
was called the spirit of compromise, assented to and adopted as
a concession by the timid and calculating time-savers of the
period. This concession, instead of allaying sectional animosity,
which was the excuse of those who in -the non-slaveholding States
gave in support, only increased it, and the arrogance of those

The Capture and Release of Mason and Slidell 2i5

who procured the enactment. Mason and Ms associates were
confirmed, by the tame acquiescence of leading party men of
the North in this measure, in the silly idea that the people of
the free States were without much political principle, sub
servient and submissive mere hucksters, immersed in trade and
money-gettingengaged in menial manual labor, like the sorrile
race in Virginia about as destitute of any just pretension to
statesmanship and manly independence consequently unfit to
make laws or administer the government, and incapable of
properly managing public affairs. A visit which he made to
Boston after his success in imposing on the people the fugitive
slave law, where he was received and treated with sycophantic
adulation, convinced him the Yankees were deficient in manly
spirit, and needed Virginians to govern and inculcate in them
self-respect.

Descended himself from one of the old and wealthy families
which had given laws and government to Virginia, he prided
himself on hereditary honors and the nobility of blood. It was
this, he assumed, which had made the royal colony of Virginia
a favored province in colonial times; and opportunities in the
war of independence, and subsequently in the organization of
the national government, had developed the superior talents
of her cavaliers and proved them to be heroes and statesmen.

Mason was a pretty correct representative and exponent of
the thought and sentiment of the people of his State at the
beginning of the war. For several months in the early part of
1861, it was alike ludicrous and painful to witness the self-suf
ficiency, inaction, and supercilious assumption of the Virginia
Convention, then assembled in Richmond. That assemblage,
which met in February, lingered through March and into April,
idle spectators of the progress of the rebellion, in the vain and
preposterous expectation that Virginia, whose statesmen main
tained as a fundamental principle the political equality of the
States, would be appealed to, and her Convention constituted an
umpire to arbitrate between the Federal Government and the
insurrectionary States-as if Virginia occupied a higher posi
tion than the others. That Convention remained in session for
weeks, buttoned up in its dignity and culpably inert, waiting to

266 Civil War and Reconstruction

advise the President that he must not presume to perform his
whole executive dutiesthat the national government was a
failure, and that a revision of the Constituton, with "new
guarantees" for the South and for slavery, was indispensable to
pacification. The Constitution under which the country had
grown and prospered for seventy years, as no other country in
the world had in so brief a period ever grown and prospered,
which had been extolled by Virginians so long as Virginia was
in the ascendant and had a controlling voice in the administra
tion, was insufficient with a Republican chief magistrate for
whom Virginia had not voted, and was wholly impotent for
present excited party necessities. Virginia, therefore, through her
Convention, did nothing, but waited in silent dignity to inform
the President, so soon as he should appeal to that body for in
struction, that a national convention must be called to incor
porate "new guarantees" in the fundamental law for the protec
tion and security of the South. If in the mean time he attempted
to exercise the authority with which he was invested, and in
the legitimate discharge of his duties should undertake to pro
vision and reinforce Fort Sumter in the harbor of Charleston,
in the sovereign State of South Carolina, he was told that
Virginia and her Union Convention, elected by a majority of
sixty thousand over the secessionists, would forthwith make
common cause with South Carolina. Such was the intelligence
communicated to Prseident Lincoln on the 4th of April, 1861,
just one month after his inauguration, by a messenger deputed
to convey to him and the Administration information of the
attitude and purpose of the Union Convention of Virginia. The
counsels and statesmanship of the Tylers and Floyds and Masons
prevailed in 1861. They were in patriotism and good sense in
strong contrast with the practical wisdom of Washington, Jef
ferson, Madison, and others of an earlier period. The Virginia
of the middle of the nineteenth century was not the Virginia of
1776 and 1800, in position, mind, or character.

President Lincoln listened with amazement to the statements
of the representatives whom the Union men in the Richmond
Convention had deputed to convey to him their views and the
reasons why they remained inactive. The fact that such an

The Capture and Release of Mason and Slidell 267

assemblage, composed of professed Union mm, had been con
vened in the principal border State, professedly to sustain the
Union, had delayed decisive action on his part, in the hope that
wisdom, patriotism, and fidelity to the government would so
mark their course as to check insurrection and strengthen the
Administration. But the long-continued and idle session of feeble
but self-presuming minds, instead of benefiting the Union cause
which they had been elected to promote, became a hindrance
and embarrassment He had been legally and cm&titetionally
elected Chief Magistrate, and was sworn to discharge his duties
in conformity to law, not under the directions of the Vitginia
Convention, nor with a view to a National Convention or a re
vision of the Constitution, nor to establish "new guarantees"
for any section or party.

Mason, though violent in his sectional demands and ulti
mately an extreme secessionist, had not anticipated that our
federal system would be broken up by these requirements; but
inspired by Calhoun, with whom he was associated in the Sen
ate during the last two or three years of that gentleman s life,
he entertained schemes to strengthen the waning fortunes of the
South, so long in the ascendant, by what was denominated * new
guarantees," which were to be incorporated and unalterably
fixed in the Constitution. The scheme of "new guarantees/*
originally a device to secure and perpetuate sectional power
for the South, became subsequently, after the rebellion was sup
pressed, the party battle-cry and engine of their radical op
ponents in their centralizing operations in the opposite direction.
With his low estimate of the spirit and courage of the Yankees,
confirmed by the submissive obsequiousness of the Bostonians
already mentioned, and the omission of Congress to make prep
aration to enforce national authority, Mason expected the man
date of Virginia through her Union Convention, which he and
Tyler had labored to bring about, would be effective with die
Administration, or if a collision took place at Sumter, that
there would be but a feeble exhibit against the matured and
well-organized force of the insurrectionists. The national up
rising when the flag was assaulted astonished him, but from
his previous arrogance, threats, and audacity, no alternative was

268 Civil War and Reconstruction

left him except to unite with South Carolina, and he became
engulfed with and fully committed to the extreme secessionists.
Although not possessed of diplomatic talent, or calculated to
make a very profound impression in England, his former official
position, his name and State made his appointment acceptable
to those whom he was chosen to represent.

John Slidell, a native of New York, who had emigrated to and
accumulated a great fortune in New Orleans, was inherently an
opponent of our federal system and of popular government.
Mason had an aversion to the Yankees and did not conceal it.
SlidelFs dislike of popular government and of the participation
of the masses in administration was not merely sectional but
general. He had little sympathy with the people North or South,
but did not openly avow his want of confidence in them or his
low estimate of their intelligence and capability for self-govern
ment. Although associated with the Democratic party and of
humble origin, he was from principle and conviction, fostered
by political and pecuniary success, a centralist, an aristocrat, and
an advocate of a strong government. In his estimation our fed
erative system was a political, and would prove to be an abso
lute failure. With this belief he thought the sooner the Union
was dissolved, and governments with more circumscribed terri
tory but clothed with ample powers established, the better for
all. The doctrine that the people can and will govern wisely
and well, he deemed a fallacy that must sooner or later be cor
rected. They were to be governed, and there must be power in
the government to govern them and compel obedience. He was
one of a class of politicians, more numerous probably than is
supposed, who are centralists in feeling, though democratic in
their professions and associations. The organizations which grew
up under our colonial system were admitted to have been stud
ied and improved when they threw off British allegiance. The
march of power is onward. During the Revolutionary war a
common cause and foreign ememies had banded the colonies
together, and made the old Articles of Confederation, which all
knew was only a league, answer for a general government. But,
relieved from outward pressure after the peace of 1783, discord
prevailed, and the confederation was found weak and inefficient.

The Capture and Release of Mason and Slidell 269

The States on that low standard could not harmonize and have
effective unity and strength. More power was needed, and the
Federal Constitution, with greater and more clearly defined
but still insufficient power, was substituted. This was another
step toward a more efficient and better government. For a time,
when there were but three or four millions of people with a
limited territory, this had answered the purpose. But its day was
about over. In his view and that of his class it was impossible
for our expanded domain and increased population to long con
tinue under one central head. If this country is to have one
general government, its powers cannot be restricted, nor those
administering it kept within any arbitrary written constitution
al limitations. Scope and elasticity are essential. There must be
homogeneity if we would have nationality. The federal system
of divided sovereignty between the general and State govern
ments, with a varied climate, dissimilarity in the institutions of
the States, in their productive industry, in the condition of society
and the structure of the local government, are all so conflicting
that the system must if not made stronger fall to pieces. TTie
theory that a laboring population without commerce and wealth
can exercise the powers of government might be carried out in
a small and purely agricultural community of limited wants; but
it was absurd to suppose that those engaged in daily manual
labor can comprehend and provide for the great commercial and
manufacturing necessities of a continent, or develop the resources
and manage the finances of a great nation. There must, by the
theory of Slidell and his school, which is substantially that of
Hamilton, be a governing and governed class. Slidell, like all
men of that political faith, expected to be one of the former and
was not scrupulous as to the means by which he obtained power.
The immense frauds and corruption which have since disgraced
the elections of Louisiana, and, alas! too many of the States,
destroying confidence in the integrity and fairness of elections,
may be traced in a great degree to John Slidell. If he had not
the bold audacity of Jefferson Davis, nor the impetuous ar
rogance of Mason, he was quite as unscrupulous, and had the
more crafty, subtle, and scheming qualities which are insinuating,
and which influence fancied leaders in their intrigues and

270 Civil War and Reconstruction

aspirations. If not the prominent man in the rebellion, he was,
perhaps beyond any other, the mischievous and in its inception
one of the controlling minds in the secession conspiracy.

The rebels had expected, not without reason, early recog
nition by and assistance from foreign governments, particularly
England and France. These two lately prominent Senators one
from "the Old Dominion/ the "Mother of States," ancient Vir
ginia, the principal border commonwealth; the other from the
wealthy planting and commercial State of Louisiana, himself
a resident of New Orleans, the emporium of the great central
valley of the Union itself an empire were not inappropriately
selected to represent the proposed new confederacy the former
in England, the other in France.

In the general gratification which was felt and expressed,
when intelligence of their arrest was received, the Administra
tion fully sympathized; but there were unsettled and controverted
questions attending the proceeding which, if England were
captious and pugnacious, would be likely to cause serious em
barrassment. The President, with whom I had an interview
immediately on receiving information that the emissaries were
captured and on board the San Jacinto, before consultation with
any other member of the Cabinet, discussed with me some of the
difficult points presented. His chief anxiety for his attention had
never been turned to admiralty law and naval captures was as
to the disposition of the prisoners, who, to use his own expression,
would be elephants on our hands, that we could not easily dispose
of. Public indignation was so overwhelming against the chief
conspirators, that he feared it would be difficult to prevent se
vere and exemplary punishment, which he always deprecated.

The subject came early before the Cabinet for consideration,
when it appeared that Captain Wilkes had acted on his own
responsibility in making the arrest, without instruction or sug
gestion from the Government. His official reports confirmed this.
These reports and the particulars of the capture had not then
been received. The information or rumor did not call for im
mediate action, nor until we had the official reports could any
be intelligently taken. There was joy and gratulation that the
messengers of mischief were arrested, but the question of the

The Capture and Release of Mason and Slidell 271

legality or illegality of the proceeding was but slightly alluded
to. Discussion of these topics and decision were postponed until
the whole facts were presented.

The San Jacinto, touching first at Hampton Roads, arrived
in New York on the 18th of November. H^the Trent with the
hostile emissaries and their despatches, been brought in as prize,
the case would have gone into the courts for adjudication, and,
from what has transpired, not unlikely thence have passed into
the region of diplomacy; but the Trent not having been cap
tured, the prisoners went summarily into the custody of the
United States Marshal, who by order of the Secretary of State
accompanied them in the San Jacinto to Boston, and on the
24th of November delivered them to Colonel Dimmick, keeper
of Fort Warren.

The Government in the mean time having come to no con
clusion, it devolved on me after receiving the reports of Captain
Wilkes, which had been studiously and carefully prepared, to
make the first public communication and take the first official
step, by acknowledging their reception, recognizing Ms act, and
either to congratulate or censure him on his achievement. Besides
this, I was under the necessity of communicating in my annual
report to the President, just then in preparation, a transaction of
this magnitude and importance connected with the navy and the
Navy Department, that he might at his discretion present it in
his message to Congress, about to convene, and to the country.
There was some diversity of opinion in the Cabinet on the
proceedings in the capture of these men and the consequences
which might grow out of it. There were, besides any irregularity
on the part of Captain Wilkes, points in regard to the obligations
of neutrals and the rights of belligerents not clearly defined,
which, in the excited condition of the public mind, were but
lightly discussed or considered by the press or people. It ms
with them sufficient that these messengers on an errand hostile
to the government were prisoners in our possession. They were
rebel conspirators by our own laws. By international law, after
foreign governments recognized the rebels as belligerents, they
were public enemies, as much so as if they had been military
officers in uniform that were being transported on this neutral

272 Civil War and Reconstruction

vessel, and they were on a mission more harmful. In what man
ner the English Ministry, notoriously in sympathy with the rebels,
would receive the intelligence and treat the proceedings, which
were in some respects irregular, was a matter of interest and
doubt. If the precedents and example which England had fur
nished under somewhat similar circumstances were regarded, she
could consistently take no serious exceptions. But the unfriendly
and almost unneutral course which Great Britain had pursued
toward our government, led the more cautious and considerate
to apprehend she would presume upon our domestic difficulties
and be exacting.

The Administration, until there were returns from England,
could not anticipate that she would avail herself of any irregu
larity to take a hostile attitude. If the naval officer for humane
reasons had omitted to make prize of the Trent, which vessel in
violation of neutral obligations was knowingly conveying public
enemies of the United States on a hostile mission, that was in
itself no cause of offense to Great Britain, though a technical
error might have been committed. Had our country been united
and this occurence taken place with Spain or some other foreign
power, England would not have been likely, without inquiry,
communication, or waiting for explanation, or ascertaining
whether the proceeding was authorized by our Government, to
have made instant preparation for war. But unfortunately our
country was then crippled, and Palmerston and Russell well knew
it. The Administration felt that we were in no condition to
embark in a foreign war, whatever might be the justice of our
cause.

The general indignation against England was so great at
the time, that a conflict with her would not have been unac
ceptable to many. Concession to her was denounced, and the
act of Wilkes applauded, regardless of consequences. The people,
if not less earnest than the Administration, were more impulsive
and headlong. The Government was criticised as slow and hesi
tating, while the people were determined. Men acting without
responsibility can be not only determined but boisterous. While
the Administration was deliberate and cautious in its movements,
it was as determined and firm as those who assailed it.

The Capture and Release of Mason and Slidell 273

Among the difficulties to be met was that of so responding to
Captain Wilkes, who was the hero of the day, as not to repress
the national enthusiasm. On the part of the Navy Department
it was especially important that no step should be taken which
would deter officers from a vigilant and energetic discharge of
their delicate and responsible duties. A long interval of peace
and a strict observance of the rights of neutrals, rigidly enforced,
had led many officers to doubt and distrust their legitimate
authority and their more comprehensive duty in war. They were
at first reluctant to exercise the unquestioned belligerent right
of search, detention, and capture of neutrals that violated neu
tral obligations, lest they might be held personally responsible.
Some very unfortunate mistakes were committed early in con
sequence of this reluctance, by which blockade-runners and ves
sels with contraband escaped. And it was felt to be impolitic,
while enjoining and stimulating officers to discharge their duty,
to reflect upon the audacity of Wilkes, who might have gone to
the other extreme. It was not difficult to compliment his intel
ligence, ability, decision, and firmness all of which qualities he
had displayed, whatever mistakes or errors of judgment were
committed. The unsettled and controverted questions were, by
his summary proceedings and quarter-deck adjudications, carried
beyond the courts to which matters of prize and naval capture
should be submitted. Nevertheless the Navy Department was
bound to take cognizance of the act, and to do this in such a
way as not to compromise the Government, nor to run counter
to public feeling and chill the prevailing patriotic sentiment,
nor to wound the feelings of an officer who in his zeal to render
a great service might have transcended his authority. On the
other hand, it would not do to sanction or give countenance to
the violation of neutral obligations in transporting known public
enemies under a professedly neutral flag. These were some of
the perplexing and embarrassing points to be met and mentioned
in my official letter to Captain Wilkes, and in my annual report,
in that disturbed and excited condition of our foreign and
domestic affairs.

Mason and Slidell were delivered over from the San Jacinto
to Fort Warren, in Boston harbor, as already mentioned, on the

274 Civil War and

24th of November; and the Administration having come to no
conclusion, I on the 30th addressed the following letter to
Captain Wilkes:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, Nov. 30, 186L
Captain CHARLES WILKES,
commanding U.S.S. San Jacinto, Boston.

DEAR SIR:

I congratulate you on your safe arrival, and especially
do I congratulate you on the great public service you have
rendered in the capture of the rebel commissioners Messrs.
Mason and Slidell, who have been conspicuous in the con
spiracy to dissolve the Union; and it is well known that,
when seized by you, they were on a mission hostile to the
Government and the country.

Your conduct in seizing these public enemies was marked
by intelligence, ability, decision, and firmness, and has the
emphatic approval of this Department. It is not necessary that
I should in this communication which is intended to be one
of congratulation to yourself, officers and crew express an
opinion on the course pursued in omitting to capture the
vessel which had these public enemies on board, further
than to say that the forbearance exercised in this instance
must not be permitted to constitute a precedent hereafter
for infractions of neutral obligations.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GIDEON WELLES.

At the same time I, in the following extract, presented the
subject, with the yearly transactions of the navy, in my annual
report to the President and the country, embracing the same
general views:

The prompt and decisive action of Captain Wilkes on
this occasion merited and received the emphatic approval of
the Department; and if a too generous forbearance was
exhibited by him in not capturing the vessel which had
these rebel enemies on board, it may, in view of the special
circumstances and of its patriotic motives, be excused; but
it must by no means be permitted to constitute a precedent

The Capture and Release of Mason and Slidett 275

hereafter for the treatment of any case of similar infraction
of neutral obligations by foreign vessels engaged in com
merce or the carrying trade.

The President did not deem it expedient to allude to this
subject in his message, not having received word from England,
but he personally expressed his cordial approval of my letter and
report, which he thought were well timed and would be satis
factory and unexceptionable to all concerned. There was in
neither the letter nor report any positive disapproval of the pro
ceedings of Captain Wilkes, unless the allusion to his forbearance
toward the Trent, which vessel had disregarded neutral obliga
tions, be deemed such. No mention was made of the neglect to
search for and seize despatches. Some there were who thought
there should have been no reserve in the thanks, and excepted to
the qualified congratulations to the officer. The House of Repre
sentatives, which convened three days after my letter was pub
lished, took occasion on the first day of the session, as already
mentioned, by a unanimous vote, to tender "the thanks of
Congress to Captain Wilkes for his arrest of the traitors SHddl
and Mason."

The rebels were convulsed with indignation and mortified
rage when they heard that the embassy from which so much was
expected had been intercepted, and that the commissioners
after escaping the blockade were prisoners. But their wrath was
soon assuaged in the belief that the capture of the conspirators
on an English vessel would prove a special dispensation in favor
of the rebellion. The sympathy of the English Ministry in behalf
of the secessionists was well understood, and the delay to recog
nize the Confederacy had been a vexation. Nor ware these ex
pectations without foundation, for on reception of the informa
tion that the belligerent emissaries had been taken from the
neutral steamer Trent, the English Government, on mere ex
parte rumor, commenced immediate preparations for war.
Troops^ arms, and munitions were ordered forthwith to Canada;
the British North American and West Indian squadrons were
at once increased, and by a royal proclamation the disposal of
arms and the shipment of saltpetre and sales of war supplies

276 Civil War and Reconstruction

were prohibited. Under these warlike demonstrations of the
Ministry, on the daim that there had been an affront to the
British flag, the act of Wilkes, which had abundant precedents
in British naval annals, was denounced as an outrage and insult.
The people of England were aroused by exaggerated misrepre
sentations to intense excitement, and a peremptory demand was
made by the English Government for the immediate and uncon
ditional delivery of these belligerent messengers, guilty of treason
to their country, and on a hostile errand against it, to the pro
tection of the English flag.

Under adverse circumstances, a compliance with this peremp
tory demand accompanied by warlike preparations was deemed
expedient. The Secretary of State, whose gratification that his
old senatorial associates had been intercepted on their hostile
errand was unsurpassed, had discredited every suggestion that
Great Britain would avail herself of any technical error of the
officer, and take serious exception to the proceeding. It was, he
claimed, in conformity with British ruling and British practice;
and if the commander of the San Jacinto had erred in permitting
the Trent to proceed, it was not for that government to take
advantage of his mistaken generosity by which they had been
benefited. But on the 21st of December Earl Russell s despatch
was received, and Mr. Seward felt that the country, struggling
to maintain the national existence, was not in a condition to
engage in a foreign war. It was an occasion when forbearance was
necessary. Although an ungracious task, it gave the Secretary of
State an opportunity to display that diplomatic ability, tact, and
skill for which he was eminently distinguished, in a despatch
which had the effect of conciliating public feeling, allaying
apprehended discontent, disappointing the rebels, and compelling
the English Ministry to refrain from further open belligerent
operations.

It is not the object of this article to discuss the merits of
any of the several questions, domestic and international, that
were involved in these proceedings. They are purposely avoided,
for they belong to the publicists. From the turn ultimately taken,
British precedents appear to have been reversed, and points of
international law which had been long in dispute are likely to

The Capture and Release of Mason and Slidell 277

be finally settled on American principles. My purpose lias been
to relate facts connected with governmental proceedings, some ol
which have not in all respects been correctly stated or rightly
understood. There were from the first honest differences In rela
tion to the rectitude and legality of the doings of the naval
officer, involving, as already mentioned, belligerent rights and
neutral obligations.

The Trent, a neutral vessel, had taken on board and was
conveying messengers or commissioners, whom its captain and
all others knew to be on an errand hostile to the United States.
This was considered such an infraction of neutral obligations
as rendered the Trent liable to seizure. It was for the courts to
decide whether the vessel engaged in this unfriendly act, in
derogation of neutrality, was or was not good prize, and subject
to condemnation, or whether the officer who stopped and
searched her and seized the messengers of evil had probable
cause to justify his act. Whether Captain Wilkes was justifiable
at this stage of the proceedings in arresting these pretended
ambassadors of an organization which had no legal existence
among nations, and taking upon himself the right to adjudicate
the question, and not only to adjudicate but the executive
power to relinquish the prize, were matters that belonged
to the courts, publicists, and other branches of the govern
ment, rather than the Navy Department. In the then con
dition of affairs, foreign and domestic, and especially the
state of public feeling in the United States, I did not, in my
letter of congratulation, deem it advisable to "express an opinion
on the course pursued in omitting to capture the vessel/* and I
so explicitly and in direct but mild and considerate terms
stated; but that such an infraction of neutral obligations as that
committed by the Trent, and which Captain Wilkes had per
mitted to pass unpunished, must not be made a precedent in
future proceedings.

When the emissaries were delivered over to the custody of
the marshal, and were transferred to Fort Warren, the disposi
tion of the prisoners became a political and diplomatic rather
than a naval question. The capture was never adjudicated; the
whole subject passed over the courts into the region of diplomacy.

278 Civil War and Reconstruction

Had the English Ministry, with customary courtesy, waited to
ascertain whether the prisoners were arrested by order of our
Government, or had they taken no harsh exceptions to what in
its worst form was but an error of judgment on the part of
an officer viligant to discharge his duty, and left these rebel
conspirators, who were citizens of the United States, with the
Government of the United States, Mason and Slidell would, as
President Lincoln remarked in his first interview with me on
the day when information of the arrest was received, have been
indeed elephants on our hands. But the peremptory demand for
their restoration to the protection of Great Britain, accompanied
with warlike demonstrations, to rescue them from amenability
to the violated laws of their country, relieved, even if it humili
ated us, of the "elephants." The surrender of the prisoners to
the imperious demands of England, and the adroit despatch
of the Secretary of State, preserved peace, which at the time was
with us a national necessity. Of the strict analogy or parallel
between British impressment of American seamen on board of
American vessels, whom England for years forced into her serv
ice, and compelled under the lash to fight the battles of England,
and the arrest by an American officer of American criminals on a
hostile errand against our government, embarked on a professed
neutral vessel, it is not necessary in this place to make any ex
tended remarks. It may be said, however, that the hundreds of
American seamen impressed by England during a long series of
years, were not public enemies of that country on a hostile mis
sion against Great Britain. They were Americans, our country
men, peacably employed in their profession, constituting parts,
and often essential parts, of the crews of the vessels from which
they were torn. It is not required to say how unlike to the case
of these humble American seamen, serving for wages on an
American vessed, was that of Mason and Slidell, insurgents but
public belligerent enemies, who had been officially and osten
tatiously entertained by the English consul at Havana, and were,
made prisoners by Wilkes, being transported in their assumed
official capacity on board the English neutral steamer Trent.
The Queen, in her proclamation of neutrality, had warned her
"loving subjects" against "carrying officers, soldiers, despatches,

The Capture and Release of Mason and Slidell 279

arms/ etc., and assured them if they did so they would "incur
and be liable to the several penalties and consequences by the
said [English] statutes or by the law of nations."

The English government and people were not insensible to
the facts when presented, and felt rebuked by the contrast be
tween the action of the two governments. The result was, the
mission of these conspirators, undertaken with such high pre
tensions, was rendered abortive and fruitless. Official neglect,
and, as they claimed, indifference and discourtesy attended them.
The Ministry, after what had transpired, could not, whatever
were their sympathies with the rebels, foster these men, or receive
and treat them as ambassadors from a legitimate government.
They therefore accomplished nothing at the courts by which
they strove to be recognized, but were slighted and avoided.
Each lingered a suppliant near the government to which he had
been sent, unrecognized and disregarded.

When the rebellion was suppressed they found themselves
homeless and aliens. Mason left England and had a vagabond
residence of two or three years in Canada. Some time after the
war closed he came quietly and humbly to Virginia, a broken-
down old man, and finding his once pleasant home in the
valley of the Shenandoah desolated by war, he retired to the
vicinity of Alexandria, where he died an obscure and miserable
death in April, 1871.

Slidell, disappointed, worn down and mortified, sought from
President Johnson pardon and safe passport to revisit this
country, but was told he could have no special privileges, and if
he returned he must not expect exemption above others. He
therefore spent the rest of his days in exile, passing the remnant
of a vicious and intriguing career in reading French fictions, and
finally died in London in July, 1871-three months after his
associate, Mason, had been entombed.

(Continued

The themes of the greatness of Abra
ham Lincoln and the dangers of govern
mental centralization run through the en
tire series. WeEes s assertions stood
the test of time, dispelling mistaken no
tions some of which have persisted to
this day about Lincoln s procedure and
policy during the war and Reconstruction.

Gideon Welles, a member of Lincoln s
Civil War Cabinet and one of his closest
supporters, is, perhaps, best known for
his three-volume diary published at the
turn of the century. However, these es
says which appeared long before form an
important supplement to the diary and
have become an important source for the
history of the Civil War. Here, for the
first time, they have been collected into
one book.

ALBERT MORDELL is widely known
as an editor, compiler, and author. The
editor of Literary Reviews and Essays of
Henry James, Mr. Mordeil has also edited
The Autocrat s Miscellanies, reviews and
essays by Oliver Wendell Holmes, and
compiled The World of Haldeman-Julius,
a selection of H-J s best writings. He has
edited many articles by Lafcadio Hearn,
which he was the first to collect. He is
the author of The Erotic Motive in Liter
ature and Quaker Militant: John Green-
leaf Whittier,

TWAYNE PUBLISHERS

New York 3

00<

5m

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